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Nicole E. Tanana

Portrait of Nicole E. Tanana

As a member of the Health Care Department, Nicole defends health care providers and institutions against medical malpractice and liability claims. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Nicole was the judicial law clerk for the Honorable Lesa S. Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. During her time with Judge Gelb, Nicole assisted in drafting various opinions on a variety of civil litigation matters, including medical malpractice, personal injury, real property and mortgage foreclosure actions.

During law school, Nicole was an intern for the Honorable Malachy E. Mannion of the Middle District of Pennsylvania as part of Drexel University's Co-Op Program. When deciding where to complete her co-op, Nicole knew that she wanted to return home to Scranton, Pennsylvania, and join the area’s robust legal community.

Nicole’s prior work experience has enabled her to gain valuable understanding of many complex civil litigation matter types and resulted in the development of strong legal research and writing skills.

    • Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law (J.D., 2020)
    • Marywood University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2017)
    • Pennsylvania, 2020
    • New York, 2023
    • Secured a complete defense victory in a premises liability action arising from an alleged incident at a skilled nursing facility. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries when a dumpster door swung open and struck her. Although the plaintiff initiated suit just before the statute of limitations expired, she failed for four months to take any affirmative steps to serve the defendants and did not effectuate service until five months after filing. The court agreed that this lack of diligence warranted dismissal under controlling Pennsylvania law and dismissed the action with prejudice, resulting in a final resolution in favor of the defendants.

    • Secured a voluntary dismissal of a client in a catastrophic medical malpractice in Philadelphia County based on her preliminary objections as to the failure to serve the complaint in a timely manner. Rather than have the court grant her preliminary objections on lack of good faith effort to serve original process, plaintiff's counsel chose to voluntarily dismiss the case. Her client was the last defendant served in a case that was active in Philadelphia for over a year.

