.

David is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department and devotes his practice largely to insurance coverage, bad faith litigation, and the defense of insurance agents/brokers. His experience with insurance coverage matters include all lines of business including first party property, commercial liability and specialty lines policies. David provides consultation services to insurers and self-insured clients covering all aspects of New Jersey claims handling practices. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, David was assistant solicitor for the City of Pleasantville, New Jersey, City of Absecon, New Jersey, Northfield, New Jersey and special counsel to the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA), as well as assistant planning board attorney for Galloway Township, New Jersey.

David is a 1990 graduate of Rutgers University (NCAS) and received his juris doctor from Claude W. Pettit College of Law at Ohio Northern University in 1994. While in law school, David received the American Jurisprudence Awards for Excellence in the study of Insurance Law, Trusts & Estates and Secured Transactions as well as making the Dean’s List.

    • Warren & Maryann Andrews v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89997
    • Reina v. Twp. of Union, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103406 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013)
    • Kouveliotes v. USCC Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148373 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2012)
    • Klama v. Zuniga-Elizando et al., DOCKET NO. A-1382-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 653 (App. Div. 2011)
    • D.E. v. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45121 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007)
    • South Jersey Family Med. Ctr. v. City of Pleasantville, 176 N.J. 184 (N.J. 2003)
    • Moore v. Acme Corrugated Box Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9897 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 1998)
    • Boody v. Township of Cherry Hill et. al, 997 F. Supp. 562 (D.N.J. 1997)
    • Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law (J.D., 1994)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1995
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1996
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Insurance (2023-2026)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association, Insurance Section
    • "Supreme Court of New Jersey Rules That Insurers Do Not Have a Duty to Defend or Indemnify for ‘Laidlow’ Claims—as Long as the Policy Includes the Correct Exclusionary Language," New Jersey Law Journal, April 7, 2025
    • "State Of The Occurrence," Defense Digest, 2012-06, Vol. 18, No. 2
    • Bad Faith and Fair Dealing in New Jersey, client seminar, May 26, 2021

Results

Successfully Overturned $1.8 Million Judgment on Appeal in New Jersey

We successfully overturned a $1.8 million judgment on appeal in a case that involved the Laidlow exclusion in a workers’ compensation/employers liability policy. The decedent succumbed to heat exhaustion while at work, and the plaintiff alleged the death was due to working conditions the employer knew were substantially certain to lead to injury. Our client, the insurer, offered to defend the employer, but only to the extent of obtaining dismissal of the workers’ compensation claim, which was filed in the wrong forum. The insured rejected the offer, and suit for the injury and coverage claims commenced. At summary judgment, the trial court refused to apply the policy’s clear and prominent Laidlow exclusion barring all coverage for claims in the Superior Court whether alleged as negligent or intentional. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of the arbitration award and awarded defense costs for the Laidlow suit, costs of the declaratory judgment action and interest. The matter went up on appeal. After briefing, but before argument, the New Jersey Supreme Court released the Rodriguez decision, which validated our client’s position on application of the Laidlow exclusion and went even further to hold that the employer’s liability carrier has no obligation to provide a defense for the common law negligence claims filed in the Superior Court. The trial court refused to apply the principles enunciated by the appellate division in the Rodriguez decision and refused to apply the reasoning of a second unpublished appellate court decision directly on point. The trial court simply ignored the cases, reasoning they were unpublished. Prior to oral argument in our matter, the Rodriguez decision was published, and the plaintiffs abandoned the case, settling for nuisance value.

Defense Verdict Secured in Contentious Fire Loss Case

We obtained a hard fought defense verdict in a contentious case involving a total fire loss at a duplex owned by a single mother. The investigation revealed that the named insured did not reside in the home and, instead, rented the two units. The claim denial included application misrepresentations and issues related to the fact that the insured property did not meet the policy’s definition of a “residence premises.” Ultimately, the court decided that the property did meet the “residence premises” definition. We were left to try the case based on material misrepresentations and tasked with convincing the jury that a single mother, who paid her premium and suffered an accidental and total fire loss, should be precluded from recovery. The jury disregarded the sympathetic plaintiff, believed the insured lied during the investigation and applied New Jersey insurance law on material misrepresentations as instructed by the court. The plaintiff had turned down $150K prior to trial.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of New Jersey Rules That Insurers Do Not Have a Duty to Defend or Indemnify for ‘Laidlow’ Claims—as Long as the Policy Includes the Correct Exclusionary Language

April 7, 2025

The general rule that has developed for an injured employee to proceed and prevail upon a Laidlow claim against their employer is that it must be shown that the employer either subjectively desired to harm its employee or knew that its acts were “substantially certain” to result in injury to or death of the employee.

Legal Updates for Employment Law

New Jersey Supreme Court Decides Laidlow Exclusion Is Valid

December 20, 2024

Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, A-2079-22, December 12, 2024 On December 12, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the validity of the intentional act exclusion (Laidlow exclusion) contained in standard workers’ compensation and employers’ liability policies. The court also addressed a carrier’s duty to defend negligence-based claims filed in the Law Division under Part One (statutory compensation benefits) or Part Two coverage (employers’ liability) of standard policies.  In Shelbourne, the claimant filed and received workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury. The claimant then filed a personal injury suit in the Law Division, alleging what is commonly known as a Laidlow claim. As the standard practice is known, the plaintiff’s attorney included allegations of negligence, along with the Laidlow claim, in an effort to bring the carrier in to defend given the allegations of negligence.  The New Jersey Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that there is no duty to defend the negligence claims—whether alleged as a simple, gross or reckless conduct—under Part One and that the C4 and C5 exclusions (as amended and approved by the New Jersey Compensation Rating & Inspection Bureau in 2007) barred coverage for the negligence and substantially certain clams (Laidlow).  The court rejected the notion that the Laidlow exclusion violated public policy. In doing so, the court distinguished older cases that did not address the amended exclusion.  A more comprehensive analysis of the decision and its greater impact will appear in the March 2025 edition of the firms’ newsletter Defense Digest.    New Jersey Legal Update – December 20, 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.