.

Haleigh A. Catalano

Portrait of Haleigh A. Catalano

Haleigh is an associate in the Casualty Department, where she focuses her practice on the defense of clients in a wide range of civil litigation matters, including premises liability, motor vehicle accidents, and general liability claims. 

Before joining the firm in September 2025, Haleigh served as a judicial law clerk in the Civil Division of the Essex County Superior Court for the Hon. Aldo J. Russo, J.S.C. During her clerkship, she conducted in-depth legal research and writing on a variety of civil matters, assisted in managing a high-volume docket, prepared bench memoranda, and draft opinions. In this role, she gained valuable experience in all phases of litigation, including motion practice, discovery disputes, settlement conferences, and trial preparation.

Haleigh earned her juris doctor, cum laude, from the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University in 2024. While in law school, she served as the Promotions Editor for the Pace Environmental Law Review, where she oversaw the publication’s outreach and contributed to the editorial process. She also served as Vice President of the Lambda Law Students Association, working to promote diversity and representation within the legal community. 

Outside of work, Haleigh enjoys traveling, reading, staying active through fitness, film photography, and exploring local restaurants.
 

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., cum laude, 2024)
    • American University (B.A., 2017)
    • New Jersey, 2025
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2025
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Puerto Rican Bar Association
    • The LGBT Bar Association of New York

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

When Immunity Ends: What Galette v. NJ Transit Means for Liability Exposure

June 30, 2026

Key Points: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit Corporation is not an arm of the state and cannot claim interstate sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs can now sue NJ Transit in the state where an accident occurs, expanding litigation venues. Forum selection risk increases, including plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. Expect higher defense costs and broader exposure in multi-state incidents. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corporation, 607 U.S.(2026), marks a significant shift in how liability exposure is assessed for public transportation entities operating across state lines. In a unanimous ruling issued just last month, the Court held that NJ Transit does not qualify as an “arm of the state” for purposes of sovereign immunity. As a result, it can be sued in courts outside New Jersey. This ruling has substantial consequences, particularly for insurers, risk managers, and defense counsel handling casualty and liability claims. Sovereign immunity is a tool used to protect states and certain state entities from being sued without consent, especially in federal or out-of-state courts. Historically, organizations tied to state governments have used this doctrine to limit where they can be sued. Galette arose from separate accidents involving NJ Transit buses outside New Jersey state lines. One of the central cases involved Cedric Galette, who was injured in 2018, in Philadelphia, when a vehicle he occupied was struck by an NJ Transit bus. He filed suit in Pennsylvania. NJ Transit argued that, as an arm of the State of New Jersey, it could not be sued in another state’s courts. Lower courts rejected that position, and the issue ultimately reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. Writing for the majority, Justice Sonia Sotomayor emphasized that sovereign immunity protects the state itself, not every entity it creates. The key question the Court addressed in its opinion was whether the state structured the entity as legally separate from the state itself. In this case, the answer was yes. In simpler terms, the Court found that NJ Transit should not be treated the same as the State of New Jersey when it comes to lawsuits. This decision has broader implications for how liability risk is evaluated across a range of public and quasi-public entities. Several factors informed the Court’s decision. First, the Court found that NJ Transit is a separate corporate entity with the power to sue and be sued, enter contracts, and hold property. Second, the Court found that it is financially independent: its debts and liabilities are not obligations of the State of New Jersey. Third, although the state exercises oversight, the Court found that this oversight did not override NJ Transit’s legal separateness. Taken together, the Court reasoned, these characteristics placed NJ Transit squarely outside the scope of sovereign immunity. This decision carries immediate implications for casualty and insurance professionals. Most importantly, it expands litigation exposure; plaintiffs are no longer limited to suing NJ Transit in New Jersey. Instead, they may bring claims in the state where an accident occurs. This increases the likelihood of cases being filed in jurisdictions with more favorable laws, higher jury awards, or procedural advantages for plaintiffs, and creates uncertainty in claims handling. Insurers will now be required to account for variability in legal standards, jury behavior, and damages depending on where a case is filed. What might have been a predictable exposure in one jurisdiction can become far less certain in another. The decision in Galette will also lead to an increased risk of forum shopping. Plaintiffs may strategically choose venues they believe will offer better outcomes, particularly in high-value bodily injury cases, complicating defense strategy and affecting every aspect of a case from early evaluation to settlement posture. The Court’s reasoning is not limited to NJ Transit: it signals that other quasi-public entities, like regional transportation authorities or public utilities, may face similar challenges if they attempt to use sovereign immunity as a shield to lawsuits. Courts will look closely at how an entity is structured, including its financial independence and legal status, rather than relying on labels or general affiliations with a state. For insurers, this decision raises important underwriting and risk assessment questions. Entities previously viewed as benefiting from immunity protections may now present broader and more complex exposure. Policy terms, limits, and pricing may need to be revisited to respond to an increased risk landscape. The Galette opinion also holds cost implications for insurers and defense counsel. Defending cases in a variety of jurisdictions typically increases costs, as the need for local counsel and varied procedural rules are factors that now must be considered. In jurisdictions known for higher verdicts, indemnity exposure may rise as well. These factors are particularly relevant in matters involving bodily injury, mass transit incidents, and multi-party accidents. In response to Galette, insurers and defense teams should place greater emphasis on early case strategy. Determining where a case may be filed and whether venue can be challenged will be critical issues to tackle early on. Coverage for public or quasi-public entities should take into consideration the possibility of multi-state exposure, increased defense obligations, and the potential for higher verdicts depending on the jurisdiction. The broader significance of Galette lies in its message: courts are willing to scrutinize claims of sovereign immunity and will not extend protections automatically. Entities that operate with a degree of independence, even if those entities are publicly created, may be treated more like private actors for liability purposes. For insurance professionals, the takeaway is straightforward: assumptions about immunity-based defenses should be revisited. Organizations that were once considered relatively insulated by sovereign immunity can now face expanded exposure, more complex litigation, and higher costs. In an environment where jurisdiction can significantly influence outcomes, Galette underscores the importance of anticipating not just whether a claim will be filed, but where it will be litigated. Haleigh works in our Roseland, NJ office. He can be reached at (973) 618-4153 or HACatalano@MDWCG.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.