.

Maura Waters Brady

Portrait of Maura Waters Brady

Maura is an experienced litigator and has defended clients in medical negligence matters since 1985. She represents health care providers (physicians, nurses, midwives, physician assistants, dentists, chiropractors and podiatrists), hospitals and other health care facilities, at the trial and appellate levels. She is also experienced in handling licensing and medical board matters. 

After graduating from The Marlborough School in Los Angeles, Maura attended Georgetown University where she played intercollegiate volleyball. Returing to California, she received her J.D. from Southwestern University and completed clerkships with judges in the U.S. District Court and The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals. Maura began her legal career in New Jersey soon after.  

Outside of the office, Maura is an active member of her community and has volunteered for numerous church, township and school organizations. Maura is a proud owner of Irish Red and White Setter dogs, which she has shown to numerous AKC titles in conformation and other competitions.    

    • Southwestern Law School (J.D., 1981)
    • Georgetown University (B.A., 1978)
    • New Jersey, 1985
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1985
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • “The Continuing Evolution of Derivative Claims,” Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

Results

Won Unanimous Defense Verdict in High-Exposure Birth Injury Case

We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a high-exposure birth injury case, successfully proving that our client’s obstetric care met accepted standards despite claims of negligence and lasting injury. The plaintiff, the mother, alleged the obstetrician defendant was negligent in failing to identify her baby as large for gestational age in the prenatal period, in failing to proceed with a cesarean section during the labor, and in negligently performing a forceps delivery. The plaintiff alleged, as a result of her injuries from the delivery, she suffered pelvic organ prolapse, incontinence, and ongoing pain and suffering. The plaintiff underwent two subsequent gynecologic surgeries and alleged, as result of her ongoing pain, she would never be able to return to work for the remainder of her life. Through the testimony of our client and experts, we were able to establish the care provided by the obstetrician was within accepted standards of care and the decision to proceed with the delivery as performed was the safest option for the mother and baby. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of our client.   

Received a Unanimous Defense Verdict in a High-Exposure Birth Injury Case

We received a unanimous defense verdict for their client in a high-exposure birth injury case. ​The plaintiff, the mother, alleged the obstetrician defendant was negligent in failing to identify her baby as large for gestational age in the prenatal period, in failing to proceed with a cesarean section during the labor, and in negligently performing a forceps delivery. The plaintiff alleged, as a result of her injuries from the delivery, she suffered pelvic organ prolapse, incontinence, and ongoing pain and suffering. The plaintiff underwent two subsequent gynecologic surgeries and alleged, as result of her ongoing pain, she would never be able to return to work for the remainder of her life. Through the testimony of our client and experts, we were able to establish the care provided by the obstetrician was within accepted standards of care and the decision to proceed with the delivery as performed was the safest option for the mother and baby. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of our client.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The Continuing Evolution of Derivative Claims

December 1, 2022

Key Points: Through derivative claims, plaintiffs often seek to find additional sources of funds to cover judgments or settlements in cases valued in excess of a doctor’s usual $1 million liability policy. These attempts need to be evaluated, as they may place a health care provider’s personal assets at risk. It is obvious to all of us who practice in the health care defense litigation field that both judgments and settlements have increased in value. In contrast, the availability of insurance coverage to cover those claims has actually decreased. While most doctors continue to maintain the minimum required $1–$3 million policy for their own liability, many of their practices have switched their policies to shared limit policies, which do not provide the “excess coverage” that has been traditionally available in a separate group policy. For plaintiffs, the obvious question is where to find additional sources of funds to cover judgments or settlements in cases valued in excess of that usual $1 million policy. If plaintiffs are thinking about this, we should be thinking about it, too. In the last few years, we have seen plaintiffs file a variety of motions seeking to expand liability, including attacking the charitable immunity status of hospitals based upon their profits and seeking to obtain information about the personal assets of individual physicians who own thriving practices. These lines of attack have only resulted in minimal success and will need legislative input to support such approaches. However, working within the confines of the current case law, we are now seeing new approaches to hold parties in cases on derivative claims for the negligence of another physician. In recent trial court opinions, we have seen corporate defendants brought into cases as direct defendants where a franchisee has been named as a defendant and, in another, a surgeon held in on a derivative claim in a case against a defendant anesthesiologist. In both of these cases, the rulings arguably put physicians’ personal assets at risk. Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hospital, 958 A.2d 101 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008) confirmed that when a hospital provides a doctor to a patient and the circumstances are such that a reasonable patient would believe that the doctor’s care is rendered on behalf of the hospital, an agency relationship is presumed unless rebutted. Accordingly, it has become common practice to make patients aware that the physicians were not employees of the hospital but of a different practice group. In a case where the treating medical care provider worked in a franchise location, the doctor was questioned during his deposition as to what information was provided to the patient to make it clear that he was not an employee of the corporate franchisor. The doctor denied having specifically advised the patient that he was not an employee of the corporation; consequently, the corporation was then joined as a defendant on a theory of “apparent authority.” However, pursuant to the franchise agreement, the corporate defendant had a right to seek indemnification from the provider. In the event that a judgement is entered against the defendant/provider for an amount in excess of his policy limits, he will be personally liable to the corporation for the excess amount. In another case, the court denied a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant surgeon and the surgeon’s practice, which owns a surgical center, in a case brought against the codefendant anesthesiologist on a claim of “apparent authority.” The court found the defense argument that Cordero did apply, as it the practice group was not a hospital, was “a distinction with no relevance.” The practice group was in the business of offering medical care that required the services of an anesthesiologist, and the difference, therefore, was merely “one of semantics.” The court noted that the anesthesiologist was identified as a member of a different practice and, arguably, was an independent contractor. Nonetheless, the extent to which the practice group represented that they “would provide the anesthesiologist” and that “the anesthesiologist was part of the surgical team” was an indicator of an apparent agency relationship upon which a reasonable fact finder could find the practice group “vicariously liable” for the actions of the anesthesiologist. That fact, therefore, remained in dispute, and the jury was required to decide whether the defendants could overcome the presumption of agency. The court made it clear it was not holding the doctor in the case under a theory of “Captain of the Ship,” which is not a recognized doctrine in New Jersey, but there remained an open question as to whether the doctor could be vicariously liable for the actions of other individuals involved in the surgical procedure. Of greater concern is the fact that the surgeon maintains a policy of insurance relative to his medical care of a patient. The practice group maintains a policy of insurance that “shares” policy limits with the doctor’s policy but denies coverage for any other physician’s medical care. Should the jury find that a reasonable patient would have concluded the practice group was vicariously liable for the care of the anesthesiologist, the group could be held responsible for any judgment in excess of the anesthesiologist’s policy. However, since there is no coverage for another physician’s care, the plaintiff could argue the physician who owns the group is personally liable for the excess judgment. On the defense side, we should be facing these issues head-on. We know that in cases where facts are very specific, appeal of issues such as these can often lead to unfavorable precedent. The risk of personal liability could require recommending settlement of an otherwise defensible case. Medical care providers who own or have relationships with other corporations, such as surgical centers, urgent care centers or corporations with multiple sites and franchises, should be made aware of these risks. We should anticipate arguments like these and evaluate the practices of both the provider and the corporation to determine whether an argument for vicarious liability would be successful and potentially expose the doctor to personal liability. Even if it is not an issue in the case in front of us, it may be an issue in a future matter. Evaluating and addressing these issues now may go a long way to preventing an unfavorable opinion in the future when, inevitably, this issue is considered on appeal.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.