.

Maura Waters Brady

Portrait of Maura Waters Brady

Maura is an experienced litigator and has defended clients in medical negligence matters since 1985. She represents health care providers (physicians, nurses, midwives, physician assistants, dentists, chiropractors and podiatrists), hospitals and other health care facilities, at the trial and appellate levels. She is also experienced in handling licensing and medical board matters. 

After graduating from The Marlborough School in Los Angeles, Maura attended Georgetown University where she played intercollegiate volleyball. Returing to California, she received her J.D. from Southwestern University and completed clerkships with judges in the U.S. District Court and The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals. Maura began her legal career in New Jersey soon after.  

Outside of the office, Maura is an active member of her community and has volunteered for numerous church, township and school organizations. Maura is a proud owner of Irish Red and White Setter dogs, which she has shown to numerous AKC titles in conformation and other competitions.    

    • Southwestern Law School (J.D., 1981)
    • Georgetown University (B.A., 1978)
    • New Jersey, 1985
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1985
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a medical malpractice action involving allegations of anesthesia negligence during emergency surgery. The plaintiff, a 43-year-old woman, presented to the hospital in septic shock seven days after undergoing a robotic hysterectomy and required emergency surgery. She alleged that she aspirated during intubation, causing complications that ultimately resulted in lower extremity gangrene and the loss of all 10 toes. The defense disputed that aspiration occurred, pointing to the patient's stable vital signs and end-tidal CO₂ readings during the procedure, and argued that the toe amputations were caused by the severe sepsis she had upon arrival at the hospital rather than the anesthesia care provided. Despite a $12 million demand, no settlement offers were made. Following a six-week trial in Hudson County, New Jersey, the jury unanimously returned a defense verdict in favor of the defense.
      • “The Continuing Evolution of Derivative Claims,” Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

    Results

    Won Unanimous Defense Verdict in High-Exposure Birth Injury Case

    We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a high-exposure birth injury case, successfully proving that our client’s obstetric care met accepted standards despite claims of negligence and lasting injury. The plaintiff, the mother, alleged the obstetrician defendant was negligent in failing to identify her baby as large for gestational age in the prenatal period, in failing to proceed with a cesarean section during the labor, and in negligently performing a forceps delivery. The plaintiff alleged, as a result of her injuries from the delivery, she suffered pelvic organ prolapse, incontinence, and ongoing pain and suffering. The plaintiff underwent two subsequent gynecologic surgeries and alleged, as result of her ongoing pain, she would never be able to return to work for the remainder of her life. Through the testimony of our client and experts, we were able to establish the care provided by the obstetrician was within accepted standards of care and the decision to proceed with the delivery as performed was the safest option for the mother and baby. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of our client.   

    Received a Unanimous Defense Verdict in a High-Exposure Birth Injury Case

    We received a unanimous defense verdict for their client in a high-exposure birth injury case. ​The plaintiff, the mother, alleged the obstetrician defendant was negligent in failing to identify her baby as large for gestational age in the prenatal period, in failing to proceed with a cesarean section during the labor, and in negligently performing a forceps delivery. The plaintiff alleged, as a result of her injuries from the delivery, she suffered pelvic organ prolapse, incontinence, and ongoing pain and suffering. The plaintiff underwent two subsequent gynecologic surgeries and alleged, as result of her ongoing pain, she would never be able to return to work for the remainder of her life. Through the testimony of our client and experts, we were able to establish the care provided by the obstetrician was within accepted standards of care and the decision to proceed with the delivery as performed was the safest option for the mother and baby. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of our client.

