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SIU Spotlight

Fraud Act and RICO Claims Belong in Court, Says NJ Appellate Court

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Ariel C. Brownstein

The ongoing battle over whether disputes under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Fraud Act) and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act (RICO) can be litigated in court recently resulted in a favorable determination for insurance carriers in the New Jersey Appellate Division case of Allstate v. Carteret Comprehensive Care, PC, et al., No. A-4605-91 (App. Div. January 9, 2025). 

In March 2023, Allstate Insurance filed a complaint against more than 30 defendants, alleging violations of the Fraud Act and RICO, among other claims. A group of defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. On October 27, 2023, the trial court issued three orders granting the moving defendants’ request, compelling all claims asserted by Allstate to arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA). The trial court ruled that AICRA’s language mandated arbitration for all disputes concerning the recovery of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, that any party to the dispute could invoke arbitration, and that the arbitration provision covered a broad range of legal disputes related to PIP benefits. 

Allstate appealed the order dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration, arguing the trial court erred because: (1) AICRA could not strip the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Fraud Act and RICO; (2) AICRA only mandates arbitration for disputes regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits under PIP; (3) AICRA, the Fraud Act, and RICO do not support the conclusion that fraud claims can be subject to PIP arbitration; and (4) statutory interpretation does not support the notion that claims under the Fraud Act and RICO should be arbitrated.

The Appellate Division distinguished the objectives of the PIP arbitration process from those of the Fraud Act and RICO. The court emphasized that PIP arbitrators have limited discovery enforcement powers and discovery in PIP arbitration is confined to assessing the nature, extent, and validity of a PIP claim. Furthermore, PIP benefits are statutory in origin, and remedies for their denial are restricted to interest and attorneys’ fees. 

In contrast, the Fraud Act and RICO serve broader purposes, such as combating insurance fraud and addressing serious threats to New Jersey’s political, social, and economic institutions. The Fraud Act allows for the recovery of compensatory damages, investigative expenses, costs, attorneys’ fees, and, when a pattern of fraud is established, treble damages. RICO provides both civil and criminal sanctions. The court astutely noted that PIP arbitration regulations do not expressly provide for injunctive relief, compensatory damages, treble damages, or attorneys’ fees for an insurance carrier. 

Additionally, the court highlighted that PIP arbitration rules do not allow for (1) broad discovery, (2) discovery from third parties, or (3) the joinder of third parties. Ultimately, the court concluded that AICRA’s history demonstrated that PIP arbitration was intended as an expedited and streamlined process strictly for resolving PIP benefit disputes.

The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that they had a right to arbitration under Allstate’s Decision Point Review Plan (DPRP). It determined that by referencing N.J.A.C. 11:3, Allstate had made clear that arbitration under its DPRP was no broader than PIP arbitration under AICRA. Since the plan’s scope was identical to AICRA, the defendants had no independent right to arbitration under the DPRP.

Additionally, Allstate argued that interpreting AICRA to require arbitration for insurance fraud claims would violate its constitutional right to a jury trial under the Fraud Act and RICO. The New Jersey Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial for statutory causes of action sounding in law, as affirmed in Lajara. While private parties may waive this right through arbitration agreements, the Legislature cannot mandate such waivers without allowing for a de novo jury trial, per Jersey Central Power & Light

The court noted that arbitration for PIP claims is permissible because there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for determining PIP entitlements, as established in Endo Surgi Center. By limiting AICRA’s arbitration provision to PIP claims and excluding fraud claims, the court avoided potential constitutional conflicts, adhering to the principle of statutory interpretation that preserves constitutionality.

A key issue was the conflicting decision from the Third Circuit in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024). In GEICO, the Third Circuit held that Fraud Act claims are arbitrable under AICRA. However, the Appellate Division noted that this decision was not binding on the case before it and disagreed with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of New Jersey law. 

The Appellate Division found that the Third Circuit had reasoned that AICRA’s arbitration provisions implicitly encompassed fraud claims but had overlooked the distinct legislative purposes of AICRA and the Fraud Act. The Third Circuit also relied on arbitration agreements in GEICO’s DPRP and assignment forms, but the Appellate Division had already determined that these were limited by AICRA’s regulations to PIP arbitration. Ultimately, the Appellate Division rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusions as unpersuasive.

Given the impracticalities of litigating Fraud Act and RICO claims through arbitration, the Appellate Division correctly distinguished between PIP claims involving medical providers—intended for arbitration—and claims brought by insurance carriers under the Fraud Act and RICO, which were meant to be litigated in court. 

After a series of setbacks in federal court on these issues, this decision by the Appellate Division strengthens insurance carriers’ ability to investigate and litigate Fraud Act and RICO claims in the appropriate judicial forum rather than through limited arbitration proceedings.

*Ari is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, NJ office and a member of the Insurance Fraud/SIU Practice Group. (856) 414.6075 | ACBrownstein@mdwcg.com 



 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.