.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2024

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    Commonwealth Court holds that an employer’s failure to reimburse a claimant for out-of-pocket payments for CBD oil is in violation of the Act.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, Pa. C. (WCAB), 305 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The employer violated the Act for failing to reimburse the pro-se claimant for out-of-pocket expenses used to purchase CBD oil for treatment of his low back injury. The workers’ compensation judge properly found that CBD oil is a medical supply the employer was obligated to pay for under the Act, that the claimant properly submitted receipts to the employer for reimbursement and that the employer did not pay for medical treatment as obligated to under the Act. In April, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the employer’s appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision. The court will consider the issues of whether CBD oil and other products that may be purchased without a prescription from a health care provider are “medical services” and/or “medicines and supplies” under Section 306 (f.1) of the Act, whether the cost containment regulations of the Act apply to CBD oil, and whether Section 306(f.1) of the Act requires direct reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for “medical services” and “medicines and supplies.” If so, are claimants required to submit supporting documentation (medical records, prescriptions, HCFAs) for reimbursement?

2.    Commonwealth Court holds that the claimant, a truck driver, was not subjected to abnormal working conditions from a minor truck fire which was extinguished in two minutes and without physical injury occurring to anyone.
Premium Transportation Staffing, Inc. v. Welker (WCAB), 305 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The claimant was trained to anticipate and respond to fires, had a fire extinguisher on the truck, was not trapped in the cab during the fire, and was able to leave the cab and retreat safely. The fire also lasted two to three minutes and was put out with assistance from another driver.

3.    Although a claimant may not have been at work with a concurrent employer on the date of a work injury with another employer, her relationship with the concurrent employer was sufficiently intact; thus, concurrent wages must be included in calculating her average weekly wage.
Resources for Human Development, Inc. and Gallagher Bassett Services v. Sherry Dixon (WCAB), 306 A.3d 1019 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The claimant’s concurrent employment was sufficiently intact at the time of the work injury because she continued to work as a home health aide for the concurrent employer after her injury with the employer, as well as after her last day of employment with the employer. 

4.    Injuries sustained by a claimant while commuting are not compensable under the Act as the claimant was not a traveling employee with no fixed place of work.
Jorge Martinez v. Lewis Tree Service (WCAB), 310 A.3d 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

The claimant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while commuting home from his work as a tree trimmer, was not a traveling employee without a fixed place of employment for purposes of an exception to the “coming and going” rule. The claimant drove his personal vehicle to and from his home, his workday started at the employer’s yard where their trucks were parked, he drove the trucks to job sites and returned to the yard at the end of the workday. Additionally, the claimant was not reimbursed for travel expenses, did not store equipment at his home and was not furthering the employer’s business while commuting home in his personal vehicle. A change of work location during the day, or from day to day, does not make a claimant a traveling employee. 

5.    The Bureau is directed to identify and publish in the Pennsylvania Bulletin a different, nationally recognized schedule for valuing pharmaceuticals.
Federated Insurance Company v. Summit Pharmacy (Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office), 308 A.3d 329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

The use of a private publisher’s schedule of pharmaceutical prices in determining average wholesale prices (AWP) to resolve payment disputes for pharmaceuticals was found inconsistent with AWP as used in the Act governing prescription reimbursement in worker’s compensation cases. Furthermore, reliance on private schedule values of AWP to calculate the amount the insurer is to reimburse a pharmacy was inappropriate. 

6.    Exclusion of counsel fees from payment of future medical benefits on the basis that claimant’s future medical expenses are speculative was contrary to Section 306(f.1)(7) of the Act, which prohibits providers from billing a claimant for any costs relating to care under the Act.
Patrice Williams v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB), 312 A.3d 976 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Although the claimant’s future medical expenses were undetermined, such that the amount of counsel fees based on medical expenses could not yet be determined, there was no requirement that the fee agreement could only apply to past or fixed medical expenses. Moreover, the Act’s prohibition on a medical provider billing a claimant for any costs related to medical care for a compensable injury applies to amounts deducted from the medical provider’s bills for counsel fees. 

