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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Delaware Superior Court Decision Imparts Lessons for Insurance Agents and Brokers Regarding Policy Exclusions and Language

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – November 2024

November 1, 2024

In June 2024, the Delaware Superior Court granted a motion for summary judgment, requiring an insurance company to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in regard to underlying litigation. In doing so, the court issued a coverage decision demonstrating the importance that a policy be clear and unambiguous to avoid the contract language being construed against the insurance company. The decision also highlights the need for agents and brokers to consider the industry their clients are in and the services they offer in order to understand the reasonable expectations of those insurers when providing insurance liability policies.

In Noble Eagle Sales, LLC v. Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company, et al., 2024 WL 2830922 (Del. Super. Ct. 2024), Noble Eagle, the insured, operated a shooting range where a patron used one of its guns to commit suicide. The decedent’s family and estate subsequently sued Noble Eagle, which had requested coverage for the lawsuit under their insurance policy. The insurance company denied coverage, citing an exclusion within the policy. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, seeking a decision from the court on whether coverage applied.

The argument centered on an exclusion found within the policy excluding coverage for bodily injuries caused by sporting equipment rented out by Noble Eagle. Noble Eagle argued that the exclusion did not clearly define sporting equipment, therefore, making the exclusion ambiguous as to whether a firearm fell within the exclusion. The insurance company argued the exclusion’s plain meaning clearly conveyed what was excluded and, thus, was not ambiguous and that without any ambiguity, the exclusion must be applied in this case. 

The court determined that the term “sporting equipment” was ambiguous and the exclusion could not be enforced in this case. In doing so, the court looked to the standard for insurance contract interpretation. 

The “interpretation of a contract must rely on a reading of all pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on any single passage in isolation.” Id. citing O’Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. 2001). Clear and unambiguous contract terms are given their plain meaning. Id. citing Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992). Ambiguity exists when the contract term is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more meanings. Id. “When ambiguity does exist, ‘the language of an insurance contract [must] be construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’” Id. In order to avoid its duty to defend its insured, an insurer must demonstrate that the allegations of the complaint are solely and entirely within specific and unambiguous exclusions from coverage. Id. citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co., 1992 WL 22690, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).

The court first addressed whether the decedent had rented the firearm. They determined the transaction unquestionably fit into the definition of “rented out” and that Noble Eagle’s decision to not charge the decedent’s estate for the rental does not transform the transaction. 

In turning to the definition of “sporting equipment” in the exclusion, the court looked to the definitions in the policy, and “sporting equipment” was not defined. Noble Eagle argued that reasonable minds could differ as to when a firearm qualifies as “sporting equipment.” The insurance company argued Noble Eagle only rented out “guns, protective eyewear, and earplugs” and that if firearms are not “sporting equipment,” the exclusion is meaningless.

The court determined that the core question it must answer hinged on whether firearms are always, definitionally, sporting equipment. The court applied Delaware decisional law and determined the exclusion could only be enforced if the sole reasonable interpretation of “sporting equipment” encompassed all of the firearms Noble Eagle rented out, regardless of the purpose for which the customer rents the firearm. The court then looked to the Merriam-Webster definition of firearm and sporting equipment. Turning to the policy language, the court determined there was more than one reasonable interpretation as to whether sporting equipment always included firearms. 

The court cannot determine from the plain language of the policy where to draw the line between firearms that can be sporting equipment, and firearms that are always sporting equipment. MUSIC, as the insurer, stood as the party best positioned to make that delineation when drafting the Policy. MUSIC’s failure to do so renders the Rental Exclusion’s application to firearm rentals ambiguous.

Id. The court further found ambiguity regarding what shooting activities would be considered sports under the policy, as firearms could be rented for either shooting practice or testing out a firearm for purchase, among others.

In finding ambiguity, the court construed the exclusion most strongly against the insurance company. The court was unable to find that all firearms were unequivocally and definitionally “sporting equipment.” According to the court, the insurance company failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the exclusion barred coverage in this case. Further, the court found the insurance company was aware, at the time of issuing the policy, that Noble Eagle rented firearms. Therefore, Noble Eagle had a reasonable expectation, as a shooting range that paid $14,000 for a liability policy, that they would have coverage in place for liability involving firearms. The court also took into consideration that the policy did define some definition of “sporting equipment,” as it explicitly referenced golf and tennis equipment. Finally, the court noted that the litigation highlighted the benefit to the insurance company of the ambiguity in the policy exclusion and the requirement under Delaware law to construe the policy against the insurer.

