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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Statute of Limitations Stands: Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Dismissal of Breach of Contract Claim Against Insurance Broker

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – February 2025

February 1, 2025

by Dana A. Gittleman and Timothy G. Ventura

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently affirmed the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ dismissal of breach of contract claims asserted against an insurance broker in Thuong Erin Wasielewski, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Thuong D. Nguyen, Deceased v. Goebel Insurance Agency, Inc. and Christopher Goebel, 2025 WL 66728. Marshall Dennehey attorneys Dana Gittleman and Timothy Ventura represented the defendants, Goebel Insurance Agency, Inc. and Christopher Goebel, in the trial court action, and appellate attorney Carol Vanderwoude handled the appellate briefing and argument. 

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was premised on the expiration of the statute of limitations before the plaintiff initiated suit. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred based on the date(s) on which the plaintiff was notified of a lack of coverage and, resultantly, a potential claim against the defendants. 

The case arose from an underlying wrongful death lawsuit, Thuong Erin Wasielewski v. Lee’s Café & Bistro and Lee’s Café & Bistro, LLC, d/b/a Lee’s Café & Bistro, Lee Hung, Wong Family Investment, LLC and Wong Family Investment (wrongful death action) and a related declaratory judgment lawsuit, Erie Insurance Exchange v. Lee’s Café and Bistro, LLC, Lee Hugh a/k/a Lee Quach and Thuong Erin Wasielewski (declaratory judgment action). The instant matter was initiated by a complaint filed on July 27, 2022.

On March 2, 2018, the wrongful death action was initiated, alleging wrongful death, premises liability and negligent security against a restaurant, Lee’s Café & Bistro, LLC, for an employee’s (plaintiff-decedent Nguyen’s) March 3, 2016, murder at the business premises. Lee’s Café tendered its defense for the wrongful death action to its insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange, which had issued a commercial general liability and property insurance policy procured by the defendants. On June 13, 2018, Erie filed the declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that it did not owe a defense and/or indemnity to Lee’s Café for the wrongful death action pursuant to the employer’s liability exclusion. On May 8, 2019, Erie filed a motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, which was granted on November 15, 2019. Accordingly, Erie was determined not to have a duty to defend or indemnify Lee’s Café in the wrongful death action. Prior to the trial of the wrongful death action, the owner and operator of Lee’s Café, and Lee’s Café entered into a settlement agreement and covenant not to enforce with the plaintiff, agreeing to settle the claims in the wrongful death action and assigning their rights against the defendants to the plaintiff.

The Erie policy was issued pursuant to an application and supplemental application signed by Ms. Chung on December 23, 2014, which—along with the policy itself—identified the scope of coverage provided, i.e. commercial general liability and property protection. The policy coverages did not include workers’ compensation, and the exclusion at issue, employer’s liability exclusion, was unambiguously disclosed in the Erie policy. 

On April 22, 2016, upon receipt of Lee’s Café’s notice of claim on March 4, 2016, Erie issued a reservation of rights letter, outlining potential grounds for disclaiming coverage and stating that the injuries to employees were excluded under the policy; thus, decedent Nguyen’s injury would be precluded. Erie advised Lee’s Café that it “may want to notify [its] Workers’ Compensation insurance carrier of this loss.” On May 16, 2016, Erie reiterated its coverage position under the subject Erie policy. Thus, as of April 22, 2016, and May 16, 2016, Lee’s Café knew of a potential coverage issue regarding the Nguyen claim under the Erie policy and that it did not have workers’ compensation insurance under the Erie policy. Further, on November 1, 2016, Lee’s Café signed a State Workers’ Insurance Fund application, stating the business did not have previous workers’ compensation insurance coverage in Pennsylvania. On April 20, 2018, Erie issued a denial letter, disclaiming coverage for the wrongful death action, citing the employer’s liability exclusion.

The trial court held the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims arising out of the defendants’ alleged failure to obtain “all necessary coverages,” including liability coverage for the employees of Lee’s Café that would have covered the March 3, 2016, loss, were time-barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Defendants’ counsel raised several instances of notice of the alleged loss (no insurance coverage) including: December 2014 policy application and inception; December 2015 policy renewal; April 22, 2016, and May 16, 2016, coverage denial letters; April 20, 2018, Erie denial letter; and June 13, 2018, declaratory judgment action.

The trial court judge identified the dates plaintiff’s cause of action potentially accrued, all of which were more than four years prior to the inception of the instant lawsuit against Defendants on July 27, 2022. The court further rejected plaintiff’s argument that the claims did not accrue until after Erie won summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action (when Lee’s Café allegedly sustained an “actual injury”), despite the several times preceding that date when Lee’s Café was put on notice that employees were not covered under the Erie policy. The court further rejected plaintiff’s argument that Lee’s Café could not bring the suit against Defendants while Erie was providing a defense in the wrongful death action. 

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found no error by the trial court, reiterating that the loss for which coverage was sought was the March 3, 2016, murder. Moreover, as of June 14, 2018, when Erie denied coverage, all necessary elements were present to trigger a potential breach of contract claim against the defendants. The Superior Court found the breach occurred in December 2015, when the defendants allegedly failed to follow instructions and procured a policy other than that which they had been contracted to procure, and the loss occurred on March 3, 2016. At the time Erie denied coverage in June 2018, “Defendants became liable to [Lee’s Café] for breach of contract.” The court further commented that Lee’s Café failed to allege facts to show that it did not know of the alleged injury on June 14, 2018, when Erie filed the declaratory judgment action. This June 2018 filing date served as the latest discovery date of the plaintiff’s purported injury, and the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim against the defendants arising from the procurement of the Erie policy expired on or about June 14, 2022. 

The Superior Court’s ruling clarifies and expands the general dearth of case law regarding the commencement of the statute of limitations applicable to claims against insurance brokers. Indeed, where, as here, there are multiple potential dates of notice or “discovery” pursuant to the discovery rule, the commencement date is, at the latest, the date a declaratory judgment action or other definitive coverage denial notification is tendered to the plaintiff. 

This decision is meaningful for insurance brokers, and the attorneys who defend them, as it sets forth a bright line test for suit preclusion in a currently ambiguous legal landscape. Further, the decision outright rejects the plaintiff’s theory that the claim did not accrue until Erie prevailed in the declaratory judgment action, a formality given that Erie’s coverage position was staunchly established by its reservation of rights and denial letters which preceded the declaratory judgment action filing. 

Insurance brokers should remain vigilant when an insurance customer’s claim is denied by the carrier and monitor any related coverage litigation. Doing so can assist in developing procedural defenses to a subsequent professional negligence claim asserted against the insurance professional, as well as substantive grounds for potential causation defenses.  


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers - February 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.