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G. Mark Thompson

President & CEO

Chairman, Executive Committee

Portrait of G. Mark Thompson

As President and CEO of Marshall Dennehey, Mark is responsible for the day-to-day management and business strategy of the firm which consists of 500 attorneys operating out of 19 offices throughout Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio and Florida. He was elected to the position in December of 2017 after serving more than three years on the Executive Committee and a decade on the Board of Directors. He succeeded Tom Brophy who served in the role for 13 years.

Mark is joined by a management team comprised of two other senior executives, a Board of Directors, managing attorneys from every office, practice group supervisors, administrative directors and over 1,000 employees who combine their talents to develop and implement the strategies and achieve the objectives of the firm and its clients.

Prior to moving to the firm's Philadelphia headquarters in 2014, Mark also served as the regional managing attorney for its four Florida offices. A Florida native, it was there he built a reputation as a "go to" attorney advising Fortune 500 clients in high profile, high exposure and often crisis  situations. During his career he has handled matters that attracted international media attention, are the subject of books, a documentary film and in one instance a hearing before the US House of Representatives in Washington DC, at which Mark represented one of the corporations testifying.

Mark has more than 30 years of experience in the legal profession, is rated AV Preeminent by Martindale Hubble, was recognized in 2006, 2007, 2013 and 2014 as a Florida Super Lawyer and in 2012 as one of Florida's Legal Elite by Florida Trend magazine. He is admitted to practice before the Florida Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. He has tried cases in county, circuit, and federal courts and argued before the District Courts of Appeal. In 2012 he also became licensed to practice in Pennsylvania.

Prior to attending law school, Mark spent two years working as an insurance adjuster. The experience continues to inform his understanding of the critical needs of claims professionals.

His civic activities include serving on the Board of Directors of Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia, a legal aid organization assisting the disadvantaged, whose north Philadelphia clinic was started and is staffed every month by Mark and his colleagues from Marshall Dennehey. Mark also has served on the Grants Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Foundation.

    • Cumberland School of Law (J.D., 1989)
    • University of Florida (B.A., 1984)
    • Florida, 1989
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 1990
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 1998
    • Pennsylvania, 2012
    • Supreme Court of the United States
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Florida Super Lawyers (2006-2007, 2013-2014)
    • Florida Trend Magazine's Florida Legal Elite, 2012
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2018-2022)
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Defense Research Institute
    • International Amusement & Leisure Defense Association
    • International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA)
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • The Best Offense is a Good Defense: Managing Liability Claims in Today's Litigious Environment, Business Insurance Webinar, August 12, 2015
    • The Claim Management Link: Interplay Between Risk Tolerance, Operational Structure, Litigation and Claim Outcomes, CLM Annual Conference, March 2015
    • Florida Premises Liability - Investigation and Defense
    • Florida Liquor Liability
    • Spoliation of Evidence
    • Defended a corporation and obtained summary judgments in multiple federal lawsuits alleging sponsorship, production, distribution and sale of videos depicting plaintiffs' underage participation in various spring break contests.
    • Defended a manufacturer and obtained satisfactory confidential resolution of claims brought by 51 factory employees alleging toxic exposure.
    • Defended a state agency and obtained defense verdict in wrongful death trial alleging inadequate traffic control.
    • Defended a major insurer and obtained defense verdict in trial brought by owner of an oddities museum whose collection and building was completely destroyed by fire.
    • Defended a tourist destination and obtained summary judgment in a negligence action brought by a contracted performer rendered quadriplegic as a result of an accident during a gymnastic slam dunk exhibition.
    • Defended a company and obtained defense verdict on appeal in lawsuit alleging bottle "exploded" while being handled by plaintiff.
    • Defended a tourist destination and obtained defense verdict in trial alleging inadequate slip resistance of drainage grates.
    • Defended and settled numerous lawsuits involving tractor trailer rollovers allegedly caused by improper loading of cargo.
    • For nearly 20 years, defended theme parks and tourist destinations throughout Florida in hundreds of cases involving amusement rides, wild animals, negligent security, E-coli outbreaks, slip and falls, defamation, food poisoning, false imprisonment and matters of intellectual property.
    • Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Lenz, 669 So.2d 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    • Becton v. Metal Container Corp., 856 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    • Jordan v. Sea World of Florida, Inc., 938 So.2d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    • Badillo v. Anheuser-Busch, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 641 (M.D. Fla. 2006)

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.