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

“IYKYK” – Keeping Up to Date with Social Media

May 1, 2025

If you know, you know! Social media has become ubiquitous and continues to evolve into myriad platforms. As the chaos surrounding a threatened shutdown and brief outage of TikTok illustrated in January 2025, most people believe that they cannot and simply do not want to live without it. Since Facebook was founded in 1996, social media has reached over half the world’s population. In 2010, there were 970 million active social media users globally. That number has ballooned to 5.24 billion users in January of 2025. In the United States, 70.1% of the total population actively use social media. Amazingly, Americans spend an average of 2 hours and 9 minutes on social media every day. With these staggering numbers in mind, it would be naïve to think that social media does not play a role in litigation and the discovery process.  Ethical and Technological Considerations  When it comes to social media users, research has shown that there are stark differences in not only the generational usage of the various types of social media, but gender differences as well. It should be no surprise that age has an effect on usage. According to DataReportal, a website that provides global digital insights and trends, recent usage numbers show that everyone is embracing social media and all that it has to offer, with 84% of 18- to 29-year-olds and 45% of those aged 65 and older using social media. Additional research demonstrates that in the United States, females are more prevalent and account for 78% of social media users, whereas 66% of men use social media. Women were noted to use platforms such as Snapchat and Pinterest, and men tend to favor sites like YouTube and X(Twitter). According to a recent article by Exploding Topics, YouTube is the world’s most popular and widely used social media platform, followed by Facebook, Instagram, WeChat, Reddit, Messenger, TikTok, Telegram and Viber. These statistics can be a useful guide in directing you to where your target audience is spending their “down” time, leading to more pointed additional discovery requests. Due to the vast amount of information and data being generated by each user, it is important to cater your discovery requests to get as much information without going down the rabbit hole of what could be mountains of documentation and paperwork. Keeping up to date on the research related to ever-changing social media trends and the various demographics can help to narrowly tailor your discovery requests and yield pertinent information to defend your case. It is important to keep in mind that the Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys to “keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” (Pa. R.P.C. 1.1.). The obligation also exists for lawyers to ensure that preservation of such discoverable materials is maintained at the risk of spoliation issues arising. In 2014, the Pennsylvania Bar Association adopted the view of the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee that a lawyer may advise a client to change the privacy settings on the client’s Facebook page, however, a lawyer “may not instruct or permit the client to delete/destroy a relevant photo, link, text, or other content, so that it no longer exists.” (Pa. Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 2014-300 [Sept. 2014]). The same principles still apply today, and lawyers are required to take affirmative steps to preserve social networking evidence and advise client(s) of the same.  Since social media discovery has to be maintained by the party, considerations can and should be given for an individual to preserve their own account. Many social media sites are now on the second and third generation of these platforms, and technological advances have allowed access to more features that may not have been feasible at their inception. For example, many platforms now allow individual users to download their entire account in just a few steps. Social media powerhouses such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok all offer this feature. This process can be accomplished, in some circumstances, in a few “clicks” and arguably alleviates the “overly burdensome” obstacle of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011.  What the Courts Have to Say  Under the general discovery principals in Pennsylvania, information contained on a litigant’s social media platforms is generally discoverable. In Pennsylvania, “…a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it related to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, content, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.” (Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1.) Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4009.1 explicitly permits the discovery of electronically stored information. This broad general principle of what is discoverable is limited by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 4011, which states: “No discovery, including discovery of electronically stored information, shall be permitted which (a) is sought in bad faith; (b) would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person or party; … or (e) would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by the deponent or any party or witness.”  Despite the popularity and extensive use of social media platforms, Pennsylvania Appellate Courts have not yet addressed the parameters of what is discoverable, and appellate review is scant. The trial courts, however, have seen their fair share of attempts to widen and/or limit the net of discoverable data. The court’s interpretations have been varied when it comes to how far litigants can go when delving into the world of social media discovery. Most courts have treated social media information as they would any other information sought in discovery. In Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP, the court stated:  Consistent with that firmly established discovery maxim, a party may obtain discovery of private Facebook posts, photographs and communications only if the electronically stored information is relevant, and the party must satisfy that relevancy requirement by showing that publically accessible information posted on the user’s Facebook page controverts or challenges the user’s claims or defenses in the pending litigation. To that extent, the resolution of social media discovery disputes pursuant to existing Rules of Procedure is simply new wine in an old bottle.  (C.C.P. Lackawanna April 22, 2013) (Nealon, J.). Moreover, in at least in one case, the court held that it was not necessary for a party to have a public profile before the opposing party is given access to the private portion of a party’s social media profile. In Arcq v. Fields, No. 11-4637 (C.C.P. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011) (Herman, J.), the defendants’ Motion to Compel information about the plaintiff’s social networking sites was denied due to the defendants’ failure to show any reasonable basis for believing access to the plaintiff’s profiles would yield any relevant information. Despite the denial of the motion, the court took a broad view of what the defendants had to show prior to being given access to the plaintiff’s private profile, stating: “[w]hile it is not an absolute necessity that a plaintiff have a public profile before a defendant can be given access to the private portion, it is necessary that defendant have some good faith belief that the private profile may contain information.” Arcq v. Fields, No. 11-4637 (C.C.P. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011) (Herman, J.).  Privacy Settings Privacy considerations are typically the main argument against disclosure of a litigant’s “private” social media information as based on the individual’s privacy rights. While the privacy argument has been rejected by Pennsylvania trial courts in some circumstances, most litigants will continue to push back when discovery seeks specific information that is contained on a litigant’s “private” social media platforms.  When discovery seeks information contained within a litigant’s private social media platforms, Pennsylvania trial level courts have implemented a balancing test that balances the need for relevant “private” social media information and the parties’ privacy concerns. In Hunter v. PRRC, Inc., 2013 WL 9917150 (York C. C. P. Nov. 4, 2013) (Linebaugh, J.), the court determined that a party making the request for social media information must make:  [A] threshold showing that otherwise available information leads to the reasonable probability that relevant information is contained with the private portions of the account. The hypothetical possibility that relevant information may exist in any account held privately is not sufficient to meet this showing. Actual facts must be shown…  A “threshold showing” is the standard for Pennsylvania Courts in deciding whether private social media information should be disclosed in discovery; however, the analysis does not end at this showing. In Trail v. Lesko, 2012 WL 2864004 (Allegheny C. C. P. July 3, 2012) (Wettick, J.), the court analyzed the approaches taken by nine earlier Pennsylvania trial courts and recognized that discovery of private social media information is inherently intrusive and, relying on Pa.R.C.P. No. 4011, noted a court should consider the “level of the intrusion and the potential value of the discovery to the party seeking discovery.” Most recently in Allen v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, LLC, 2018 WL 4278941 (Northampton C. C. P. Aug 6, 2018) (Dally, J.), the court found that in order to obtain the private portions of a litigant’s social media information, the requesting party must show discrepancies between the public portions of the litigant’s social media platforms and what the litigant is claiming in the lawsuit. These considerations, as to whether your case will cross the threshold, should be considered in any motion to compel. It is evident that social media discovery exploration is a necessary component to ensure that you are properly defending your clients. Preparing discovery that is geared toward the opposing party’s use of various social media platforms helps to maintain the most effective use of your and your client’s time. Understanding the court’s parameters of what is permissible and whether your case will meet the privacy threshold will help you successfully navigate the inevitable discovery disputes.     The Quarterly Dose – May 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Defense Digest

