Tyler is a member of the Health Care Department concentrating his practice on the defense of health care practitioners and providers, as well as physicians’ offices, hospitals and health systems in various litigation matters. He works closely with clients to defend against claims and preserve their interests throughout all stages of the litigation process. In addition to representing clients in complex medical malpractice matters, Tyler also commits himself to defending corporations in the general casualty, product liability, construction injury and premises liability fields.
Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Tyler worked as a Nationally Registered Paramedic in both Montgomery County and Bucks County. Drawing from his professional health care experience, Tyler understands the nature and complexity of each client’s interests and manages each case with a multidisciplinary approach. When clients are confronted with legal obstacles, they can rely on Tyler to appreciate and maintain their interests from the foundational issues through the complex issues that may arise in each matter.
Tyler earned his juris doctor from Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, where he served as Vice Chairperson of the Moot Court Board. He received his undergraduate degree in Emergency Medicine from the University of Pittsburgh.
Thought Leadership
The Quarterly Dose
LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania
November 1, 2025
Pennsylvania Superior Court Enforces Venue Selection Clause in Surgical Consent Form Somerlot v. Jung, 2025 Pa. Super. 166 (July 30, 2025) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, sustaining preliminary objections of the defendant-physician and defendant-facility as to venue, and transferred the case to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas based upon the venue selection clause in the surgical consent form. This opinion emphasizes a party’s right to contract for a proper venue prior to initiating litigation. Notably, to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance and consideration. The Superior Court held that the plaintiff was free to reject the contract entirely or propose a counteroffer, reject the venue clause, prior to consenting to surgery, but she failed to do so. Because the plaintiff was afforded a meaningful choice when she signed the consent-to operate contract, the contract was valid, and the venue-selection provision was enforced. Venue was appropriately transferred to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. A Jury Does Not Need to Make an Express Finding of Liability as to Each Defendant to Establish a Hospital’s Vicarious Liability for a Child’s Brain Injury Hagans v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 2025 Pa. Super. 142 (July 10, 2025) The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying the defendant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial and remitter. The court also entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that the verdict must be vacated because the plaintiff failed to ask the jury to determine the liability of any agent or employee as a necessary predicate to a finding of vicarious liability. The Superior Court was not persuaded. According to the Superior Court, the trial court had found that, through expert testimony and other evidence presented at trial, the plaintiff sufficiently established the defendant’s agents acted negligently. Also, the jury did not need to make an express finding as to each individual defendant. The plaintiff was required to establish the liability of the defendant’s employees to determine if the defendant was vicariously liable, which the plaintiff did. Thus, the defendant’s liability was based on the actions of its employees. The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.
Case Law Alerts
A Jury Does Not Need to Make an Express Finding of Liability as to Each Defendant to Establish a Hospital’s Vicarious Liability for a Child’s Brain Injury
October 1, 2025
The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying the defendant-hospital’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remitter. The court also entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff-parent and against the defendant-hospital. On appeal, the defendant-hospital argued that the verdict must be vacated because the plaintiff failed to asked the jury to determine the liability of any agent or employee as a necessary predicate to a finding of vicarious liability. The Superior Court was not persuaded. According to the Superior Court, the trial court had found that, through expert testimony and other evidence presented at trial, the plaintiff sufficiently established the defendant-hospital’s agents acted negligently. Also, the jury did not need to make an express finding as to each individual defendant. The plaintiff was required to establish the liability of the defendant-hospital’s employees to determine if the defendant-hospital was vicariously liable, which the plaintiff did. Thus, the defendant-hospital’s liability was based on the actions of its employees. Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
