Frank provides seasoned defense counsel to employers, insurance carriers and third-party administrators across the full spectrum of workers’ compensation matters. His practice blends deep legal knowledge with a solutions oriented approach that supports clients both inside and outside the courtroom. In addition to his litigation work, Frank regularly advises on risk management practices designed to prevent claims before they arise.
Clients value Frank’s ability to pair innovative legal strategy with real‑world practicality, achieving favorable outcomes while reducing exposure and controlling costs.
An accomplished writer, Frank’s articles on trending issues impacting workers' compensation have appeared in various publications. He also provides monthly Pennsylvania case law updates for the firm's What's Hot In Workers' Comp newsletter. In addition, Frank is a frequent speaker for local and national employer and insurance industry groups. He is an active member of the Montgomery County Bar Association, the Claims & Litigation Management Alliance, and the RIMS Delaware Valley Chapter.
Frank received his undergraduate degree from Villanova University and his juris doctor from the Widener University School of Law.
Results
The defense successfully proves flaw in claimant’s expert testimony
We successfully defended a Claim Petition on behalf of a national trucking company where the claimant alleged a disabling aggravation of a pre-existing cervical condition from a fall at work. Our thorough review of the medical records and the presentation of the evidence convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof on causation. While providing the requisite direct testimony, on cross examination, the claimant’s expert admitted when he first saw the claimant one month after the work incident, the claimant had a head droop from cervical fusion surgery five months before the date of injury, and said that surgery “unrelated” to the work injury would be needed to correct it. This was inconsistent with the expert’s direct examination testimony, which was that the work incident had caused the head droop. Further, with the employer’s expert, who reviewed the testimony of the claimant’s expert and reviewed all medical records pre- and post-incident, we were able to establish that the opinion of the claimant’s expert was flawed, pointing out that the claimant’s expert failed to perform a side-by-side comparison of pre-injury diagnostic studies to post-injury studies, which would indicate whether the head droop was a slow progression from the prior surgery or due to a traumatic incident. The Judge found that the claimant’s expert failed to adequately explain what he saw in the studies completed after the work incident that supported his theory on causation.
Successfully Defended a Claim Petition on Behalf of a National Trucking Company
We successfully defended a claim on behalf of our client where the answer was late without a reasonable excuse. However, we persuaded the workers’ compensation judge that the claim petition was not well-pled as to the main allegation. We further convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof on causation.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Limits 120‑Day Notice Requirement for Owner-Employees
May 1, 2026
Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company v. David Heater( WCAB); No. 103 MAP 2024; decided March 26, 2026; by Chief Justice Todd. In this case, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether an injured worker, who was a sole proprietor, must give notice of his work injury under Section 311 of the Act, to the workers’ compensation insurance carrier within 120 days in order to comply with the notice provisions of the Act. In the underlying case, the claimant was the sole owner and employee of his general contracting business. On September 28, 2025, while performing roof repairs, he allegedly fell from a ladder and fractured his neck, requiring immediate surgery. The claimant applied for workers’ compensation benefits from his company’s carrier. The insurer issued a Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial (NCD), denying the claim on the basis that the claimant was actually injured when attempting to perform a back flip on break, and on the basis that he did not give notice of his injury within 120 days under Sections 311-313 of the Act. After the denial was issued, the claimant filed a claim petition for the injury. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the claim petition, finding that the claimant failed to provide timely notice to his insurer, as required by Section 311. The WCJ’s decision was affirmed on appeal by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and by the Commonwealth Court. The Supreme Court, however, after granting the claimant’s request to hear an appeal, reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. The Court noted that although Section 311 does not define the term employer, definitions of that term are contained in Section 401, which includes an insurer, and Section 103, which does not. The Court held that the plain language of Section 311 controlled, and does not require an injured claimant who is the sole employee and owner of a business to notify an insurer of a work related injury within 120 days to be eligible for compensation.
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
A Dispenser of Durable Medical Equipment is Not a Health Care Provider Under Section 109 of the Act and Therefore May Not Seek Recourse Through the Medical Fee Review Process
April 1, 2026
Scomed Supply v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. and Sedgwick Claims Management Services (Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office); No. 79 C.D. 2025; filed April 16, 2026; by Judge Wolf. Scomed, a retail seller of medical supplies, dispensed electrodes, batteries, lead wires, moisturizer, and alcohol wipes necessary for use of a TENS unit prescribed to the claimant for a work injury. Scomed billed Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. for the goods on ten occasions. The insurer paid for less than the full amount billed, and Scomed filed five applications for fee review. The Medical Fee Review Section found that no further payment was due and Scomed filed hearing requests thereafter. The matters were assigned to a Fee Review Hearing Officer, who held an initial hearing where the insurer argued that because Scomed was not a health care provider, the fee review matters should be dismissed. At a second hearing, the insurer expanded on their motion to dismiss citing the Commonwealth Court’s prior decision in Harburg Medical Sales Company v. PMA Management Corporation (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 635 C.D. 2020; filed August 30, 2021(unreported)), wherein the court held that a medical supplies distributor was not a health care provider under the Act because it did not provide health care services. At a third hearing, the insurer submitted documents showing the distinction between a health care provider and a medical supplier. The hearing officer found that Scomed was not a health care provider as defined by Section 109 of the Act, and denied the hearing requests. Scomed appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Hearing Officer. The court rejected Scomed’s argument that the Act defines health care providers broadly, and should be construed to include durable medical equipment. The court noted that Section 109 of the Act, and the Medical Cost Containment Regulations, describe entities that are licensed by the Commonwealth to provide health care services, and that Scomed primarily sells or distributes medical goods, not services. According to the court, Scomed has nothing to do with treatment, and simply dispenses a product.