7.    Under Section 440 of the Act, an unreasonable contest will always result in an award of attorney’s fees and a reasonable contest may result in an attorney’s fee award.
Glenny Torres v. Amazon.com Services LLC (WCAB), 313 A.3d 486 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

An award of attorney’s fees is mandatory when a workers’ compensation judge resolves a contest in favor of the claimant and finds the basis of the employer’s contest was unreasonable. An employer is not automatically absolved from exposure to attorney’s fees whenever its contest is deemed reasonable in a workers’ compensation matter; instead, a workers’ compensation judge has discretion to either award or exclude attorney’s fees if the workers’ compensation judge determines the contest is reasonable.

8.    A pharmacy staffed by a pharmacist supplied by an employee leasing agency is a provider as defined by Section 109 of the Act. When a physician has ownership interest in said pharmacy, a referral to the pharmacy violates the Act’s self-referral prohibition.
700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office & SWIF, 315 A.3d 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Drugs and pharmaceutical services fall within “goods and services” as governed by the anti-referral provision of the Act. Thus, Fee Review applications associated with prescriptions filled for a claimant initiated by a pharmacist were properly denied for originating from a prohibited self-referral. The pharmacy did not dispute that the prescribing physician had a financial interest in the pharmacy.

9.    Commonwealth Court holds that a claimant who was the sole proprietor is required to provide notice of a work-related injury to the workers’ compensation insurance carrier within 120 days of occurrence of the injury. 
Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. David Heater (WCAB), 316 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Where a claimant is both the injured employee and the sole proprietor/employer, the “employer” to whom the claimant must notify of a work-related injury under the Act is the insurer that bears the ultimate liability for the claim. This allows the insurer to ensure that the prompt and complete investigation into the claimed injury, which would normally be performed by a disinterested employer, can be performed to protect against stale claims. Failure of the sole proprietor/claimant to give notice to his workers’ compensation insurer within 21 days of his injury, as required, precluded his Claim Petition. On December 17, 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the claimant’s appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision. They will consider the issue of whether the 21-day notice requirement of Section 311 of the Act is satisfied when the claimant gives notice solely to the employer.

10.    Acts 121 and Act 126 signed into law by Governor Shapiro.

On October 30, 2024, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro signed into law two significant workers’ compensation bills that were recently passed by the State Legislature. Act 126 establishes direct deposit for the payment of wage benefits to claimants. Act 121 relates to first responders and post-traumatic stress injuries (PTSI). First responder claimants will no longer have to prove that a psychiatric injury was caused by abnormal working conditions. The law applies to specified categories of public employees, stipulates that PTSI must result from an individual undergoing a qualifying traumatic event and limits benefits to 104 weeks. A diagnosis to be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist is required, and claims must be filed within three years of a diagnosis. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Congress Passes Financial Exploitation Prevention Act

On June 25, 2026, the House passed the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025 (“the Act”) by a vote of 414 to 2. The Act allows financial advisors and firms to delay suspicious transactions regarding the accounts of clients who are 65 or older, if they believe financial exploitation has occurred or is about to take place. With the advancement of technology and AI, the House’s overwhelming bipartisan passage of the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act represents an important step in strengthening the financial industry’s ability to combat the growing threat of elder financial exploitation. The Act recognizes what advisors have long known that financial professionals are often the first to detect suspicious behavior but have historically lacked clear legal authority to intervene before irreversible financial harm occurs. From the industry’s perspective, the bill accomplishes several important objectives, including the following: (1) Provides a practical “pause button” by allowing financial professionals to temporarily delay certain transaction requests when there is a reasonable belief that a senior or vulnerable adult is being financially exploited; (2) Empowers financial professionals to act by providing greater certainty that firms can act in good faith to protect clients without unnecessary legal risk; and (3) Strengthens investor protection without sacrificing client rights by allowing temporary delays based on a reasonable suspicion of exploitation, which is intended only to allow additional review and not to deny clients access to their money indefinitely. In sum, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act will equip financial professionals with practical, carefully tailored tools to stop suspected financial exploitation before client assets are lost. By allowing firms to temporarily delay suspicious transactions under defined circumstances, Congress is recognizing the critical role advisors play as the first line of defense against increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. The Act strikes an appropriate balance between protecting vulnerable investors and preserving individual financial autonomy, while reinforcing collaboration among advisors, families, and law enforcement to combat financial exploitation. The bill now awaits Senate action.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998. For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer. In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability. The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline. Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter. The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant. The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing. The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations. As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer. The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements. Therefore, the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements. For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.