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SIU Spotlight

Fraud Act and RICO Claims Belong in Court, Says NJ Appellate Court

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Ariel C. Brownstein

The ongoing battle over whether disputes under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Fraud Act) and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act (RICO) can be litigated in court recently resulted in a favorable determination for insurance carriers in the New Jersey Appellate Division case of Allstate v. Carteret Comprehensive Care, PC, et al., No. A-4605-91 (App. Div. January 9, 2025). 

In March 2023, Allstate Insurance filed a complaint against more than 30 defendants, alleging violations of the Fraud Act and RICO, among other claims. A group of defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. On October 27, 2023, the trial court issued three orders granting the moving defendants’ request, compelling all claims asserted by Allstate to arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA). The trial court ruled that AICRA’s language mandated arbitration for all disputes concerning the recovery of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, that any party to the dispute could invoke arbitration, and that the arbitration provision covered a broad range of legal disputes related to PIP benefits. 

Allstate appealed the order dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration, arguing the trial court erred because: (1) AICRA could not strip the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Fraud Act and RICO; (2) AICRA only mandates arbitration for disputes regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits under PIP; (3) AICRA, the Fraud Act, and RICO do not support the conclusion that fraud claims can be subject to PIP arbitration; and (4) statutory interpretation does not support the notion that claims under the Fraud Act and RICO should be arbitrated.

The Appellate Division distinguished the objectives of the PIP arbitration process from those of the Fraud Act and RICO. The court emphasized that PIP arbitrators have limited discovery enforcement powers and discovery in PIP arbitration is confined to assessing the nature, extent, and validity of a PIP claim. Furthermore, PIP benefits are statutory in origin, and remedies for their denial are restricted to interest and attorneys’ fees. 

In contrast, the Fraud Act and RICO serve broader purposes, such as combating insurance fraud and addressing serious threats to New Jersey’s political, social, and economic institutions. The Fraud Act allows for the recovery of compensatory damages, investigative expenses, costs, attorneys’ fees, and, when a pattern of fraud is established, treble damages. RICO provides both civil and criminal sanctions. The court astutely noted that PIP arbitration regulations do not expressly provide for injunctive relief, compensatory damages, treble damages, or attorneys’ fees for an insurance carrier. 

Additionally, the court highlighted that PIP arbitration rules do not allow for (1) broad discovery, (2) discovery from third parties, or (3) the joinder of third parties. Ultimately, the court concluded that AICRA’s history demonstrated that PIP arbitration was intended as an expedited and streamlined process strictly for resolving PIP benefit disputes.

The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that they had a right to arbitration under Allstate’s Decision Point Review Plan (DPRP). It determined that by referencing N.J.A.C. 11:3, Allstate had made clear that arbitration under its DPRP was no broader than PIP arbitration under AICRA. Since the plan’s scope was identical to AICRA, the defendants had no independent right to arbitration under the DPRP.

Additionally, Allstate argued that interpreting AICRA to require arbitration for insurance fraud claims would violate its constitutional right to a jury trial under the Fraud Act and RICO. The New Jersey Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial for statutory causes of action sounding in law, as affirmed in Lajara. While private parties may waive this right through arbitration agreements, the Legislature cannot mandate such waivers without allowing for a de novo jury trial, per Jersey Central Power & Light

The court noted that arbitration for PIP claims is permissible because there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for determining PIP entitlements, as established in Endo Surgi Center. By limiting AICRA’s arbitration provision to PIP claims and excluding fraud claims, the court avoided potential constitutional conflicts, adhering to the principle of statutory interpretation that preserves constitutionality.

A key issue was the conflicting decision from the Third Circuit in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024). In GEICO, the Third Circuit held that Fraud Act claims are arbitrable under AICRA. However, the Appellate Division noted that this decision was not binding on the case before it and disagreed with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of New Jersey law. 

The Appellate Division found that the Third Circuit had reasoned that AICRA’s arbitration provisions implicitly encompassed fraud claims but had overlooked the distinct legislative purposes of AICRA and the Fraud Act. The Third Circuit also relied on arbitration agreements in GEICO’s DPRP and assignment forms, but the Appellate Division had already determined that these were limited by AICRA’s regulations to PIP arbitration. Ultimately, the Appellate Division rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusions as unpersuasive.

Given the impracticalities of litigating Fraud Act and RICO claims through arbitration, the Appellate Division correctly distinguished between PIP claims involving medical providers—intended for arbitration—and claims brought by insurance carriers under the Fraud Act and RICO, which were meant to be litigated in court. 

After a series of setbacks in federal court on these issues, this decision by the Appellate Division strengthens insurance carriers’ ability to investigate and litigate Fraud Act and RICO claims in the appropriate judicial forum rather than through limited arbitration proceedings.

*Ari is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, NJ office and a member of the Insurance Fraud/SIU Practice Group. (856) 414.6075 | ACBrownstein@mdwcg.com 



 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

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Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.