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Alec is a member of the Professional Liability Department and focuses his practice on representing insurers in both pre-litigation consultation and the defense of first-party and bad faith lawsuits.

When engaged prior to litigation, Alec is prepared to provide insurers legal guidance and support during the claim handling process in order to ensure appropriate and effective outcomes. He has experience managing SIU investigations, conducting examinations under oath, and assisting with coverage analyses and opinions. In the event that litigation ensues, Alec is experienced in defending insurance companies in lawsuits involving breach of contract, bad faith, and a variety of other extra-contractual claims in both Pennsylvania and federal courts.

Alec earned his Juris Doctor, cum laude, from Delaware Law School in 2021. Throughout law school, Alec was recognized on the Dean's List and served as a Bluebook Editor for the Widener Law Review. In his final year, Alec served in the chambers of the Honorable Jack A. Panella of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, where he engaged in the appellate resolution of civil matters. 
 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2021)
    • Widener University (B.A., 2016)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2024
    • Chester County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Condominium Conundrum (Acts, Liability, & HO6 and HOA master policies), Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (PAMIC), Lancaster, PA, April 7-8, 2026
    • Untying Tangled Titles – How Property Deed Fraud Drives Costs and Indemnity, International Association of Special Investigation Units (IASIU) 2025 Fraud Conference, Denver, CO, August 27, 2025
    • Epidurals, Facets and Ablations: Investigating Common Interventional Pain Management Procedures, Pennsylvania Auto Crime Investigators Association (PACIA), Philadelphia, PA, October 4, 2024
    • Untying Tangled Titles – How Property Insurance Drives Fraud, 2024 Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority (IFPA) Conference, Hershey, PA, April 12, 2024

Thought Leadership

The Legal Intelligencer

Efficient Proximate Cause Rule Clarified: Coverage Hinges on the Dominant Peril

April 9, 2026

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Court Clarifies Efficient Proximate Cause Rule: Covered Peril Must Be the Dominant Cause

February 24, 2026

A scenario all too familiar in the world of property insurance claims arises when an insured seeks a full roof replacement after their roof is beyond its useful life. The roof is visibly deteriorated, and a minor wind event becomes the proverbial “straw that breaks the camel’s back.” This raises a central coverage question: was the loss caused by a covered peril—wind—mandating payment for a new roof? Or, was the loss caused by excluded conditions—deterioration and wear and tear—which insurance does not cover? The answer to this question often determines whether the insurer owes tens of thousands of dollars, or nothing at all. Recently, in Stella Property Development and Event Production, LLC v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2026 WL 221489 (W.D. Pa. 2026), the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania addressed three issues that are often central to these types of claims:  Pennsylvania’s “causation” analysis, the scope of ensuing loss clauses, and the evidentiary threshold for maintaining statutory bad faith claims. Following a windstorm, Stella submitted an insurance claim, alleging extensive roof damage. Auto-Owners had issued Stella a commercial property policy, covering a historic building formerly used as a church. As typical, the policy insured against “direct physical loss or damage” to the structure subject to various exclusions. After multiple inspections, Auto-Owners concluded that the roof had not been damaged by a single wind event, but rather, was in a deteriorated state due to age, decay, and wear and tear. Accordingly, Auto-Owners denied coverage pursuant to the policy’s wear and tear and maintenance exclusions. Stella filed suit, asserting claims for breach of contract and statutory bad faith. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment, prompting a 32-page Memorandum Opinion.   Causation The “entire premise” of Stella’s argument was that, even if the roof manifested wear and tear, the cited exclusions did not bar coverage under Pennsylvania’s “efficient proximate cause” rule. However, Stella also invoked what other jurisdictions refer to as the “concurrent causation” doctrine. Accordingly, prior to addressing Stella’s argument, the District Court clarified the difference between these theories. “Efficient proximate cause” is framed in causal sequence, and asks which peril was the “triggering” cause. It requires coverage where a covered cause of loss “sets into motion the chain of events” culminating in the loss, even if excluded causes contributed along the way. “Concurrent causation” is applied where covered and excluded perils operate as independent, concurrent causes of the same loss. It permits coverage so long as the covered peril is a “concurrent proximate cause of the injuries.” The District Court then explained, regardless of labels, “courts often collapse the analysis into a single inquiry focused on identifying the proximate or predominant cause of the loss.” Looking to Trexler Lumber Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh for guidance, the District Court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine in a predominant-cause sense. Under that framework, Stella’s claim was not defeated merely because excluded perils contributed to the loss, but Stella was required to adduce evidence that the covered peril was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the damage, as opposed to merely a remote or incidental cause.   Ensuing Loss Clauses The policy’s wear and tear and maintenance exclusions each contained ensuing loss provisions, albeit with slightly different wording. Despite the differing language, the District Court’s interpretation was consistent: the ensuing loss clauses applied only where the excluded condition itself “results in” a new, distinct covered peril. While inadequate maintenance and/or wear and tear may affect how a roof performs during a windstorm, neither “results in” a windstorm. Accordingly, the District Court made clear that ensuing loss clauses are to be strictly construed, and do not automatically trigger coverage when excluded conditions contribute to the loss. Rather, coverage is only restored when the excluded conditions actually give rise to a separate covered peril.   Bad Faith Claim Finally, because Auto-Owners’ coverage determination was grounded in a thorough investigation and well-supported expert opinions, Stella’s bad faith claim failed as a matter of law, and was dismissed. In coming to its coverage decision, Auto-Owners’ relied on detailed investigative materials, multiple inspections, and expert assessments. Those findings all attributed the roof damage to decay, wear and tear, and inadequate maintenance, thereby providing Auto-Owners with an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that a covered windstorm was not the dominant and efficient cause of the loss.   Takeaway This decision provides helpful framework as to how Pennsylvania courts are likely to assess causation in these claims, regardless of labels. Insurers should take heed of this as they adjust claims that involve multiple perils. Legal Updates for Insurance Services - February 24, 2026, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please contact MeDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Events

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.