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Defense Digest

Driving the Workday: The Third Circuit Clarifies Compensable Travel Time Under the FLSA

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Michael C. Burke

Key Points:

  • Travel during the workday between clients’ homes is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
  • The key is whether the employee is considered on-duty at the time of travel—that is, whether the employee can use the time effectively for personal purposes. 
  • Travel to a job site following an off-duty period is only compensable if “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s duties. 
  • The Third Circuit’s ruling is sure to impact any industry with mobile employees engaged in providing in-home services. 

As the demand for in-home care grows, so do questions about how federal labor laws apply to the home health care workforce. In Sec’y U.S. Dep’t. of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Management, Inc., 128 F.4th 146 (3d Cir. 2025), the Third Circuit offered key guidance on the compensability of the travel time associated with the provision of at-home health care services.

In the underlying litigation, the Department of Labor sued a home health care service provider, Nursing Home Care Management, Inc. d/b/a Prestige Home Care Agency (Prestige), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting various violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a federal law regulating how employers compensate their employees for work they perform. Among other things, the FLSA codifies the federal minimum wage, right to overtime pay, and various record keeping requirements imposed upon employers relating to those obligations. 

In the instant case, the Department alleged, in relevant part, that Prestige failed to pay its Home Health Aides (HHAs) for time spent traveling between client homes. Specifically, it alleged that Prestige: (1) did not compensate HHAs for travel time from one client’s home to another during the workday; and (2) did not compensate HHAs for travel time to and from clients’ homes before and after an off-duty period. 

At the conclusion of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of its claim regarding travel time, the Department relied on the “continuous workday doctrine,” which states that “time spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.38. By contrast, Prestige argued that travel time constitutes off-duty time under the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which provides that an employer need not compensate an employee for “. . . traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity . . . which such employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254.

The District Court granted summary judgment to the Department on its FLSA claims, concluding that Prestige’s practices amounted to willful violations of the FLSA. To resolve the travel time issue, the court re-focused the question. It noted that in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that “any activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a principal activity is itself a principal activity under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.” Thus, the court concluded that travel is a necessary, integral, and indispensable part of a HHA’s principal activities as, were an HHA not to travel, it would be impossible to provide Prestige’s services in its clients’ homes. Thereafter, Prestige appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. 

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals took a slightly different approach, centering the discussion of travel time around two key questions—first, whether travel is compensable when the employee lacks the time to go off duty; and second, if the employee has the time to go off duty, must he still be compensated for the time necessary to travel between job sites?

In addressing the first question, the court distinguished its analysis from those of the District Court and the parties. It explained that the analysis of whether the travel time was compensable was not a question of whether travel, itself, is a principal activity. Rather, the court grounded its analysis in the federal regulations interpreting the FLSA, which make two key points clear—(1) employees are working for purposes of the law (in other words, are “on-duty”) when idle so long as “they are unable to use the time effectively for [their] own purposes,” and (2) under the continuous workday doctrine, “time spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during the work day, must be counted as hours worked.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.15, 785.38. For these reasons, the court held that HHAs are entitled to compensation when they are on duty and traveling. 

Nevertheless, on the second question, the court returned to the “integral and indispensable” analysis. It noted that, though not necessary for those HHAs who were already on duty such as in the first inquiry, the test remained appropriate for those employees who traveled to a client’s home following an off-duty period. The court explained that such employees are entitled to compensation, but only for travel that was necessary to travel between job sites. Put differently, such employees are only entitled to travel that was “integral and indispensable” to the principal activities of HHAs. On this point, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s analysis that necessary travel to a client’s home is integral and indispensable as, were an HHA not to travel, it would be impossible to provide services in clients’ homes. Still, the court took care to set boundaries. It explained that an employee’s marginal travel that is unnecessary to move between job sites, such as to travel home, to another job, or to go shopping, is not compensable under the FLSA. 

The result of this decision is twofold. First, at least with respect to travel, compensability under the FLSA is not a question of whether the activity, itself, is a principal activity or is integral and indispensable to a principal activity. Rather, the question is whether the employee is able to use the time effectively for their own purposes—or put differently, whether the employee is “on duty”—and whether the travel occurs during the broader continuous workday. Second, for employees traveling following an off-duty period, compensability turns on whether any or all of that travel is “integral and indispensable” to their job duties. Though applied here in the home health care context, employers engaged in providing any services at clients’ homes, such as real estate services, cable and utility services, landscaping, and home cleaning services, should note that such time may be compensable under the FLSA. 

*Michael is a member of our Professional Liability Department and works in our Philadelphia, PA office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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