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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Delaware Superior Court Decision Imparts Lessons for Insurance Agents and Brokers Regarding Policy Exclusions and Language

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – November 2024

November 1, 2024

In June 2024, the Delaware Superior Court granted a motion for summary judgment, requiring an insurance company to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in regard to underlying litigation. In doing so, the court issued a coverage decision demonstrating the importance that a policy be clear and unambiguous to avoid the contract language being construed against the insurance company. The decision also highlights the need for agents and brokers to consider the industry their clients are in and the services they offer in order to understand the reasonable expectations of those insurers when providing insurance liability policies.

In Noble Eagle Sales, LLC v. Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company, et al., 2024 WL 2830922 (Del. Super. Ct. 2024), Noble Eagle, the insured, operated a shooting range where a patron used one of its guns to commit suicide. The decedent’s family and estate subsequently sued Noble Eagle, which had requested coverage for the lawsuit under their insurance policy. The insurance company denied coverage, citing an exclusion within the policy. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, seeking a decision from the court on whether coverage applied.

The argument centered on an exclusion found within the policy excluding coverage for bodily injuries caused by sporting equipment rented out by Noble Eagle. Noble Eagle argued that the exclusion did not clearly define sporting equipment, therefore, making the exclusion ambiguous as to whether a firearm fell within the exclusion. The insurance company argued the exclusion’s plain meaning clearly conveyed what was excluded and, thus, was not ambiguous and that without any ambiguity, the exclusion must be applied in this case. 

The court determined that the term “sporting equipment” was ambiguous and the exclusion could not be enforced in this case. In doing so, the court looked to the standard for insurance contract interpretation. 

The “interpretation of a contract must rely on a reading of all pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on any single passage in isolation.” Id. citing O’Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. 2001). Clear and unambiguous contract terms are given their plain meaning. Id. citing Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992). Ambiguity exists when the contract term is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more meanings. Id. “When ambiguity does exist, ‘the language of an insurance contract [must] be construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’” Id. In order to avoid its duty to defend its insured, an insurer must demonstrate that the allegations of the complaint are solely and entirely within specific and unambiguous exclusions from coverage. Id. citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co., 1992 WL 22690, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).

The court first addressed whether the decedent had rented the firearm. They determined the transaction unquestionably fit into the definition of “rented out” and that Noble Eagle’s decision to not charge the decedent’s estate for the rental does not transform the transaction. 

In turning to the definition of “sporting equipment” in the exclusion, the court looked to the definitions in the policy, and “sporting equipment” was not defined. Noble Eagle argued that reasonable minds could differ as to when a firearm qualifies as “sporting equipment.” The insurance company argued Noble Eagle only rented out “guns, protective eyewear, and earplugs” and that if firearms are not “sporting equipment,” the exclusion is meaningless.

The court determined that the core question it must answer hinged on whether firearms are always, definitionally, sporting equipment. The court applied Delaware decisional law and determined the exclusion could only be enforced if the sole reasonable interpretation of “sporting equipment” encompassed all of the firearms Noble Eagle rented out, regardless of the purpose for which the customer rents the firearm. The court then looked to the Merriam-Webster definition of firearm and sporting equipment. Turning to the policy language, the court determined there was more than one reasonable interpretation as to whether sporting equipment always included firearms. 

The court cannot determine from the plain language of the policy where to draw the line between firearms that can be sporting equipment, and firearms that are always sporting equipment. MUSIC, as the insurer, stood as the party best positioned to make that delineation when drafting the Policy. MUSIC’s failure to do so renders the Rental Exclusion’s application to firearm rentals ambiguous.

Id. The court further found ambiguity regarding what shooting activities would be considered sports under the policy, as firearms could be rented for either shooting practice or testing out a firearm for purchase, among others.

In finding ambiguity, the court construed the exclusion most strongly against the insurance company. The court was unable to find that all firearms were unequivocally and definitionally “sporting equipment.” According to the court, the insurance company failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the exclusion barred coverage in this case. Further, the court found the insurance company was aware, at the time of issuing the policy, that Noble Eagle rented firearms. Therefore, Noble Eagle had a reasonable expectation, as a shooting range that paid $14,000 for a liability policy, that they would have coverage in place for liability involving firearms. The court also took into consideration that the policy did define some definition of “sporting equipment,” as it explicitly referenced golf and tennis equipment. Finally, the court noted that the litigation highlighted the benefit to the insurance company of the ambiguity in the policy exclusion and the requirement under Delaware law to construe the policy against the insurer.

This case demonstrates the importance that a policy—including its exclusions—be clear and unambiguous. Further, agents and brokers must take into consideration the type of business and services being provided by an insurer, the reasonable expectations of those insurers in obtaining liability policies, and the implications of any potential exclusions that may apply.  


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.