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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Failure to settle compensatory damages claim for policy limit, despite carve-out for punitive damages claim, amounts to bad-faith under totality of the circumstances standard.

Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, Appellant v. Rebecca L. Heikka, Appellee, Fla. 4th DCA, Nos. 4D2022-2969 and 4D2023-1916, Nov. 6, 2024; Consolidated Appeals from Circuit Court for 17th Judicial Cir., Broward Co., Judge C.A. Rodriguez, Case No. CACE 07-008440

December 1, 2024

by Seth B. Altman

In the first phase of these consolidated appeals, Safeco appealed the final judgment following a directed verdict in Heikka’s favor in her bad-faith claim against Safeco. 

Heikka had been a passenger on a motorcycle that was rear-ended by Safeco’s insured, who was later convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene of an accident. Heikka suffered severe injuries. 

Safeco’s insured had a policy with a $25,000 limit for bodily injury. Prior to Heikka filing a lawsuit, her attorney and Safeco’s adjuster had been in communication regarding tender of the policy limit and a settlement release. The adjuster sent a release of all claims and a check for $25,000 to plaintiff’s counsel. However, plaintiff’s counsel wanted the release to make an exception for punitive damages or claims against anyone else; therefore, Heikka could not accept the release by Safeco without the requested carve-outs/exceptions as the insured’s policy did not cover punitive damages, and any uninsured or underinsured motorist claim would have been brought against Heikka’s own insurer and not against Safeco. Heikka’s attorney returned the release with the requested revisions. According to Heikka’s attorney, Safeco agreed to his changes. Safeco denied ever receiving the release. 

Heikka’s attorney cashed the check and later filed suit against Safeco for compensatory damages as a predicate to amending to seek punitive damages. Safeco retained counsel for the insured, who advised the insured of his exposure and options. Safeco, believing Heikka agreed to the original release, moved to enforce settlement. In turn, Heikka’s attorney demanded his version of the release—which excluded punitive damages and any other parties—be honored per the prior agreement. He also warned, if his amended release was not accepted, a bad-faith suit would be filed. 

Safeco sought to enforce its release in a declaratory action. The court found no settlement as there was no meeting of the minds, and Heikka was allowed to proceed on both compensatory and punitive damages. 

At trial, the jury returned a verdict of $1,169,292.83 in compensatory damages but did not award punitive damages. Heikka then moved to amend her complaint to add statutory and common law bad-faith claims. 

A trial on the bad-faith claim then ensued, and a directed verdict was entered in favor of Heikka.

On appeal, Safeco argued it could not settle with a carve-out and leave punitive damages open against the insured because its policy did not cover punitive damages. The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with Safeco under the “totality of circumstances” standard. The obligation to settle in good faith requires an insurer to do more than just initiate settlement discussions. Had Safeco analyzed their insured’s potential exposure to a punitive damage claim versus the exposure on a compensatory damage claim and put itself in the shoes of its insured, it would have agreed to settle with the carve-out. The District Court concluded, “Safeco failed to fulfill its duties to act in good faith in accordance with Boston Old Colony [Insurance Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980)] when it refused Heikka’s offer to settle her compensatory damages claim for the policy limits, subject to a carve-out for punitive damages. In doing so, Safeco increased the exposure of its insured, as he faced the possibility of both an excess compensatory damages judgment and punitive damages judgment against him.” The directed verdict and judgment were affirmed.

In the second phase of these consolidated appeals, Safeco also appealed the denial of its disqualification motion and the subsequent granting of Heikka’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 

Safeco had moved to disqualify Judge Rodriguez following the directed verdict based on the judge’s inappropriate conduct during the trial. The trial court denied the motion and then awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Heikka’s attorneys. 

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that Safeco’s motion should have been granted and then reversed the attorney’s fees and costs judgment entered after the erroneous denial of the motion to disqualify. Although Judge Rodriguez engaged in certain conduct which required disqualification, the District Court ruled that reversal of the directed verdict itself was not required. It reviewed the verdict de novo, removing any perceived bias/taint from Judge Rodriguez, and upheld the directed verdict. However, any subsequent proceedings, such as the motion for attorney’s fees and costs, required assignment of a new judge. 

The court also noted that Judge Rodriguez’s assessment of attorney’s fees and costs for the underlying tort litigation was error as a matter of law as Sec. 624.155 does not provide for a plaintiff to recover its own fees for prosecution of the tort suit. Therefore, Judge Rodriguez’s award of $825,000 in fees/costs was reversed, and the court directed a successor judge be appointed to hear all subsequent issues, including the attorney’s fees and costs, but not for the underlying tort litigation. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – December 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.