This case demonstrates the importance that a policy—including its exclusions—be clear and unambiguous. Further, agents and brokers must take into consideration the type of business and services being provided by an insurer, the reasonable expectations of those insurers in obtaining liability policies, and the implications of any potential exclusions that may apply.  


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Ohio Supreme Court Extends Sham-Affidavit Rule to Contradictory Expert Reports

Legal Roundup: Ohio In its June 23, 2026, decision in Moore v. Mercy Medical Center, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to strike an expert witness’s affidavit that contradicted the opinions expressed in the expert’s prior report. This case pertains to allegations of medical malpractice after plaintiff Cheri Moore gave birth to an infant in respiratory distress who required intubation. Moore alleged that a delay in ordering an emergency cesarean section resulted in the need for intubation, causing her child’s injuries. Specifically, Moore sued Dr. Meniru, who completed his first shift at 7:00 a.m. on May 28, 2015, and did not resume treating Moore until 7:00 a.m. on May 29, 2015. One of Moore’s expert witnesses authored a report stating that the doctors, including Dr. Meniru, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section in the evening of May 28, 2015. Based on this report, Dr. Meniru moved for summary judgment, arguing that the alleged breach occurred during a period when he was not on duty. In response to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit from the same expert. Although the expert expressly incorporated his previous report into his affidavit, he also offered an additional opinion: that Dr. Meniru breached the standard of care by failing to begin a cesarean section within 30 minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress. Dr. Meniru filed a motion to strike the expert’s affidavit, arguing that it contradicted the opinions set forth in his prior report in violation of the sham-affidavit rule. The sham-affidavit rule applies to “a contradictory affidavit that indicates only that the affiant cannot maintain a consistent story, or is willing to offer a statement solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment”. Moore, supra, at ¶ 19, citing Pettiford v. Aggarwal, 126 Ohio St.3d 413, 2010-Ohio-3237. The trial court granted both the motion to strike and the motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth District affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted two questions of law: (1) whether the sham-affidavit rule applies when the sworn testimony contradicts prior unsworn statements; and (2) whether an inconsistency within the affidavit goes to credibility or admissibility, justifying an order striking the affidavit. Previous rulings by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the sham-affidavit rule have pertained to contradictions between an affidavit and sworn deposition testimony. See, e.g., Byrd v. Smith, 2006- Ohio-3455, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 850 N.E.2d 47. However, here, the Court was asked to apply the same rule to contradictions between a sworn affidavit and an unsworn expert report. The Court held that, because Moore’s expert incorporated his prior report into his affidavit, he effectively adopted the report as part of his sworn testimony.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. 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Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reaffirms Liberal Pleading Standard in Medical Malpractice Actions

Legal Roundup: Pennsylvania The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reinforced a broader fact-pleading approach that may make it more difficult for health care defendants to obtain dismissal at the preliminary objection stage. In DaSilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, the court held that the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint satisfied Pennsylvania’s fact‑pleading requirements despite the absence of individually named negligent actors. In DaSilva, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint alleging that Abington Memorial Hospital was directly and vicariously negligent after the patient, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, was left unattended by hospital staff, exited the emergency department, and was struck by a vehicle, suffering serious injuries. The trial court sustained the hospital’s preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, stating plaintiffs “failed to plead any material factual allegations in support of their claims of negligence [and] set forth vague allegations of negligence and unidentified agency.” Id. at *5. The plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the complaint sufficiently pled negligence and vicarious liability claims under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). The court concluded that allegations describing the patient’s condition, the hospital’s awareness of that condition, and the alleged failure to monitor or prevent elopement were adequate to satisfy Pennsylvania’s pleading requirements. Significantly, the court rejected the hospital’s argument that the complaint failed because it did not identify the specific employees responsible for the alleged negligence. Instead, the court found that generalized references to “emergency room staff” were sufficient to place the hospital on notice of the claims because “the names of those who performed services for the plaintiff are known to the defendant or can be ascertained during discovery.” Id. at *12 (citing Est. of Denmark ex rel. Hurst v. Williams, 117 A.3d 300, 307 (Pa. Super. 2015)). The effect of DaSilva is that plaintiffs may proceed past the pleading stage with relatively generalized allegations, particularly in cases involving institutional defendants where relevant details are uniquely within the defendant’s control. As a result, health care defendants should anticipate that challenges to claim sufficiency may be resolved in the later stages of litigation, including discovery and summary judgment.