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Nicole E. Tanana

Portrait of Nicole E. Tanana

As a member of the Health Care Department, Nicole defends health care providers and institutions against medical malpractice and liability claims. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Nicole was the judicial law clerk for the Honorable Lesa S. Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. During her time with Judge Gelb, Nicole assisted in drafting various opinions on a variety of civil litigation matters, including medical malpractice, personal injury, real property and mortgage foreclosure actions.

During law school, Nicole was an intern for the Honorable Malachy E. Mannion of the Middle District of Pennsylvania as part of Drexel University's Co-Op Program. When deciding where to complete her co-op, Nicole knew that she wanted to return home to Scranton, Pennsylvania, and join the area’s robust legal community.

Nicole’s prior work experience has enabled her to gain valuable understanding of many complex civil litigation matter types and resulted in the development of strong legal research and writing skills.

    • Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law (J.D., 2020)
    • Marywood University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2017)
    • Pennsylvania, 2020
    • New York, 2023

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

“IYKYK” – Keeping Up to Date with Social Media

May 1, 2025

If you know, you know! Social media has become ubiquitous and continues to evolve into myriad platforms. As the chaos surrounding a threatened shutdown and brief outage of TikTok illustrated in January 2025, most people believe that they cannot and simply do not want to live without it. Since Facebook was founded in 1996, social media has reached over half the world’s population. In 2010, there were 970 million active social media users globally. That number has ballooned to 5.24 billion users in January of 2025. In the United States, 70.1% of the total population actively use social media. Amazingly, Americans spend an average of 2 hours and 9 minutes on social media every day. With these staggering numbers in mind, it would be naïve to think that social media does not play a role in litigation and the discovery process.  Ethical and Technological Considerations  When it comes to social media users, research has shown that there are stark differences in not only the generational usage of the various types of social media, but gender differences as well. It should be no surprise that age has an effect on usage. According to DataReportal, a website that provides global digital insights and trends, recent usage numbers show that everyone is embracing social media and all that it has to offer, with 84% of 18- to 29-year-olds and 45% of those aged 65 and older using social media. Additional research demonstrates that in the United States, females are more prevalent and account for 78% of social media users, whereas 66% of men use social media. Women were noted to use platforms such as Snapchat and Pinterest, and men tend to favor sites like YouTube and X(Twitter). According to a recent article by Exploding Topics, YouTube is the world’s most popular and widely used social media platform, followed by Facebook, Instagram, WeChat, Reddit, Messenger, TikTok, Telegram and Viber. These statistics can be a useful guide in directing you to where your target audience is spending their “down” time, leading to more pointed additional discovery requests. Due to the vast amount of information and data being generated by each user, it is important to cater your discovery requests to get as much information without going down the rabbit hole of what could be mountains of documentation and paperwork. Keeping up to date on the research related to ever-changing social media trends and the various demographics can help to narrowly tailor your discovery requests and yield pertinent information to defend your case. It is important to keep in mind that the Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys to “keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” (Pa. R.P.C. 1.1.). The obligation also exists for lawyers to ensure that preservation of such discoverable materials is maintained at the risk of spoliation issues arising. In 2014, the Pennsylvania Bar Association adopted the view of the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee that a lawyer may advise a client to change the privacy settings on the client’s Facebook page, however, a lawyer “may not instruct or permit the client to delete/destroy a relevant photo, link, text, or other content, so that it no longer exists.” (Pa. Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 2014-300 [Sept. 2014]). The same principles still apply today, and lawyers are required to take affirmative steps to preserve social networking evidence and advise client(s) of the same.  Since social media discovery has to be maintained by the party, considerations can and should be given for an individual to preserve their own account. Many social media sites are now on the second and third generation of these platforms, and technological advances have allowed access to more features that may not have been feasible at their inception. For example, many platforms now allow individual users to download their entire account in just a few steps. Social media powerhouses such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok all offer this feature. This process can be accomplished, in some circumstances, in a few “clicks” and arguably alleviates the “overly burdensome” obstacle of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011.  What the Courts Have to Say  Under the general discovery principals in Pennsylvania, information contained on a litigant’s social media platforms is generally discoverable. In Pennsylvania, “…a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it related to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, content, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.” (Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1.) Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4009.1 explicitly permits the discovery of electronically stored information. This broad general principle of what is discoverable is limited by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 4011, which states: “No discovery, including discovery of electronically stored information, shall be permitted which (a) is sought in bad faith; (b) would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person or party; … or (e) would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by the deponent or any party or witness.”  Despite the popularity and extensive use of social media platforms, Pennsylvania Appellate Courts have not yet addressed the parameters of what is discoverable, and appellate review is scant. The trial courts, however, have seen their fair share of attempts to widen and/or limit the net of discoverable data. The court’s interpretations have been varied when it comes to how far litigants can go when delving into the world of social media discovery. Most courts have treated social media information as they would any other information sought in discovery. In Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP, the court stated:  Consistent with that firmly established discovery maxim, a party may obtain discovery of private Facebook posts, photographs and communications only if the electronically stored information is relevant, and the party must satisfy that relevancy requirement by showing that publically accessible information posted on the user’s Facebook page controverts or challenges the user’s claims or defenses in the pending litigation. To that extent, the resolution of social media discovery disputes pursuant to existing Rules of Procedure is simply new wine in an old bottle.  (C.C.P. Lackawanna April 22, 2013) (Nealon, J.). Moreover, in at least in one case, the court held that it was not necessary for a party to have a public profile before the opposing party is given access to the private portion of a party’s social media profile. In Arcq v. Fields, No. 11-4637 (C.C.P. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011) (Herman, J.), the defendants’ Motion to Compel information about the plaintiff’s social networking sites was denied due to the defendants’ failure to show any reasonable basis for believing access to the plaintiff’s profiles would yield any relevant information. Despite the denial of the motion, the court took a broad view of what the defendants had to show prior to being given access to the plaintiff’s private profile, stating: “[w]hile it is not an absolute necessity that a plaintiff have a public profile before a defendant can be given access to the private portion, it is necessary that defendant have some good faith belief that the private profile may contain information.” Arcq v. Fields, No. 11-4637 (C.C.P. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011) (Herman, J.).  Privacy Settings Privacy considerations are typically the main argument against disclosure of a litigant’s “private” social media information as based on the individual’s privacy rights. While the privacy argument has been rejected by Pennsylvania trial courts in some circumstances, most litigants will continue to push back when discovery seeks specific information that is contained on a litigant’s “private” social media platforms.  When discovery seeks information contained within a litigant’s private social media platforms, Pennsylvania trial level courts have implemented a balancing test that balances the need for relevant “private” social media information and the parties’ privacy concerns. In Hunter v. PRRC, Inc., 2013 WL 9917150 (York C. C. P. Nov. 4, 2013) (Linebaugh, J.), the court determined that a party making the request for social media information must make:  [A] threshold showing that otherwise available information leads to the reasonable probability that relevant information is contained with the private portions of the account. The hypothetical possibility that relevant information may exist in any account held privately is not sufficient to meet this showing. Actual facts must be shown…  A “threshold showing” is the standard for Pennsylvania Courts in deciding whether private social media information should be disclosed in discovery; however, the analysis does not end at this showing. In Trail v. Lesko, 2012 WL 2864004 (Allegheny C. C. P. July 3, 2012) (Wettick, J.), the court analyzed the approaches taken by nine earlier Pennsylvania trial courts and recognized that discovery of private social media information is inherently intrusive and, relying on Pa.R.C.P. No. 4011, noted a court should consider the “level of the intrusion and the potential value of the discovery to the party seeking discovery.” Most recently in Allen v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, LLC, 2018 WL 4278941 (Northampton C. C. P. Aug 6, 2018) (Dally, J.), the court found that in order to obtain the private portions of a litigant’s social media information, the requesting party must show discrepancies between the public portions of the litigant’s social media platforms and what the litigant is claiming in the lawsuit. These considerations, as to whether your case will cross the threshold, should be considered in any motion to compel. It is evident that social media discovery exploration is a necessary component to ensure that you are properly defending your clients. Preparing discovery that is geared toward the opposing party’s use of various social media platforms helps to maintain the most effective use of your and your client’s time. Understanding the court’s parameters of what is permissible and whether your case will meet the privacy threshold will help you successfully navigate the inevitable discovery disputes.     The Quarterly Dose – May 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Defense Digest

Can Felons Pursue Damages Against Their Providers for Their Criminal Conduct? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Says No

