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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Court Clarifies Efficient Proximate Cause Rule: Covered Peril Must Be the Dominant Cause

February 24, 2026

by Alec N. DelConte

A scenario all too familiar in the world of property insurance claims arises when an insured seeks a full roof replacement after their roof is beyond its useful life. The roof is visibly deteriorated, and a minor wind event becomes the proverbial “straw that breaks the camel’s back.” This raises a central coverage question: was the loss caused by a covered peril—wind—mandating payment for a new roof? Or, was the loss caused by excluded conditions—deterioration and wear and tear—which insurance does not cover? The answer to this question often determines whether the insurer owes tens of thousands of dollars, or nothing at all.

Recently, in Stella Property Development and Event Production, LLC v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2026 WL 221489 (W.D. Pa. 2026), the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania addressed three issues that are often central to these types of claims:  Pennsylvania’s “causation” analysis, the scope of ensuing loss clauses, and the evidentiary threshold for maintaining statutory bad faith claims.

Following a windstorm, Stella submitted an insurance claim, alleging extensive roof damage. Auto-Owners had issued Stella a commercial property policy, covering a historic building formerly used as a church. As typical, the policy insured against “direct physical loss or damage” to the structure subject to various exclusions.

After multiple inspections, Auto-Owners concluded that the roof had not been damaged by a single wind event, but rather, was in a deteriorated state due to age, decay, and wear and tear. Accordingly, Auto-Owners denied coverage pursuant to the policy’s wear and tear and maintenance exclusions. Stella filed suit, asserting claims for breach of contract and statutory bad faith. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment, prompting a 32-page Memorandum Opinion.

 

Causation

The “entire premise” of Stella’s argument was that, even if the roof manifested wear and tear, the cited exclusions did not bar coverage under Pennsylvania’s “efficient proximate cause” rule. However, Stella also invoked what other jurisdictions refer to as the “concurrent causation” doctrine. Accordingly, prior to addressing Stella’s argument, the District Court clarified the difference between these theories.

“Efficient proximate cause” is framed in causal sequence, and asks which peril was the “triggering” cause. It requires coverage where a covered cause of loss “sets into motion the chain of events” culminating in the loss, even if excluded causes contributed along the way.

“Concurrent causation” is applied where covered and excluded perils operate as independent, concurrent causes of the same loss. It permits coverage so long as the covered peril is a “concurrent proximate cause of the injuries.”

The District Court then explained, regardless of labels, “courts often collapse the analysis into a single inquiry focused on identifying the proximate or predominant cause of the loss.”

Looking to Trexler Lumber Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh for guidance, the District Court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine in a predominant-cause sense. Under that framework, Stella’s claim was not defeated merely because excluded perils contributed to the loss, but Stella was required to adduce evidence that the covered peril was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the damage, as opposed to merely a remote or incidental cause.

 

Ensuing Loss Clauses

The policy’s wear and tear and maintenance exclusions each contained ensuing loss provisions, albeit with slightly different wording. Despite the differing language, the District Court’s interpretation was consistent: the ensuing loss clauses applied only where the excluded condition itself “results in” a new, distinct covered peril. While inadequate maintenance and/or wear and tear may affect how a roof performs during a windstorm, neither “results in” a windstorm.

Accordingly, the District Court made clear that ensuing loss clauses are to be strictly construed, and do not automatically trigger coverage when excluded conditions contribute to the loss. Rather, coverage is only restored when the excluded conditions actually give rise to a separate covered peril.

 

Bad Faith Claim

Finally, because Auto-Owners’ coverage determination was grounded in a thorough investigation and well-supported expert opinions, Stella’s bad faith claim failed as a matter of law, and was dismissed.

In coming to its coverage decision, Auto-Owners’ relied on detailed investigative materials, multiple inspections, and expert assessments. Those findings all attributed the roof damage to decay, wear and tear, and inadequate maintenance, thereby providing Auto-Owners with an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that a covered windstorm was not the dominant and efficient cause of the loss.

 

Takeaway

This decision provides helpful framework as to how Pennsylvania courts are likely to assess causation in these claims, regardless of labels. Insurers should take heed of this as they adjust claims that involve multiple perils.


Legal Updates for Insurance Services - February 24, 2026, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please contact MeDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.