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David is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department and devotes his practice largely to insurance coverage, bad faith litigation, and the defense of insurance agents/brokers. His experience with insurance coverage matters include all lines of business including first party property, commercial liability and specialty lines policies. David provides consultation services to insurers and self-insured clients covering all aspects of New Jersey claims handling practices. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, David was assistant solicitor for the City of Pleasantville, New Jersey, City of Absecon, New Jersey, Northfield, New Jersey and special counsel to the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA), as well as assistant planning board attorney for Galloway Township, New Jersey.

David is a 1990 graduate of Rutgers University (NCAS) and received his juris doctor from Claude W. Pettit College of Law at Ohio Northern University in 1994. While in law school, David received the American Jurisprudence Awards for Excellence in the study of Insurance Law, Trusts & Estates and Secured Transactions as well as making the Dean’s List.

    • Warren & Maryann Andrews v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89997
    • Reina v. Twp. of Union, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103406 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013)
    • Kouveliotes v. USCC Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148373 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2012)
    • Klama v. Zuniga-Elizando et al., DOCKET NO. A-1382-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 653 (App. Div. 2011)
    • D.E. v. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45121 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007)
    • South Jersey Family Med. Ctr. v. City of Pleasantville, 176 N.J. 184 (N.J. 2003)
    • Moore v. Acme Corrugated Box Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9897 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 1998)
    • Boody v. Township of Cherry Hill et. al, 997 F. Supp. 562 (D.N.J. 1997)
    • Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law (J.D., 1994)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1995
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1996
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Insurance (2023-2027)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association, Insurance Section
    • "Supreme Court of New Jersey Rules That Insurers Do Not Have a Duty to Defend or Indemnify for ‘Laidlow’ Claims—as Long as the Policy Includes the Correct Exclusionary Language," New Jersey Law Journal, April 7, 2025
    • "State Of The Occurrence," Defense Digest, 2012-06, Vol. 18, No. 2
    • Bad Faith and Fair Dealing in New Jersey, client seminar, May 26, 2021

Results

Successfully Overturned $1.8 Million Judgment on Appeal in New Jersey

We successfully overturned a $1.8 million judgment on appeal in a case that involved the Laidlow exclusion in a workers’ compensation/employers liability policy. The decedent succumbed to heat exhaustion while at work, and the plaintiff alleged the death was due to working conditions the employer knew were substantially certain to lead to injury. Our client, the insurer, offered to defend the employer, but only to the extent of obtaining dismissal of the workers’ compensation claim, which was filed in the wrong forum. The insured rejected the offer, and suit for the injury and coverage claims commenced. At summary judgment, the trial court refused to apply the policy’s clear and prominent Laidlow exclusion barring all coverage for claims in the Superior Court whether alleged as negligent or intentional. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of the arbitration award and awarded defense costs for the Laidlow suit, costs of the declaratory judgment action and interest. The matter went up on appeal. After briefing, but before argument, the New Jersey Supreme Court released the Rodriguez decision, which validated our client’s position on application of the Laidlow exclusion and went even further to hold that the employer’s liability carrier has no obligation to provide a defense for the common law negligence claims filed in the Superior Court. The trial court refused to apply the principles enunciated by the appellate division in the Rodriguez decision and refused to apply the reasoning of a second unpublished appellate court decision directly on point. The trial court simply ignored the cases, reasoning they were unpublished. Prior to oral argument in our matter, the Rodriguez decision was published, and the plaintiffs abandoned the case, settling for nuisance value.

Defense Verdict Secured in Contentious Fire Loss Case

We obtained a hard fought defense verdict in a contentious case involving a total fire loss at a duplex owned by a single mother. The investigation revealed that the named insured did not reside in the home and, instead, rented the two units. The claim denial included application misrepresentations and issues related to the fact that the insured property did not meet the policy’s definition of a “residence premises.” Ultimately, the court decided that the property did meet the “residence premises” definition. We were left to try the case based on material misrepresentations and tasked with convincing the jury that a single mother, who paid her premium and suffered an accidental and total fire loss, should be precluded from recovery. The jury disregarded the sympathetic plaintiff, believed the insured lied during the investigation and applied New Jersey insurance law on material misrepresentations as instructed by the court. The plaintiff had turned down $150K prior to trial.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of New Jersey Rules That Insurers Do Not Have a Duty to Defend or Indemnify for ‘Laidlow’ Claims—as Long as the Policy Includes the Correct Exclusionary Language

April 7, 2025

The general rule that has developed for an injured employee to proceed and prevail upon a Laidlow claim against their employer is that it must be shown that the employer either subjectively desired to harm its employee or knew that its acts were “substantially certain” to result in injury to or death of the employee.

Legal Updates for Employment Law

New Jersey Supreme Court Decides Laidlow Exclusion Is Valid

December 20, 2024

Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, A-2079-22, December 12, 2024 On December 12, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the validity of the intentional act exclusion (Laidlow exclusion) contained in standard workers’ compensation and employers’ liability policies. The court also addressed a carrier’s duty to defend negligence-based claims filed in the Law Division under Part One (statutory compensation benefits) or Part Two coverage (employers’ liability) of standard policies.  In Shelbourne, the claimant filed and received workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury. The claimant then filed a personal injury suit in the Law Division, alleging what is commonly known as a Laidlow claim. As the standard practice is known, the plaintiff’s attorney included allegations of negligence, along with the Laidlow claim, in an effort to bring the carrier in to defend given the allegations of negligence.  The New Jersey Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that there is no duty to defend the negligence claims—whether alleged as a simple, gross or reckless conduct—under Part One and that the C4 and C5 exclusions (as amended and approved by the New Jersey Compensation Rating & Inspection Bureau in 2007) barred coverage for the negligence and substantially certain clams (Laidlow).  The court rejected the notion that the Laidlow exclusion violated public policy. In doing so, the court distinguished older cases that did not address the amended exclusion.  A more comprehensive analysis of the decision and its greater impact will appear in the March 2025 edition of the firms’ newsletter Defense Digest.    New Jersey Legal Update – December 20, 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.