.

Defense Digest

Waiving the Right to Seek Arbitration: New Court Ruling Limits Parties’ Ability to Seek to Enforce Arbitration Clause

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021

January 29, 2021

by Elizabeth A. Underwood

Key Points:

  • A recent ruling in the Pennsylvania Superior Court limits the time for a party to seek to enforce an arbitration provision.
  • A party must seek to enforce an arbitration provision before it seeks to obtain other favorable rulings from the court to prevent waiver of the right to seek arbitration.
  • Waiver can occur even if the pleadings remain open if the parties have sought other rulings from the court prior to requesting arbitration.

As a matter of public policy, the Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania continue to strongly favor the settlement of disputes by arbitration. However, a party wishing to enforce an arbitration provision can waive its right to elect arbitration if it does not promptly seek to enforce such a contractual provision. In the recent case DiDonato v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., 2020 WL 6280080 (Pa. Super. Oct. 27, 2020), the Pennsylvania Superior Court further clarified and limited the circumstances under which a party may seek to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. Specifically, the Superior Court found that two defendants who sought to enforce an arbitration agreement contained within an enrollment contract for the defendant, Blair Academy, signed by the decedent’s mother, waived their right to assert arbitration because they participated in the judicial process, particularly by attempting to obtain favorable rulings from the court prior to seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement.

Specifically, in DiDonato, the plaintiff, Ruth DiDonato, administratrix of the estate of J.D., a minor, initiated a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against the defendant, Ski Shawnee, and defendants Blair Academy and John Padden (the Academy defendants), arising from a skiing accident that resulted in the death of a student at Blair Academy. In response to the complaint, the Academy defendants and Ski Shawnee filed preliminary objections as to venue, alleging that venue in Philadelphia County was improper and that the case should be transferred to the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas. The Academy defendants did not raise the existence of a contract requiring the arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims in their preliminary objections. Thereafter, both the Academy defendants and Ski Shawnee entered into a stipulation with the plaintiff to strike certain paragraphs and claims from the complaint.

Further, while the preliminary objections were pending, the Academy defendants filed a petition for removal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, the District Court ruled that removal was improper and remanded the case to state court. Upon remand, the parties engaged in discovery limited to the issue of venue raised in both defendants’ preliminary objections. During this discovery period, the Academy defendants did not produce the enrollment contract in response to a request for “any document which refers, relates to or evidences any communication between you and [Decedent].” Approximately nine months after the complaint was filed, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted the preliminary objections as to venue and transferred the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County.

Upon transfer to Monroe County, prior to filing an answer to the complaint, the Academy defendants filed a motion to sever and to compel arbitration. In their motion, for the first time, the Academy defendants produced and sought to enforce the enrollment contract which contained a clause requiring any and all claims against the Academy defendants to be resolved in arbitration. The Academy defendants also filed an answer, raising the arbitration clause in its new matter. The plaintiff opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing, among on other grounds, that the defendant waived the right to arbitration by waiting nearly a year to raise the issue. The trial court granted the motion, in part, compelling the estate’s survival claim and the mother’s wrongful death claim against the Academy defendants to arbitration.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, holding that the Academy defendants waived their right to assert the arbitration clause because of their delay in seeking arbitration. Despite the public policy in favor of arbitration, the court noted that when “a party avails itself of the judicial process,” including by attempting to win favorable rulings through the courts, that party waives the right to assert and enforce an arbitration provision. The court set forth the following factors to assess whether a party has availed itself of the judicial process such that the right to arbitration is waived, specifically, whether the party:

(1) failed to raise the issue of arbitration promptly;

(2) engaged in discovery;

(3) filed pretrial motions that do not raise the issue of arbitration;

(4) waited for adverse rulings on pre-trial motions before asserting arbitration; or

(5) waited until the case is ready for trial before asserting arbitration.

O’Donnell v. Hovanian Enterprises, Inc., 29 A.3d 1183, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Of significance for the court was the Academy defendants’ use of court proceedings in an apparent attempt to gain a strategic advantage in the case, specifically by: (1) filing preliminary objections as to venue; (2) seeking to remove the case to federal court; and (3) entering stipulations to dismiss various counts within the complaint prior to raising the issuing of arbitration. Further, the court was troubled by the fact that the Academy defendants had not produced, cited to, or in any way referenced the enrollment contract containing the arbitration provision for nearly a year, until they attached it to their motion to compel arbitration. Although the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the failure to raise the arbitration provision in preliminary objection, as a matter of law, waives the defendants’ right to assert arbitration, the Superior Court stressed that, in this case, the totality of the defendants’ actions as described above—requiring the plaintiff to extensively litigate the removal and venue issues prior to the defendant raising the claim for arbitration, prejudiced the plaintiff such that a waiver was warranted.

Given the ruling in DiDonato, it is imperative to assess at the very beginning of the litigation whether an applicable arbitration provision exists and to make the strategic assessment whether to raise the provision or to proceed in court. The decision to assert an arbitration provision cannot be considered a “back-up” strategy prior to other legal maneuverings, as courts are likely to rule that the party has waived the right to assert the arbitration provision if it is not raised as the primary defense to a complaint.

*Beth is a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office. She can be reached at (215) 575-2599 or eapope@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.