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Legal Update for Florida Civil Litigation

Florida Passes Tort Reform: What You Need to Know

On March 24, 2023, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” into law. HB 837 contains sweeping tort reform that will uproot the landscape of Florida civil litigation. The changes apply to causes of action accruing after the effective date—March 24, 2023. Prior to the bill becoming law, plaintiffs’ firms, anticipating this monumental change, filed approximately 100,000 lawsuits. These filings represent approximately 77% of the total cases filed since January 1, 2023.[1] Below is a brief summary of the changes and the potential impact the new law brings. 
 
NEW MODIFIED COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 
 
HB 837 changes Florida’s standard from “pure” comparative negligence to “modified” comparative negligence. This aligns Florida with a majority of the other states who have already adopted a “modified” comparative negligence standard. This new standard does not apply in medical negligence actions.
 
Previously, a plaintiff was entitled to recover a percentage of damages proportionate to the degree of fault of the defendant. Under “modified” comparative negligence, if a plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover. 
 
This new standard will likely reduce the number of cases brought in which the plaintiff was the predominant cause of his or her own harm. 
 
TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR GENERAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
 
HB 837 amends section 95.11, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the statutes of limitations for various causes of action. The bill now reduces the statute of limitations for general negligence from four years to two years. 
 
This may encourage plaintiffs to file suit earlier as plaintiffs and their counsel will prepare their cause of action and evaluate the validity of their claims at an earlier juncture. This will also increase the ability to obtain evidence closer to the time of the alleged incident. 
 
Where liability is contested, plaintiffs may be deterred from filing suit sooner. The two-year statute of limitations could also be used as leverage to effectuate earlier settlement and resolution of claims, especially pre-suit. 
 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN PAST AND FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES 
 
HB 837 changes the evidence that plaintiffs can introduce to establish past and future medical expenses. Previously, with the exception of services paid by Medicare or Medicaid, plaintiffs were permitted to board the full amount of medical bills charged for services rendered. This was without evidence of any adjustments or reductions and was prior to a post-verdict setoff for adjustments by private insurance. If plaintiffs had Medicare or Medicaid, only the amounts actually paid by Medicare or Medicaid were admissible as evidence of past medical expenses. 
 
Now, the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. For unpaid past medical bills, admissible evidence will depend whether the plaintiff has health care coverage, Medicare, or Medicaid: 
 
•    If plaintiff has health care coverage but obtains treatment under letter of protection or does not submit charges, evidence of amount that health care coverage would have paid to satisfy charges, plus plaintiff’s share of medical expenses, is admissible. Evidence of reasonable amounts that were billed to plaintiff for medically-necessary treatment or services is also admissible. 
•    If plaintiff does not have insurance, or has Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of 120 percent of Medicare reimbursement rate in effect is admissible. 
•    If there is no applicable Medicare rate, evidence admissible is 170 percent of applicable state Medicaid rate. 
 
Damages that may be recovered may not include any amount in excess of the evidence of medical treatment and services expenses admitted. Further, it cannot exceed the sum of amounts actually paid, amounts necessary to satisfy charges due and owing, and the amounts necessary for reasonable and necessary future medical treatment and services. 
 
For future medical bills, the “usual and customary” amount also depends on whether the plaintiff has health care coverage: 
 
•    If plaintiff has health care coverage other than Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of amount that could be satisfied if charges were submitted, in addition to portion of medical expenses under insurance contract, is admissible. 
•    If plaintiff does not have insurance, or has Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of 120 percent of Medicare reimbursement rate in effect is admissible. 
•    If there is no applicable Medicare rate, evidence admissible is 170 percent of applicable state Medicaid rate. 
 
LETTERS OF PROTECTION AND REFERRALS MUST BE DISCLOSED 
 
If a plaintiff treats under a letter of protection, the letter of protection must be disclosed, as must all bills for medical expenses, which must be itemized and coded. Whether the plaintiff was referred for treatment under the letter of protection must also be disclosed, along with who referred the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is referred for treatment under a letter of protection by their attorney, disclosure of the referral is permitted, notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege, as the financial relationship between the law firm and the medical provider is relevant to the issue of bias of the testifying medical provider. This new law overturns the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., 228 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2017). 
 
BAD FAITH – NEW DUTY OF INSUREDS AND IMPACT ON DAMAGES 
 
Now, in every bad faith action in Florida, the insured, claimant, and/or their representative have a duty to act in good faith in providing information, making demands, setting deadlines, and attempting to settle the claim. The trier of fact may consider whether the insured, claimant and/or their representative acted in good faith and may reasonably reduce the amount of damages awarded. Mere negligence remains insufficient to bring a claim for bad faith against an insurer.
 