    Thought Leadership

    Defense Digest

    The Continuing Evolution of Derivative Claims

    December 1, 2022

    Key Points: Through derivative claims, plaintiffs often seek to find additional sources of funds to cover judgments or settlements in cases valued in excess of a doctor’s usual $1 million liability policy. These attempts need to be evaluated, as they may place a health care provider’s personal assets at risk. It is obvious to all of us who practice in the health care defense litigation field that both judgments and settlements have increased in value. In contrast, the availability of insurance coverage to cover those claims has actually decreased. While most doctors continue to maintain the minimum required $1–$3 million policy for their own liability, many of their practices have switched their policies to shared limit policies, which do not provide the “excess coverage” that has been traditionally available in a separate group policy. For plaintiffs, the obvious question is where to find additional sources of funds to cover judgments or settlements in cases valued in excess of that usual $1 million policy. If plaintiffs are thinking about this, we should be thinking about it, too. In the last few years, we have seen plaintiffs file a variety of motions seeking to expand liability, including attacking the charitable immunity status of hospitals based upon their profits and seeking to obtain information about the personal assets of individual physicians who own thriving practices. These lines of attack have only resulted in minimal success and will need legislative input to support such approaches. However, working within the confines of the current case law, we are now seeing new approaches to hold parties in cases on derivative claims for the negligence of another physician. In recent trial court opinions, we have seen corporate defendants brought into cases as direct defendants where a franchisee has been named as a defendant and, in another, a surgeon held in on a derivative claim in a case against a defendant anesthesiologist. In both of these cases, the rulings arguably put physicians’ personal assets at risk. Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hospital, 958 A.2d 101 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008) confirmed that when a hospital provides a doctor to a patient and the circumstances are such that a reasonable patient would believe that the doctor’s care is rendered on behalf of the hospital, an agency relationship is presumed unless rebutted. Accordingly, it has become common practice to make patients aware that the physicians were not employees of the hospital but of a different practice group. In a case where the treating medical care provider worked in a franchise location, the doctor was questioned during his deposition as to what information was provided to the patient to make it clear that he was not an employee of the corporate franchisor. The doctor denied having specifically advised the patient that he was not an employee of the corporation; consequently, the corporation was then joined as a defendant on a theory of “apparent authority.” However, pursuant to the franchise agreement, the corporate defendant had a right to seek indemnification from the provider. In the event that a judgement is entered against the defendant/provider for an amount in excess of his policy limits, he will be personally liable to the corporation for the excess amount. In another case, the court denied a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant surgeon and the surgeon’s practice, which owns a surgical center, in a case brought against the codefendant anesthesiologist on a claim of “apparent authority.” The court found the defense argument that Cordero did apply, as it the practice group was not a hospital, was “a distinction with no relevance.” The practice group was in the business of offering medical care that required the services of an anesthesiologist, and the difference, therefore, was merely “one of semantics.” The court noted that the anesthesiologist was identified as a member of a different practice and, arguably, was an independent contractor. Nonetheless, the extent to which the practice group represented that they “would provide the anesthesiologist” and that “the anesthesiologist was part of the surgical team” was an indicator of an apparent agency relationship upon which a reasonable fact finder could find the practice group “vicariously liable” for the actions of the anesthesiologist. That fact, therefore, remained in dispute, and the jury was required to decide whether the defendants could overcome the presumption of agency. The court made it clear it was not holding the doctor in the case under a theory of “Captain of the Ship,” which is not a recognized doctrine in New Jersey, but there remained an open question as to whether the doctor could be vicariously liable for the actions of other individuals involved in the surgical procedure. Of greater concern is the fact that the surgeon maintains a policy of insurance relative to his medical care of a patient. The practice group maintains a policy of insurance that “shares” policy limits with the doctor’s policy but denies coverage for any other physician’s medical care. Should the jury find that a reasonable patient would have concluded the practice group was vicariously liable for the care of the anesthesiologist, the group could be held responsible for any judgment in excess of the anesthesiologist’s policy. However, since there is no coverage for another physician’s care, the plaintiff could argue the physician who owns the group is personally liable for the excess judgment. On the defense side, we should be facing these issues head-on. We know that in cases where facts are very specific, appeal of issues such as these can often lead to unfavorable precedent. The risk of personal liability could require recommending settlement of an otherwise defensible case. Medical care providers who own or have relationships with other corporations, such as surgical centers, urgent care centers or corporations with multiple sites and franchises, should be made aware of these risks. We should anticipate arguments like these and evaluate the practices of both the provider and the corporation to determine whether an argument for vicarious liability would be successful and potentially expose the doctor to personal liability. Even if it is not an issue in the case in front of us, it may be an issue in a future matter. Evaluating and addressing these issues now may go a long way to preventing an unfavorable opinion in the future when, inevitably, this issue is considered on appeal.

    Firm Highlights

    Thought Leadership

    The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

    In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

    Thought Leadership

    Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

    Thought Leadership

    Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

    The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.