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Defense Digest

When Immunity Ends: What Galette v. NJ Transit Means for Liability Exposure

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2026

June 30, 2026

by Haleigh A. Catalano

Key Points:

  • The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit Corporation is not an arm of the state and cannot claim interstate sovereign immunity.
  • Plaintiffs can now sue NJ Transit in the state where an accident occurs, expanding litigation venues.
  • Forum selection risk increases, including plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions.
  • Expect higher defense costs and broader exposure in multi-state incidents.

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corporation, 607 U.S.(2026), marks a significant shift in how liability exposure is assessed for public transportation entities operating across state lines. In a unanimous ruling issued just last month, the Court held that NJ Transit does not qualify as an “arm of the state” for purposes of sovereign immunity. As a result, it can be sued in courts outside New Jersey.

This ruling has substantial consequences, particularly for insurers, risk managers, and defense counsel handling casualty and liability claims. Sovereign immunity is a tool used to protect states and certain state entities from being sued without consent, especially in federal or out-of-state courts. Historically, organizations tied to state governments have used this doctrine to limit where they can be sued.

Galette arose from separate accidents involving NJ Transit buses outside New Jersey state lines. One of the central cases involved Cedric Galette, who was injured in 2018, in Philadelphia, when a vehicle he occupied was struck by an NJ Transit bus. He filed suit in Pennsylvania. NJ Transit argued that, as an arm of the State of New Jersey, it could not be sued in another state’s courts. Lower courts rejected that position, and the issue ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. Writing for the majority, Justice Sonia Sotomayor emphasized that sovereign immunity protects the state itself, not every entity it creates. The key question the Court addressed in its opinion was whether the state structured the entity as legally separate from the state itself. In this case, the answer was yes. In simpler terms, the Court found that NJ Transit should not be treated the same as the State of New Jersey when it comes to lawsuits. This decision has broader implications for how liability risk is evaluated across a range of public and quasi-public entities.

Several factors informed the Court’s decision. First, the Court found that NJ Transit is a separate corporate entity with the power to sue and be sued, enter contracts, and hold property. Second, the Court found that it is financially independent: its debts and liabilities are not obligations of the State of New Jersey. Third, although the state exercises oversight, the Court found that this oversight did not override NJ Transit’s legal separateness. Taken together, the Court reasoned, these characteristics placed NJ Transit squarely outside the scope of sovereign immunity.

This decision carries immediate implications for casualty and insurance professionals. Most importantly, it expands litigation exposure; plaintiffs are no longer limited to suing NJ Transit in New Jersey. Instead, they may bring claims in the state where an accident occurs. This increases the likelihood of cases being filed in jurisdictions with more favorable laws, higher jury awards, or procedural advantages for plaintiffs, and creates uncertainty in claims handling. Insurers will now be required to account for variability in legal standards, jury behavior, and damages depending on where a case is filed. What might have been a predictable exposure in one jurisdiction can become far less certain in another.

The decision in Galette will also lead to an increased risk of forum shopping. Plaintiffs may strategically choose venues they believe will offer better outcomes, particularly in high-value bodily injury cases, complicating defense strategy and affecting every aspect of a case from early evaluation to settlement posture.

The Court’s reasoning is not limited to NJ Transit: it signals that other quasi-public entities, like regional transportation authorities or public utilities, may face similar challenges if they attempt to use sovereign immunity as a shield to lawsuits. Courts will look closely at how an entity is structured, including its financial independence and legal status, rather than relying on labels or general affiliations with a state.

For insurers, this decision raises important underwriting and risk assessment questions. Entities previously viewed as benefiting from immunity protections may now present broader and more complex exposure. Policy terms, limits, and pricing may need to be revisited to respond to an increased risk landscape.

The Galette opinion also holds cost implications for insurers and defense counsel. Defending cases in a variety of jurisdictions typically increases costs, as the need for local counsel and varied procedural rules are factors that now must be considered. In jurisdictions known for higher verdicts, indemnity exposure may rise as well. These factors are particularly relevant in matters involving bodily injury, mass transit incidents, and multi-party accidents.

In response to Galette, insurers and defense teams should place greater emphasis on early case strategy. Determining where a case may be filed and whether venue can be challenged will be critical issues to tackle early on. Coverage for public or quasi-public entities should take into consideration the possibility of multi-state exposure, increased defense obligations, and the potential for higher verdicts depending on the jurisdiction.

The broader significance of Galette lies in its message: courts are willing to scrutinize claims of sovereign immunity and will not extend protections automatically. Entities that operate with a degree of independence, even if those entities are publicly created, may be treated more like private actors for liability purposes.

For insurance professionals, the takeaway is straightforward: assumptions about immunity-based defenses should be revisited. Organizations that were once considered relatively insulated by sovereign immunity can now face expanded exposure, more complex litigation, and higher costs. In an environment where jurisdiction can significantly influence outcomes, Galette underscores the importance of anticipating not just whether a claim will be filed, but where it will be litigated.

Haleigh works in our Roseland, NJ office. He can be reached at (973) 618-4153 or HACatalano@MDWCG.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.