BAD FAITH – CHANGES TO 90-DAY PERIOD, ADMISSIBILITY, AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 
No bad faith action can lie if an insurer tenders the lesser of the policy limits or the amount demanded by the plaintiff within 90 days after receiving actual notice of the claim and sufficient evidence supporting the claim. It is not bad faith if the insurer does not tender, and the existence of the 90 days is inadmissible in any action seeking bad faith. Should the insurer not tender, the statute of limitations is extended for an additional 90 days. 
 
BAD FAITH – WHEN INSURER IS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO PAY POLICY LIMITS FOR MULTIPLE CLAIMS EXCEEDING LIMITS 
 
If multiple claims arising out of a single occurrence exceed the policy limits, the insurer is not liable beyond the policy limits for failure to pay any or all of the policy limits within 90 days if:
 
•    The insurer files an interpleader to determine rights of claims, and if found in excess of policy limits, claimants are entitled to a prorated share; or 
•    The insurer makes full policy limits available at binding arbitration, in which claimants are entitled to a pro rata share of policy limits as determined by the arbitrator, who must also consider comparative fault and the likely outcome of trial. If a claim is resolved by the arbitrator, a general release must be executed by the claimant to the insured party whose claim is resolved. 
 
NEGLIGENT SECURITY – NEW PRESUMPTION AGAINST LIABILITY AND CONSIDERATION OF FAULT OF ALL PARTIES
 
In a negligent security action against the owner or operator of real property by a person lawfully on the property who was harmed by the criminal act of a third party, the trier of fact is now required to consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the injury or death, including the criminal actor. Moreover, the owner or operator of the property cannot be held negligent for damages to a third party attempting to commit, or engaged in committing, any criminal act on the property. 
 
HB 837 also creates a presumption against negligent security liability for the owner or operator of a “multifamily residential property” if the burden of proof is met to demonstrate “substantial compliance” with crime assessments, crime and safety training for employees, and safety and security measures which include:
 
•    Security camera system at points of exit and entry that maintains the video retrievable for 30 days; 
•    A lighted parking lot from dusk to dawn; 
•    Lighting in common areas, porches, walkways, and laundry rooms from dusk to dawn; 
•    A deadbolt measuring at least one inch in every door; 
•    Locking devices on every window and sliding door; 
•    Locked gates at pool fence areas; and 
•    A peephole or viewer on door that does not have a window or window next to the door. 
 
CONTINGENCY FEE MULTIPLIER – NEW LODESTAR FEE PRESUMPTION
 
Previously, Florida case law allowed for courts to consider and award contingency fee multipliers to attorneys’ fees, based on factors which included but were not limited to: the relevant market if contingency fee multipliers were required to obtain competent counsel; whether the attorney mitigated the risk of nonpayment; the amount involved, the results obtained, the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and client; and likelihood of success at the outset of the action. 
 
HB 837 now changes the ability to obtain a contingency fee multiplier by creating a “strong presumption” that the “lodestar” fee, the number of hours which would have reasonably been spent by an attorney and multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate, is sufficient and reasonable. This can only be overcome in rare and exceptional circumstances in which evidence has been presented that competent counsel could otherwise not have been retained. 
 
ONE-WAY ATTORNEYS’ FEES – LIMITED APPLICABILITY 
 
Previously, “one-way attorneys’ fees” applied in situations in which an insured prevailed in an action against an insurer. One-way attorneys’ fees in insurance cases now only apply to declaratory judgment actions for the determination of insurance coverage against an insurer after a denial of coverage of a claim, which does not include a defense under a reservation of rights. If a declaratory judgment is granted in favor of the insured against the insurer, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees, which are limited to those incurred in the action. 
 
Further, section 768.79, Florida Statutes, also known as the “offer of judgment” or “proposal for judgment” statute, will apply to any civil action involving an insurance contract. 
 ______________________________________________
 

[1] Ron Hurtibise, Civil Case Filings Surge Before DeSantis Signed Sweeping Lawsuit Reform Bill, SUN-SENTINEL, (March 24, 2023, 6:55 p.m.), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-bz-case-filing-surge-before-tort-reform-20230324-7ze7uzxslbcndcaaessd4bmgzy-story.html.

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Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.