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The Quarterly Dose

ALL RISE: Recent Victories and Success Stories

The Quarterly Dose – August 2026

August 26, 2026

Gary Samms (King of Prussia) secured a non-suit in a hotly-contested medical malpractice matter with a pre-trial demand of $7 million. The granting of a non-suit is a rarity at trial. The case involved the death of a neurologist following complications from a green light procedure for prostate issues. The plaintiffs contended thermal injury occurred, as well as a bladder perforation, infection, bladder removal and, ultimately, death. They argued that the hospital did not act appropriately and failed to have appropriate policies and procedures regarding the use of warm saline during the procedure. Their corporate and direct negligence theories failed after Gary’s cross-examination of their expert on voir dire, which revealed that the expert was not qualified to offer opinions on hospital policies and procedures. This development built on Gary’s earlier successful cross-examinations of the pathologist involved in the autopsy and the urologist who performed the procedure. The victory was in part due to the excellent work of Tyler Price (Philadelphia) and paralegal Nancy Farnen (Philadelphia). Gary also prevailed in a binding high-low arbitration regarding the death of a patient suffering from C-diff after a surgical procedure. His evaluation of the records and experts was significant to the success.

Maura Waters Brady (Roseland) obtained a unanimous defense verdict on behalf of a defendant anesthesiologist following a six-week trial in Hudson County, New Jersey. The plaintiff, a 43-year-old woman, presented to the hospital in septic shock seven days after undergoing a robotic hysterectomy and required emergency surgery. She alleged that she aspirated during intubation, causing complications that ultimately resulted in lower extremity gangrene and the loss of all 10 toes. The defense disputed that aspiration occurred, pointing to the patient’s stable vital signs and end-tidal CO₂ readings during the procedure, and argued that the toe amputations were caused by the severe sepsis she had upon arrival at the hospital rather than the anesthesia care provided. Despite a $12 million demand, no settlement offers were made. Instrumental to the defense were Julia Klubenspies (Roseland) and Karen Kankula (paralegal, Roseland).

Thomas Lent (recently retired) and Andra Paganie (Erie) obtained a dismissal with prejudice of a second amended complaint against our client, a skilled nursing facility. The plaintiffs, a dentist (POA) and his wife, alleged that they suffered a variety of harms after the facility allegedly failed to timely provide them with an update on the dentist’s father prior to his passing. The father was 101 years old and a longtime resident of the facility. In a 17-page opinion and order, the judge overwhelmingly agreed with our arguments for the demurrer to all main counts. The judge granted leave to amend on one claim, but with a cautionary comment, as this would be the plaintiffs’ counsel’s fourth bite at the apple.

Jack Farrell, Daniel Dolente, and Travis Talbot (all of Philadelphia) successfully obtained dismissal of a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas action on forum non conveniens grounds, with leave for plaintiffs to refile in Delaware. Plaintiffs asserted negligent security and branch design claims against a bank after an alleged robbery and assault in Wilmington, Delaware. Despite all key facts, witnesses, and evidence being centered in Delaware, plaintiffs filed suit in Philadelphia. After a years-long venue and forum dispute, including a Superior Court appeal, we demonstrated significant hardship to witnesses and the case’s strong connection to Delaware. The court ultimately granted the petition to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Charmaine Pinckney and Jennifer Cicchetti (Philadelphia) provided paralegal support.

Nicole Tanana (Scranton) secured a complete defense victory in a premises liability action arising from an alleged incident at a skilled nursing facility. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries when a dumpster door swung open and struck her. Although the plaintiff initiated suit just before the statute of limitations expired, she failed to take any affirmative steps to serve the defendants for more than four months and did not effectuate service until five months after filing. The court agreed that this lack of diligence warranted dismissal under controlling Pennsylvania law and dismissed the action with prejudice, resulting in a final resolution in favor of the defendants.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.