June 1, 2024

Key Points: Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently evaluated the no felony conviction recovery rule.  No felony conviction recovery rule bars medical malpractice and indemnification claims brought against murderer’s medical providers. Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court evaluated the no felony conviction recovery rule in the context of a quadruple murderer. In DiNardo v. Kohler, et al., 304 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the no felony conviction recovery rule barred medical malpractice and indemnification claims brought against murderer’s medical providers.  Cosmo DiNardo, who suffers from various mental health illnesses and conditions, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder, confessed to killing four individuals and pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree murder. Subsequently, DiNardo, through an agent, filed a complaint against his treating psychiatrist and mental health care providers, alleging that his criminal conduct was the result of his psychiatrist’s grossly negligent treatment. DiNardo sought compensatory damages, indemnification for judgments levied against him by his victims’ families, and counsel fees. As to compensatory damages, DiNardo sought recovery for “severe emotional distress and physical pain” for: (1) living with the knowledge that he murdered four individuals; (2) knowing his family’s businesses suffered irreparable harm due to his actions; (3) knowing his family will bear the costs of litigation and judgement due to the murders; and (4) knowing he will spend the rest of his life in state prison.  Mr. DiNardo’s providers filed preliminary objections to his complaint, seeking to have the complaint dismissed as a whole. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections as to DiNardo’s request for indemnification and counsel fees, but overruled the preliminary objections as to DiNardo’s medical malpractice claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling as to DiNardo’s request for indemnification and counsel fees, reversed the trial court’s ruling on his medical malpractice claims, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal with respect to the following issue: “Does the ‘no felony conviction recovery’ rule preclude the award of any civil damages or relief where [DiNardo] alleges that [he] would not benefit or profit from his own criminal acts, but rather would be compensated for alleged malpractice relating to the crimes for which he pleaded guilty to?”  The no felony conviction recovery rule is a common law principle, that a person should not be permitted to benefit from their own wrongdoing. The Pennsylvania Supreme started with the well-established premise that psychiatrists and psychologist are subject to liability for malpractice or professional negligence, including negligence related to treatment or lack thereof. However, the court then acknowledged that case law “firmly establishes” that persons convicted of serious crimes must bear the losses stemming from their criminal actions and public policy will not permit the responsibility for these losses to be shifted to others. Highlighting decisions from outside the Commonwealth, the court noted that other state courts routinely bar plaintiffs from seeking damages sustained as a result of their own criminal conduct, and courts are “virtually unanimous” in rejecting a patient’s attempt to shift responsibility for their criminal actions onto their psychiatrist or other healthcare providers. There are several public policies which are the basis for the no felony conviction recovery rule. The bedrock public policy is that injuries that arise from volitional criminal conduct should not provide a basis for a recovery in a civil action based in tort. The Supreme Court stated that allowing such a civil action would impact the criminal justice system and the public’s perception thereof, as the goal of finality and allocation of responsibility would be undercut by allowing such a civil action. The court also recognized the potential detrimental effects on the practice of psychiatric medicine, stating:  Allowing the recovery of damages from a mental healthcare provider for a patient’s criminal conduct could undermine trust between the patient and psychiatrist; encourage psychiatrists to refuse to treat, or avoid treating, certain patients; spur institutionalization and excessive medication out of concern for financial liability should patients be released from care and commit crimes; and would not respect the difficulty mental healthcare professionals face in predicting whether an individual poses a risk of violence. Finally, the court acknowledged that such civil actions would have a financial impact by potentially increasing health care costs if medical providers “became “guarantors” of the financial costs of the crimes committed by their patients. With all of these public policies considerations in mind, the court held that the no felony conviction recovery rule bars an individual from maintaining a tort action for damages that are sustained as the direct result of his volitional serious criminal acts and prohibits the person from recovering for losses which flowed from such acts. Regardless of whether the damages sought are considered profit, compensation, or a benefit, a criminal is barred from recovering damages that flowed from his criminal conduct.  This ruling creates another avenue for seeking dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims against a medical provider, particularly mental health professionals, at the preliminary objection stage of a proceeding. Further, the court’s consideration of the various public policy considerations may lead to the creation of additional novel arguments based on the same or similar public policy considerations, which may provide another avenue to seek the dismissal of a health care provider.  *Nicole works in our Scranton, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.