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Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

Can Testing Gene Mutations Help in Defending Mesothelioma Claims?

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – February 2020

February 3, 2021

by Erin N. Margolin

If you have ever watched television, you have surely seen a commercial from a plaintiff’s firm proclaiming: “Mesothelioma is caused by asbestos exposure. If you or a family member suffers from mesothelioma, you may be entitled to financial compensation.” However, these advertisements are misleading. As advances in genetics research are made, it has become clear that occupational asbestos exposure is not the only potential cause of mesothelioma. In fact, in at least 20 to 30% of mesothelioma diagnoses, occupational asbestos exposure has nothing to do with the diagnosis. As information on other potential causes of mesothelioma increases, large payouts by industrial defendants on these cases are no longer a foregone conclusion.

Let’s start with a basic scientific overview. Mesothelioma is a type of cancer that occurs in the thin layer of tissue that covers the majority of your internal organs, i.e., your mesothelium. There are several types of mesothelioma: pleural mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue that surrounds the lungs); peritoneal mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue in the abdomen); pericardial mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue around the heart); and tunica vaginalis mesothelioma (mesothelioma that affects the tissue around the testicles). Mesothelioma occurs when the DNA in cells is damaged. DNA is the chemical in our cells that makes up our genes. Genes are the instructions for how our cells function, and we inherit our genes from our parents.

Consequently, it makes sense in that our genes play a role in whether or not we are predisposed to various cancers, including mesothelioma. For instance, BAP1 tumor predisposition syndrome is caused by mutations in the BAP1 gene. BAP1 is an important “good” gene, which suppresses tumors, and every human has two copies of this gene: one from their father and one from their mother. BAP1 gene mutations have been found in the genes of patients with mesothelioma, in addition to various other types of cancer. P16 deletions also are a possible feature of the genes of patients with malignant mesothelioma; in fact, this deletion occurs in up to 80% of pleural mesothelioma cases and approximately 25% of peritoneal mesothelioma cases. It can be expounded from this that some people with no industrial asbestos exposure whatsoever, but with certain gene mutations, are more predisposed to developing mesothelioma than others who do not have the same genes. Likewise, many individuals with a large amount of occupational exposure to asbestos never develop mesothelioma, likely because they do not have any gene mutations.

In the 2011 article “Germline BAP1 Mutations Predispose to Malignant Mesothelioma,” Joseph Testa opined that mesothelioma clustering associated with the BAP1 gene mutation is observed in some families; in fact, such clustering in families in the U.S. and Turkey have lead to up to 50% of family members developing mesothelioma. Dr. Testa’s study sequenced the BAP1 in germline DNA from one family in Wisconsin and one family in Louisiana, none of whom had any occupational asbestos exposure. In the family from Wisconsin, six affected family members (four with mesothelioma and two with other types of cancer) had identical gene mutations, whereas, unaffected family members did not. Likewise, the genes of the five affected family members (three with mesothelioma and two with other types of cancer) in the Louisiana family showed complete concordance between the BAP1 mutation status and linkage analysis.

The question then becomes: What else plays a factor in these pre-disposed individuals developing mesothelioma?

In 2018, Dr. Richard Attanoos wrote an article titled “Malignant Mesothelioma and its Non-Asbestos Causes,” about the developing information on the other causes of mesothelioma. Dr. Attanoos states that therapeutic radiation for other malignancies is a now a well-established cause of mesothelioma. Additionally, he noted that chronic pleural inflammation can cause mesothelioma, as diffuse malignant mesothelioma has been reported in patients with tuberculosis, chronic empyema, peritonitis and/or Crohn’s Disease. Dr. Attanoos expounded that some mesotheliomas are also idiopathic in nature and some may be caused by mineral fibers other than asbestos.

Dr. Attanoos goes on to explain that while most pleural mesotheliomas (70% to 90%) in men in Europe and North America were attributable to occupational asbestos exposure; for peritoneal mesothelioma, however, the proportion was lower. Additionally, in North America, few mesotheliomas in women were attributable to asbestos exposures. Dr. Attanoos pontificates that, given amphibole asbestos exposures are presently uncommon and epidemiologic evidence, including incidences of mesothelioma in both sexes, as well as the time trend of these diagnoses in addition to the lack of occupational asbestos exposures, suggests that there are other factors which cause mesothelioma. In simpler terms, there is overwhelming evidence that recent diagnoses of mesothelioma cases are being caused by something other than occupational exposure to asbestos. Dr. Attanoos opines that the current data suggests that a smaller fraction of tumors in men and very few tumors in women are now related to asbestos.

This is expounded upon in the 2018 article “Genomics and Epigenetics of Malignant Mesothelioma,” authored by Dr. Adam Sage. Dr. Sage notes that there have been global efforts to limit asbestos exposure through bans; however, a corresponding decrease in mesothelioma diagnoses has not been observed. In fact, the incidence of mesothelioma increased by almost 40% between 2005–2014. He opines that a significant portion of the newly diagnosed cases are the result of non-mining professional occupations and environmental exposures. Dr. Sage believes that germline mutations in the BAP1 gene are one of the most significant factors that lead to the development of mesothelioma.

Testing for BAP1 mutations is fairly easy, especially as genetic testing continues to be on the rise. In fact, much like women with a familial history of breast cancer undergo BRCA testing, there may be a time in the near future when those with a family history of mesothelioma are given genetic testing for BAP1 mutations and P16 deletions so that they can be monitored for early detection. Even ancestral DNA testing companies, such as 23andMe and AncestryDNA, already test clients for BRCA. It is reasonable to assume that other gene mutations linked to cancer will be commonly tested in the future.

Accordingly, it is likely that the presence of the BAP1 mutation will be readily available information in future asbestos litigation. There is already strong evidence to suggest that occupational asbestos exposure is not causing mesothelioma diagnoses to continue to rise. In the meantime, in order to appropriately defend occupational exposure mesothelioma cases, it will be important to question plaintiffs regarding their familial cancer history as well as any genetics testing that they have undergone. Additionally, a history of radiation therapy as well as exposure to other types of mineral fibers should be investigated.

 

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – February 2020, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tdrau@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.