.

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Failure to settle compensatory damages claim for policy limit, despite carve-out for punitive damages claim, amounts to bad-faith under totality of the circumstances standard.

Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, Appellant v. Rebecca L. Heikka, Appellee, Fla. 4th DCA, Nos. 4D2022-2969 and 4D2023-1916, Nov. 6, 2024; Consolidated Appeals from Circuit Court for 17th Judicial Cir., Broward Co., Judge C.A. Rodriguez, Case No. CACE 07-008440

December 1, 2024

by Seth B. Altman

In the first phase of these consolidated appeals, Safeco appealed the final judgment following a directed verdict in Heikka’s favor in her bad-faith claim against Safeco. 

Heikka had been a passenger on a motorcycle that was rear-ended by Safeco’s insured, who was later convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene of an accident. Heikka suffered severe injuries. 

Safeco’s insured had a policy with a $25,000 limit for bodily injury. Prior to Heikka filing a lawsuit, her attorney and Safeco’s adjuster had been in communication regarding tender of the policy limit and a settlement release. The adjuster sent a release of all claims and a check for $25,000 to plaintiff’s counsel. However, plaintiff’s counsel wanted the release to make an exception for punitive damages or claims against anyone else; therefore, Heikka could not accept the release by Safeco without the requested carve-outs/exceptions as the insured’s policy did not cover punitive damages, and any uninsured or underinsured motorist claim would have been brought against Heikka’s own insurer and not against Safeco. Heikka’s attorney returned the release with the requested revisions. According to Heikka’s attorney, Safeco agreed to his changes. Safeco denied ever receiving the release. 

Heikka’s attorney cashed the check and later filed suit against Safeco for compensatory damages as a predicate to amending to seek punitive damages. Safeco retained counsel for the insured, who advised the insured of his exposure and options. Safeco, believing Heikka agreed to the original release, moved to enforce settlement. In turn, Heikka’s attorney demanded his version of the release—which excluded punitive damages and any other parties—be honored per the prior agreement. He also warned, if his amended release was not accepted, a bad-faith suit would be filed. 

Safeco sought to enforce its release in a declaratory action. The court found no settlement as there was no meeting of the minds, and Heikka was allowed to proceed on both compensatory and punitive damages. 

At trial, the jury returned a verdict of $1,169,292.83 in compensatory damages but did not award punitive damages. Heikka then moved to amend her complaint to add statutory and common law bad-faith claims. 

A trial on the bad-faith claim then ensued, and a directed verdict was entered in favor of Heikka.

On appeal, Safeco argued it could not settle with a carve-out and leave punitive damages open against the insured because its policy did not cover punitive damages. The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with Safeco under the “totality of circumstances” standard. The obligation to settle in good faith requires an insurer to do more than just initiate settlement discussions. Had Safeco analyzed their insured’s potential exposure to a punitive damage claim versus the exposure on a compensatory damage claim and put itself in the shoes of its insured, it would have agreed to settle with the carve-out. The District Court concluded, “Safeco failed to fulfill its duties to act in good faith in accordance with Boston Old Colony [Insurance Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980)] when it refused Heikka’s offer to settle her compensatory damages claim for the policy limits, subject to a carve-out for punitive damages. In doing so, Safeco increased the exposure of its insured, as he faced the possibility of both an excess compensatory damages judgment and punitive damages judgment against him.” The directed verdict and judgment were affirmed.

In the second phase of these consolidated appeals, Safeco also appealed the denial of its disqualification motion and the subsequent granting of Heikka’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 

Safeco had moved to disqualify Judge Rodriguez following the directed verdict based on the judge’s inappropriate conduct during the trial. The trial court denied the motion and then awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Heikka’s attorneys. 

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that Safeco’s motion should have been granted and then reversed the attorney’s fees and costs judgment entered after the erroneous denial of the motion to disqualify. Although Judge Rodriguez engaged in certain conduct which required disqualification, the District Court ruled that reversal of the directed verdict itself was not required. It reviewed the verdict de novo, removing any perceived bias/taint from Judge Rodriguez, and upheld the directed verdict. However, any subsequent proceedings, such as the motion for attorney’s fees and costs, required assignment of a new judge. 

The court also noted that Judge Rodriguez’s assessment of attorney’s fees and costs for the underlying tort litigation was error as a matter of law as Sec. 624.155 does not provide for a plaintiff to recover its own fees for prosecution of the tort suit. Therefore, Judge Rodriguez’s award of $825,000 in fees/costs was reversed, and the court directed a successor judge be appointed to hear all subsequent issues, including the attorney’s fees and costs, but not for the underlying tort litigation. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – December 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.