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Case Law Alerts

Barking Up the Wrong Tree? How the Supreme Court of Ohio Shortened the Leash on Landlord Liability for Statutory Dog-Bite Claims

L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2219.

July 20, 2026

by Adam J. Mintz

In a recent 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed whether the owner of a manufactured-home community that permits leashed dogs in common areas is a “harborer” of a dog under R.C. 955.28(B), Ohio’s dog-bite statute, which imposes strict liability on the “owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog” for injuries it causes, subject to limited exceptions.

The case arose after a child was bitten in the face by a tenant’s dog while playing on a playground within the defendant’s community. The plaintiff alleged that the community owner was a “harborer” of the dog that bit him and, therefore, strictly liable for his injuries. Although the Second District Court of Appeals agreed, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the case to determine the meaning of “harborer” under the statute.

Applying its plain and ordinary meaning, the Court held that to “harbor” a dog means to shelter, protect, or exercise control over it. While Ohio’s courts of appeals have long described a harborer as someone who has possession and control of the premises where the dog lives and silently acquiesces to its presence, the Court clarified that mere acquiescence is not enough; to harbor a dog requires one to actively shelter, protect, or exercise control over it. Because Sun did not shelter, protect, or exercise control over the tenant’s dog, the Court concluded it was not a harborer of it.

This decision significantly changes how statutory dog-bite claims against landlords and other property owners will be analyzed. Specifically, rather than focusing on who controls the premises where the dog is kept, courts must now focus on who controls the dog itself. As a result, it will be considerably more difficult to classify landlords as harborers under R.C. 955.28(B). Importantly, the decision does not eliminate a property owner’s liability for common-law negligence claims. Property owners may still face liability if, for example, they knew of a dog’s repeated aggressive behavior or ignored lease violations. The decision narrows only one avenue of recovery. Landlords should still enforce their pet policies, document complaints, and respond to reports of dangerous animals.

Nonetheless, for landlords and their insurers, this opinion provides a meaningful new defense against statutory dog-bite claims. Ownership or maintenance of common areas, standing alone, no longer automatically exposes a property owner to strict liability for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog. Plaintiffs will need stronger evidence that the defendant actively sheltered, protected, or exercised control over the dog that caused the injury.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.