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Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

Can Testing Gene Mutations Help in Defending Mesothelioma Claims?

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – February 2020

February 3, 2021

by Erin N. Margolin

If you have ever watched television, you have surely seen a commercial from a plaintiff’s firm proclaiming: “Mesothelioma is caused by asbestos exposure. If you or a family member suffers from mesothelioma, you may be entitled to financial compensation.” However, these advertisements are misleading. As advances in genetics research are made, it has become clear that occupational asbestos exposure is not the only potential cause of mesothelioma. In fact, in at least 20 to 30% of mesothelioma diagnoses, occupational asbestos exposure has nothing to do with the diagnosis. As information on other potential causes of mesothelioma increases, large payouts by industrial defendants on these cases are no longer a foregone conclusion.

Let’s start with a basic scientific overview. Mesothelioma is a type of cancer that occurs in the thin layer of tissue that covers the majority of your internal organs, i.e., your mesothelium. There are several types of mesothelioma: pleural mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue that surrounds the lungs); peritoneal mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue in the abdomen); pericardial mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue around the heart); and tunica vaginalis mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue around the testicles). Mesothelioma occurs when the DNA in cells is damaged. DNA is the chemical in our cells that makes up our genes. Genes are the instructions for how our cells function, and we inherit our genes from our parents.

Consequently, it makes sense in that our genes play a role in whether or not we are predisposed to various cancers, including mesothelioma. For instance, BAP1 tumor predisposition syndrome is caused by mutations in the BAP1 gene. BAP1 is an important “good” gene, which suppresses tumors, and every human has two copies of this gene: one from their father and one from their mother. BAP1 gene mutations have been found in the genes of patients with mesothelioma, in addition to various other types of cancer. P16 deletions also are a possible feature of the genes of patients with malignant mesothelioma; in fact, this deletion occurs in up to 80% of pleural mesothelioma cases and approximately 25% of peritoneal mesothelioma cases. It can be expounded from this that some people with no industrial asbestos exposure whatsoever, but with certain gene mutations, are more predisposed to developing mesothelioma than others who do not have the same genes. Likewise, many individuals with a large amount of occupational exposure to asbestos never develop mesothelioma, likely because they do not have any gene mutations.

In the 2011 article “Germline BAP1 Mutations Predispose to Malignant Mesothelioma,” Joseph Testa opined that mesothelioma clustering associated with the BAP1 gene mutation is observed in some families; in fact, such clustering in families in the U.S. and Turkey have lead to up to 50% of family members developing mesothelioma. Dr. Testa’s study sequenced the BAP1 in germline DNA from one family in Wisconsin and one family in Louisiana, none of whom had any occupational asbestos exposure. In the family from Wisconsin, six affected family members (four with mesothelioma and two with other types of cancer) had identical gene mutations, whereas, unaffected family members did not. Likewise, the genes of the five affected family members (three with mesothelioma and two with other types of cancer) in the Louisiana family showed complete concordance between the BAP1 mutation status and linkage analysis.

The question then becomes: What else plays a factor in these pre-disposed individuals developing mesothelioma?

In 2018, Dr. Richard Attanoos wrote an article titled “Malignant Mesothelioma and its Non-Asbestos Causes,” about the developing information on the other causes of mesothelioma. Dr. Attanoos states that therapeutic radiation for other malignancies is a now a well-established cause of mesothelioma. Additionally, he noted that chronic pleural inflammation can cause mesothelioma, as diffuse malignant mesothelioma has been reported in patients with tuberculosis, chronic empyema, peritonitis and/or Crohn’s Disease. Dr. Attanoos expounded that some mesotheliomas are also idiopathic in nature and some may be caused by mineral fibers other than asbestos.

Dr. Attanoos goes on to explain that while most pleural mesotheliomas (70% to 90%) in men in Europe and North America were attributable to occupational asbestos exposure; for peritoneal mesothelioma, however, the proportion was lower. Additionally, in North America, few mesotheliomas in women were attributable to asbestos exposures. Dr. Attanoos pontificates that, given amphibole asbestos exposures are presently uncommon and epidemiologic evidence, including incidences of mesothelioma in both sexes, as well as the time trend of these diagnoses in addition to the lack of occupational asbestos exposures, suggests that there are other factors which cause mesothelioma. In simpler terms, there is overwhelming evidence that recent diagnoses of mesothelioma cases are being caused by something other than occupational exposure to asbestos. Dr. Attanoos opines that the current data suggests that a smaller fraction of tumors in men and very few tumors in women are now related to asbestos.

This is expounded upon in the 2018 article “Genomics and Epigenetics of Malignant Mesothelioma,” authored by Dr. Adam Sage. Dr. Sage notes that there have been global efforts to limit asbestos exposure through bans; however, a corresponding decrease in mesothelioma diagnoses has not been observed. In fact, the incidence of mesothelioma increased by almost 40% between 2005–2014. He opines that a significant portion of the newly diagnosed cases are the result of non-mining professional occupations and environmental exposures. Dr. Sage believes that germline mutations in the BAP1 gene are one of the most significant factors that lead to the development of mesothelioma.

Testing for BAP1 mutations is fairly easy, especially as genetic testing continues to be on the rise. In fact, much like women with a familial history of breast cancer undergo BRCA testing, there may be a time in the near future when those with a family history of mesothelioma are given genetic testing for BAP1 mutations and P16 deletions so that they can be monitored for early detection. Even ancestral DNA testing companies, such as 23andMe and AncestryDNA, already test clients for BRCA. It is reasonable to assume that other gene mutations linked to cancer will be commonly tested in the future.

Accordingly, it is likely that the presence of the BAP1 mutation will be readily available information in future asbestos litigation. There is already strong evidence to suggest that occupational asbestos exposure is not causing mesothelioma diagnoses to continue to rise. In the meantime, in order to appropriately defend occupational exposure mesothelioma cases, it will be important to question plaintiffs regarding their familial cancer history as well as any genetics testing that they have undergone. Additionally, a history of radiation therapy as well as exposure to other types of mineral fibers should be investigated.

 

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – February 2020, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tdrau@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.