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G. Mark Thompson

President & CEO

Chairman, Executive Committee

Portrait of G. Mark Thompson

As President and CEO of Marshall Dennehey, Mark is responsible for the day-to-day management and business strategy of the firm which consists of 500 attorneys operating out of 19 offices throughout Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio and Florida. He was elected to the position in December of 2017 after serving more than three years on the Executive Committee and a decade on the Board of Directors. He succeeded Tom Brophy who served in the role for 13 years.

Mark is joined by a management team comprised of two other senior executives, a Board of Directors, managing attorneys from every office, practice group supervisors, administrative directors and over 1,000 employees who combine their talents to develop and implement the strategies and achieve the objectives of the firm and its clients.

Prior to moving to the firm's Philadelphia headquarters in 2014, Mark also served as the regional managing attorney for its four Florida offices. A Florida native, it was there he built a reputation as a "go to" attorney advising Fortune 500 clients in high profile, high exposure and often crisis  situations. During his career he has handled matters that attracted international media attention, are the subject of books, a documentary film and in one instance a hearing before the US House of Representatives in Washington DC, at which Mark represented one of the corporations testifying.

Mark has more than 30 years of experience in the legal profession, is rated AV Preeminent by Martindale Hubble, was recognized in 2006, 2007, 2013 and 2014 as a Florida Super Lawyer and in 2012 as one of Florida's Legal Elite by Florida Trend magazine. He is admitted to practice before the Florida Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. He has tried cases in county, circuit, and federal courts and argued before the District Courts of Appeal. In 2012 he also became licensed to practice in Pennsylvania.

Prior to attending law school, Mark spent two years working as an insurance adjuster. The experience continues to inform his understanding of the critical needs of claims professionals.

His civic activities include serving on the Board of Directors of Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia, a legal aid organization assisting the disadvantaged, whose north Philadelphia clinic was started and is staffed every month by Mark and his colleagues from Marshall Dennehey. Mark also has served on the Grants Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Foundation.

    • Cumberland School of Law (J.D., 1989)
    • University of Florida (B.A., 1984)
    • Florida, 1989
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 1990
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 1998
    • Pennsylvania, 2012
    • Supreme Court of the United States
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Florida Super Lawyers (2006-2007, 2013-2014)
    • Florida Trend Magazine's Florida Legal Elite, 2012
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2018-2022)
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Defense Research Institute
    • International Amusement & Leisure Defense Association
    • International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA)
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • The Best Offense is a Good Defense: Managing Liability Claims in Today's Litigious Environment, Business Insurance Webinar, August 12, 2015
    • The Claim Management Link: Interplay Between Risk Tolerance, Operational Structure, Litigation and Claim Outcomes, CLM Annual Conference, March 2015
    • Florida Premises Liability - Investigation and Defense
    • Florida Liquor Liability
    • Spoliation of Evidence
    • Defended a corporation and obtained summary judgments in multiple federal lawsuits alleging sponsorship, production, distribution and sale of videos depicting plaintiffs' underage participation in various spring break contests.
    • Defended a manufacturer and obtained satisfactory confidential resolution of claims brought by 51 factory employees alleging toxic exposure.
    • Defended a state agency and obtained defense verdict in wrongful death trial alleging inadequate traffic control.
    • Defended a major insurer and obtained defense verdict in trial brought by owner of an oddities museum whose collection and building was completely destroyed by fire.
    • Defended a tourist destination and obtained summary judgment in a negligence action brought by a contracted performer rendered quadriplegic as a result of an accident during a gymnastic slam dunk exhibition.
    • Defended a company and obtained defense verdict on appeal in lawsuit alleging bottle "exploded" while being handled by plaintiff.
    • Defended a tourist destination and obtained defense verdict in trial alleging inadequate slip resistance of drainage grates.
    • Defended and settled numerous lawsuits involving tractor trailer rollovers allegedly caused by improper loading of cargo.
    • For nearly 20 years, defended theme parks and tourist destinations throughout Florida in hundreds of cases involving amusement rides, wild animals, negligent security, E-coli outbreaks, slip and falls, defamation, food poisoning, false imprisonment and matters of intellectual property.
    • Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Lenz, 669 So.2d 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    • Becton v. Metal Container Corp., 856 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    • Jordan v. Sea World of Florida, Inc., 938 So.2d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    • Badillo v. Anheuser-Busch, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 641 (M.D. Fla. 2006)

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.