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Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Court Finds Fact Issues on Visibility of Freestanding Sign’s Legs

Bogle v. D.N.D. Mkt. & Deli, 2026 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1157 (Pa. Super. April 29, 2026)

July 20, 2026

by Lauren E. Purcell

In a non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that when determining whether a freestanding sign was an open and obvious condition, the legs of the sign were to be considered separately and warranted separate analysis.

The plaintiff, while walking into the defendant store, tripped and fell on a leg of a freestanding lottery sign that was placed on the sidewalk outside of the store. While the plaintiff admitted she was able to observe the sign prior to the incident, she claimed that she did not notice the legs of the freestanding frame that supported the sign. The plaintiff filed negligence claims against the defendant store and, after discovery, the defendant store filed a motion for summary judgment.  In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant store argued that the sign was an open and obvious condition.  In her response in opposition, the plaintiff argued that the legs of the sign were not open and obvious, and created a tripping hazard. In support of her opposition, the plaintiff presented expert reports. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and ruled that there were no genuine issues of fact as to whether the sign was open and obvious. The trial court concluded that it did not consider the legs separate from the sign as a matter of law when considering the issue of whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Instead, the trial court found the sign with its legs was open and obvious. In support of its ruling, the trial court relied upon the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in Larose v. Berish, 334 A.3d 406 (Pa. Super. 2002). The plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that created genuine issues of material fact as to the open and obvious nature of the sign’s legs.  The Superior Court held the trial court erred when it determined that Larose required it to consider the sign and its legs as one to determine whether it was open and obvious.  The Superior Court reasoned that Larose does not stand for the proposition that an object resting on another object must be considered as one for purposes of determining whether the condition is open and obvious.  Instead, the Superior Court found the circumstances in Larose to be distinguishable and that Larose did not dictate as a matter of law that the legs of the sign created an open and obvious danger. The Superior Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant store and reversed the order.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.