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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

The Expansive Scope of Liability Under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law Is Defensible by Requiring Plaintiffs to Meet Their Burden

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – August 2024

August 1, 2024

The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) provides consumers with broad protection from fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices, and it authorizes private causes of action to recover actual damages along with attorneys fees and treble damages. The 1996 amendment of this law widened the scope of actionable conduct under the “catchall” provision to include “deceptive conduct” that creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding, as a prohibited practice. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi).

The courts in Pennsylvania have liberally interpreted deceptive or unfair conduct to mean anything that “has the capacity or tendency to deceive, and neither the intention to deceive nor actual deception must be proved; rather it need only be shown that the acts and practices are capable of being interpreted in a misleading way.” Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden Gate National Senior Care, LLC, 194 A.3d 1010, 1023 (Pa. 2018). Recently, the Supreme Court held that the UTPCPL imposes “strict liability on commercial vendors who engage in conduct that has the potential to deceive and which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.” Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 245 A.3d 637, 649 (Pa. 2021). 

On April 25, 2024, the Supreme Court further determined that the “availability of up to treble damages under [UTPCPL] is not dependent upon other damages to which the plaintiff is also entitled,” such that a court must consider awarding treble damages even if punitive damages are separately granted on other claims. Dwyer v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 313 A.3d 969, 982 (Pa. 2024).

Given the expansive scope of potential liability and damages under the UTPCPL faced by any business that provides goods and services to consumers, it is critical that defendants encountering such claims avail themselves of the defenses that can be asserted. A recent court case illustrates important elements of a plaintiff’s burden of proof under the UTPCPL that need to be emphasized in these cases.

In McMahon v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., -- F.Supp.3d --, 2024 WL 1932319 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2024), the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania rejected claims brought under several sections of the UTPCPL and the catchall provision. In that case, the plaintiffs purchased meals at Chipotle restaurants and paid with cash, but Chipotle was unable to provide exact change for the purchases due to a nationwide coin shortage. The plaintiffs accepted the return of less than the full amount of change due, but then brought suit claiming violations of the UTPCPL. In asserting counts under the statute’s catchall and other provisions, the plaintiffs claimed that Chipotle advertised prices of goods with the intent not to sell them as advertised, provided a receipt for purchases that indicated exact change was given when it was not, and charged a higher price than the cost of the order. 

The McMahon court rejected the plaintiffs' claims, finding that they could not prove that Chipotle’s alleged false representations, deceived them or affected their purchasing decision, and the plaintiffs failed to show that they suffered harm as a result of justifiably relying on a false representation. In emphasizing the requirements for establishing a UTPCPL claim under the catchall provision, the District Court acknowledged the law imposes strict liability, but it still requires a plaintiff to establish justifiable reliance based on a defendant’s “direct recommendation to their detriment.” 2024 WL 1932319 at * 9, citing Gregg, 245 A.3d at 645. The court in McMahon found the plaintiffs did not rely on Chipotle’s alleged false representations when purchasing food at the restaurant in granting summary judgment on the UTPCPL claims. 

The federal court decision in McMahon is consistent with Pennsylvania state court rulings that, “[e]ven with the broadening of the applicability of the catchall provision, in order to prevail on such a cause of action, the UTPCPL plaintiff must still prove justifiable reliance and causation….” Kirwin v. Sussman Automotive, 149 A.3d 333, 336 (Pa. Super. 2016); Gregg, 245 A.3d at 646 (“Regardless of which unfair method of competition a plaintiff challenges in a private cause of action, ... Section 201-9.2 [of the UTPCPL] requires the plaintiff to establish justifiable reliance.”).

Defendants facing claims brought under the expansive catchall provision of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law maintain a viable defense to liability based on the plaintiff’s burden of proving the elements of such a cause of action, particularly the necessity of proving both conduct that is deceptive and which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding, and justifiably reliance on such conduct that causes harm. The importance of challenging the plaintiff’s factual assertions of such claims is critical to avoiding the imposition of liability and damages under the UTPCPL. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.