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SIU Spotlight

Class Action Out of Minnesota with Potential Impacts on Litigating and Negotiating Major Case

SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024

July 1, 2024

by Matthew J. Burdalski

A class action suit is brewing in Minnesota which has the potential for major implications in the way major case investigations are litigated and negotiated. In Taqueria El Primo LLC et al. v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. et al., Civil No. 19-3071, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota has certified a class action against Illinois Farms Insurance. The plaintiffs allege that so called “no-bill” or billing moratorium agreements between Farmers and certain medical providers are in violation of the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act and the terms of the policy of insurance. the plaintiffs further allege that the billing limitations impacted have the potential to affect the ability of insureds to use PIP benefits under their policies to seek treatment with health care providers of their choice.

Following SIU investigations revealing what Farmers believed to be fraudulent billing practices on the part of certain health care providers treating its insureds, Farmers entered into confidential settlement agreements with those health care providers in the state of Minnesota in which the providers agreed, in exchange for a settlement of Farmers’ claims, to not bill Farmers for treatment to its insureds. There were various such agreements with differing terms and conditions. The agreements, again with some exceptions, were also confidential per the terms and the settlements. Often, the confidentiality of the agreements was requested by the health care providers.

The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging those non-disclosed agreements constituted unfair and illegal practices on the part of Farmers, resulting in the class members not receiving the value guaranteed by the policies of insurance purchased as they would not be able to use their No-Fault Benefits with any health care provider covered by such agreements. The plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief voiding any such existing agreements. 

Farmers contends that the agreements were at all times legally permissible and has denied any and all violations of Minnesota law. Farmers argued that there was no proof at all from any class representative that medical treatment was sought and denied as a result of any no-bill agreement and that such agreements touched so small a percentage of available providers in the State there was no likelihood of any actual damage to any class member. 

The court ultimately approved the class action for monetary and injunctive relief on the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (MCFA) claim only. Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court agreed there had been no actual breach applicable to the class since there would need to be individualized evidence of a claim denied based on the at-issue agreements for the members of the Class. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim was similarly dismissed as there could be no theory of damages applicable to the class as a whole. 

Regarding the MCFA claim, the court allowed the same to go forward. The MCFA prohibits the “act, use or employment by any person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby…” Minn. Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1. In short, the court found that the MCFA claim could proceed since it is not necessary to show any individual consumer’s reliance on the purported wrongful conduct. All that is required is a causal nexus between the conduct and the damages of the plaintiffs established through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court found the case raises several common questions applicable to all class members: 

  • Whether the billing limitations violate the No-Fault Act;
  • Whether the billing limitations violated the policies; 
  • Whether Farmers would have been able to sell the policies with the limitations at all;
  • Whether Farmers would have been able to sell the policies only if it disclosed the limitations’ and 
  • Whether under Minnesota law it is inherently material and harmful to all purchasers as a matter of law, irrespective of individual consumer differences, if a company was only able to sell a product by fraudulently omitting a fact that if disclosed the company would have been barred from selling.

The court likewise found that resolution of those questions posed several common questions of law which predominated over any differences between the class members. Finally, the court found that, if the plaintiffs’ theories were correct, damages could be measured on a class-wide basis, thus meeting the final elements necessary for class certification. 

The court did not engage in any discussion of the merits of the claims, but the very fact that the classes were certified and the legality of the no-bill agreements will now be litigated is a substantial development for the insurance community and SIU specifically. The failure to disclose the no-bill agreements to current and prospective insureds seems to have been the sticking point with the court. However, as previously noted, that confidentiality was bargained for by, in most cases, the health providers and their attorneys.

No-bill agreements have been an important tool utilized by insures and SIU to effectively prevent further fraudulent billing by bad actor health care providers taking advantage of No-Fault benefits across the country. Such agreements arguably work to the benefit of insureds by preventing improper treatment and billing and keeping fraudulent actors at bay, resulting in reduced premiums. However, this current legal landscape puts those agreements directly at risk and should be followed closely. 

Matt is a shareholder in the firm’s Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group where he focuses primarily on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud. His practice in the area of fraud investigation involves the assessment and evaluation of both medical provider fraud and fraudulent claims on the part of his clients’ insureds. 


 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.