Can Felons Pursue Damages Against Their Providers for Their Criminal Conduct? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Says No

June 1, 2024

Key Points: Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently evaluated the no felony conviction recovery rule.  No felony conviction recovery rule bars medical malpractice and indemnification claims brought against murderer’s medical providers. Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court evaluated the no felony conviction recovery rule in the context of a quadruple murderer. In DiNardo v. Kohler, et al., 304 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the no felony conviction recovery rule barred medical malpractice and indemnification claims brought against murderer’s medical providers.  Cosmo DiNardo, who suffers from various mental health illnesses and conditions, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder, confessed to killing four individuals and pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree murder. Subsequently, DiNardo, through an agent, filed a complaint against his treating psychiatrist and mental health care providers, alleging that his criminal conduct was the result of his psychiatrist’s grossly negligent treatment. DiNardo sought compensatory damages, indemnification for judgments levied against him by his victims’ families, and counsel fees. As to compensatory damages, DiNardo sought recovery for “severe emotional distress and physical pain” for: (1) living with the knowledge that he murdered four individuals; (2) knowing his family’s businesses suffered irreparable harm due to his actions; (3) knowing his family will bear the costs of litigation and judgement due to the murders; and (4) knowing he will spend the rest of his life in state prison.  Mr. DiNardo’s providers filed preliminary objections to his complaint, seeking to have the complaint dismissed as a whole. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections as to DiNardo’s request for indemnification and counsel fees, but overruled the preliminary objections as to DiNardo’s medical malpractice claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling as to DiNardo’s request for indemnification and counsel fees, reversed the trial court’s ruling on his medical malpractice claims, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal with respect to the following issue: “Does the ‘no felony conviction recovery’ rule preclude the award of any civil damages or relief where [DiNardo] alleges that [he] would not benefit or profit from his own criminal acts, but rather would be compensated for alleged malpractice relating to the crimes for which he pleaded guilty to?”  The no felony conviction recovery rule is a common law principle, that a person should not be permitted to benefit from their own wrongdoing. The Pennsylvania Supreme started with the well-established premise that psychiatrists and psychologist are subject to liability for malpractice or professional negligence, including negligence related to treatment or lack thereof. However, the court then acknowledged that case law “firmly establishes” that persons convicted of serious crimes must bear the losses stemming from their criminal actions and public policy will not permit the responsibility for these losses to be shifted to others. Highlighting decisions from outside the Commonwealth, the court noted that other state courts routinely bar plaintiffs from seeking damages sustained as a result of their own criminal conduct, and courts are “virtually unanimous” in rejecting a patient’s attempt to shift responsibility for their criminal actions onto their psychiatrist or other healthcare providers. There are several public policies which are the basis for the no felony conviction recovery rule. The bedrock public policy is that injuries that arise from volitional criminal conduct should not provide a basis for a recovery in a civil action based in tort. The Supreme Court stated that allowing such a civil action would impact the criminal justice system and the public’s perception thereof, as the goal of finality and allocation of responsibility would be undercut by allowing such a civil action. The court also recognized the potential detrimental effects on the practice of psychiatric medicine, stating:  Allowing the recovery of damages from a mental healthcare provider for a patient’s criminal conduct could undermine trust between the patient and psychiatrist; encourage psychiatrists to refuse to treat, or avoid treating, certain patients; spur institutionalization and excessive medication out of concern for financial liability should patients be released from care and commit crimes; and would not respect the difficulty mental healthcare professionals face in predicting whether an individual poses a risk of violence. Finally, the court acknowledged that such civil actions would have a financial impact by potentially increasing health care costs if medical providers “became “guarantors” of the financial costs of the crimes committed by their patients. With all of these public policies considerations in mind, the court held that the no felony conviction recovery rule bars an individual from maintaining a tort action for damages that are sustained as the direct result of his volitional serious criminal acts and prohibits the person from recovering for losses which flowed from such acts. Regardless of whether the damages sought are considered profit, compensation, or a benefit, a criminal is barred from recovering damages that flowed from his criminal conduct.  This ruling creates another avenue for seeking dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims against a medical provider, particularly mental health professionals, at the preliminary objection stage of a proceeding. Further, the court’s consideration of the various public policy considerations may lead to the creation of additional novel arguments based on the same or similar public policy considerations, which may provide another avenue to seek the dismissal of a health care provider.  *Nicole works in our Scranton, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.