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Tyler is a member of the Health Care Department concentrating his practice on the defense of health care practitioners and providers, as well as physicians’ offices, hospitals and health systems in various litigation matters. He works closely with clients to defend against claims and preserve their interests throughout all stages of the litigation process. In addition to representing clients in complex medical malpractice matters, Tyler also commits himself to defending corporations in the general casualty, product liability, construction injury and premises liability fields.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Tyler worked as a Nationally Registered Paramedic in both Montgomery County and Bucks County. Drawing from his professional health care experience, Tyler understands the nature and complexity of each client’s interests and manages each case with a multidisciplinary approach. When clients are confronted with legal obstacles, they can rely on Tyler to appreciate and maintain their interests from the foundational issues through the complex issues that may arise in each matter. 

Tyler earned his juris doctor from Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, where he served as Vice Chairperson of the Moot Court Board. He received his undergraduate degree in Emergency Medicine from the University of Pittsburgh.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2022)
    • University of Pittsburgh (B.S., 2013)
    • Pennsylvania, 2022
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • Lehigh County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

June 11, 2026

Tyler R. Price, Esquire Former Nationally Registered Paramedic Working in emergency medicine demanded sharp critical thinking — recognizing life-threatening conditions, delivering timely interventions, uncovering relevant medical history, and shaping a treatment plan that aligned with a patient’s ultimate needs. I was taught to always “bring a shovel” to every encounter, because careful digging almost always revealed the details that mattered most. As an attorney, I still bring that shovel. Thorough investigation and deliberate “digging” into the facts of each case are essential to understanding potential theories of liability, assessing exposure, and evaluating every viable defense. Examining a case from multiple angles and points in the timeline allows me to appreciate how each fact fits into the broader strategy. Although I’m no longer making split second medical decisions, the same disciplined approach guides my litigation work. Every detail counts. For every client, in every matter, my goal is to identify the key facts that allow us to build the strongest possible defense. My training in emergency medicine gave me the tools, mindset, and discipline that now make me an effective litigator. Megan J. Nelson, Esquire Registered Nurse My nursing career has been a significant asset to my work as a medical malpractice defense attorney. A Registered Nurse since 2010, I have extensive, hands-on clinical experience across high-acuity settings. My background in neonatal and pediatric critical care (including work in the NICU, PICU, pediatric cardiac ICU, and pediatric emergency department) and experience managing critically ill patients (including those requiring ECMO and cardiac bypass) gives me a practical understanding of complex medical care, clinical decision-making, and the realities of fast-paced health care settings often central to malpractice claims. This firsthand knowledge allows me to analyze medical records with precision, communicate effectively with experts and providers, and identify nuances that may be overlooked by those without clinical training. In my current work on Rule 5.900 petitions for expedited judicial intervention regarding medical treatments, this clinical foundation is especially critical, as I am often tasked with effectively “educating” the court during emergency hearings—translating complex medical conditions, interventions, and risks into understandable terms for the judge. I am also able to prepare providers for testimony in a way that ensures clarity and accuracy under pressure. Ultimately, my clinical foundation enables me to bridge the gap between medicine and law, strengthening my ability to build compelling defenses grounded in real-world health care practice.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

November 1, 2025

Pennsylvania Superior Court Enforces Venue Selection Clause in Surgical Consent Form Somerlot v. Jung, 2025 Pa. Super. 166 (July 30, 2025) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, sustaining preliminary objections of the defendant-physician and defendant-facility as to venue, and transferred the case to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas based upon the venue selection clause in the surgical consent form. This opinion emphasizes a party’s right to contract for a proper venue prior to initiating litigation. Notably, to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance and consideration. The Superior Court held that the plaintiff was free to reject the contract entirely or propose a counteroffer, reject the venue clause, prior to consenting to surgery, but she failed to do so. Because the plaintiff was afforded a meaningful choice when she signed the consent-to operate contract, the contract was valid, and the venue-selection provision was enforced. Venue was appropriately transferred to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.    A Jury Does Not Need to Make an Express Finding of Liability as to Each Defendant to Establish a Hospital’s Vicarious Liability for a Child’s Brain Injury Hagans v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 2025 Pa. Super. 142 (July 10, 2025) The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying the defendant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial and remitter. The court also entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that the verdict must be vacated because the plaintiff failed to ask the jury to determine the liability of any agent or employee as a necessary predicate to a finding of vicarious liability. The Superior Court was not persuaded. According to the Superior Court, the trial court had found that, through expert testimony and other evidence presented at trial, the plaintiff sufficiently established the defendant’s agents acted negligently. Also, the jury did not need to make an express finding as to each individual defendant. The plaintiff was required to establish the liability of the defendant’s employees to determine if the defendant was vicariously liable, which the plaintiff did. Thus, the defendant’s liability was based on the actions of its employees.  The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.