Frank provides seasoned defense counsel to employers, insurance carriers and third-party administrators across the full spectrum of workers’ compensation matters. His practice blends deep legal knowledge with a solutions oriented approach that supports clients both inside and outside the courtroom. In addition to his litigation work, Frank regularly advises on risk management practices designed to prevent claims before they arise.
Clients value Frank’s ability to pair innovative legal strategy with real‑world practicality, achieving favorable outcomes while reducing exposure and controlling costs.
An accomplished writer, Frank’s articles on trending issues impacting workers' compensation have appeared in various publications. He also provides monthly Pennsylvania case law updates for the firm's What's Hot In Workers' Comp newsletter. In addition, Frank is a frequent speaker for local and national employer and insurance industry groups. He is an active member of the Montgomery County Bar Association, the Claims & Litigation Management Alliance, and the RIMS Delaware Valley Chapter.
Frank received his undergraduate degree from Villanova University and his juris doctor from the Widener University School of Law.
Results
The defense successfully proves flaw in claimant’s expert testimony
We successfully defended a Claim Petition on behalf of a national trucking company where the claimant alleged a disabling aggravation of a pre-existing cervical condition from a fall at work. Our thorough review of the medical records and the presentation of the evidence convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof on causation. While providing the requisite direct testimony, on cross examination, the claimant’s expert admitted when he first saw the claimant one month after the work incident, the claimant had a head droop from cervical fusion surgery five months before the date of injury, and said that surgery “unrelated” to the work injury would be needed to correct it. This was inconsistent with the expert’s direct examination testimony, which was that the work incident had caused the head droop. Further, with the employer’s expert, who reviewed the testimony of the claimant’s expert and reviewed all medical records pre- and post-incident, we were able to establish that the opinion of the claimant’s expert was flawed, pointing out that the claimant’s expert failed to perform a side-by-side comparison of pre-injury diagnostic studies to post-injury studies, which would indicate whether the head droop was a slow progression from the prior surgery or due to a traumatic incident. The Judge found that the claimant’s expert failed to adequately explain what he saw in the studies completed after the work incident that supported his theory on causation.
Successfully Defended a Claim Petition on Behalf of a National Trucking Company
We successfully defended a claim on behalf of our client where the answer was late without a reasonable excuse. However, we persuaded the workers’ compensation judge that the claim petition was not well-pled as to the main allegation. We further convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof on causation.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment
August 13, 2026
This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over. On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch. The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed. According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer. Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break. The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition. The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal. The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort, she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries. A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies
June 19, 2026
700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy. In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy. The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.
Events
News
106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America
August 20, 2026
98 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America
August 20, 2025
