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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Statute of Limitations Stands: Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Dismissal of Breach of Contract Claim Against Insurance Broker

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – February 2025

February 1, 2025

by Dana A. Gittleman and Timothy G. Ventura

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently affirmed the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ dismissal of breach of contract claims asserted against an insurance broker in Thuong Erin Wasielewski, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Thuong D. Nguyen, Deceased v. Goebel Insurance Agency, Inc. and Christopher Goebel, 2025 WL 66728. Marshall Dennehey attorneys Dana Gittleman and Timothy Ventura represented the defendants, Goebel Insurance Agency, Inc. and Christopher Goebel, in the trial court action, and appellate attorney Carol Vanderwoude handled the appellate briefing and argument. 

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was premised on the expiration of the statute of limitations before the plaintiff initiated suit. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred based on the date(s) on which the plaintiff was notified of a lack of coverage and, resultantly, a potential claim against the defendants. 

The case arose from an underlying wrongful death lawsuit, Thuong Erin Wasielewski v. Lee’s Café & Bistro and Lee’s Café & Bistro, LLC, d/b/a Lee’s Café & Bistro, Lee Hung, Wong Family Investment, LLC and Wong Family Investment (wrongful death action) and a related declaratory judgment lawsuit, Erie Insurance Exchange v. Lee’s Café and Bistro, LLC, Lee Hugh a/k/a Lee Quach and Thuong Erin Wasielewski (declaratory judgment action). The instant matter was initiated by a complaint filed on July 27, 2022.

On March 2, 2018, the wrongful death action was initiated, alleging wrongful death, premises liability and negligent security against a restaurant, Lee’s Café & Bistro, LLC, for an employee’s (plaintiff-decedent Nguyen’s) March 3, 2016, murder at the business premises. Lee’s Café tendered its defense for the wrongful death action to its insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange, which had issued a commercial general liability and property insurance policy procured by the defendants. On June 13, 2018, Erie filed the declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that it did not owe a defense and/or indemnity to Lee’s Café for the wrongful death action pursuant to the employer’s liability exclusion. On May 8, 2019, Erie filed a motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, which was granted on November 15, 2019. Accordingly, Erie was determined not to have a duty to defend or indemnify Lee’s Café in the wrongful death action. Prior to the trial of the wrongful death action, the owner and operator of Lee’s Café, and Lee’s Café entered into a settlement agreement and covenant not to enforce with the plaintiff, agreeing to settle the claims in the wrongful death action and assigning their rights against the defendants to the plaintiff.

The Erie policy was issued pursuant to an application and supplemental application signed by Ms. Chung on December 23, 2014, which—along with the policy itself—identified the scope of coverage provided, i.e. commercial general liability and property protection. The policy coverages did not include workers’ compensation, and the exclusion at issue, employer’s liability exclusion, was unambiguously disclosed in the Erie policy. 

On April 22, 2016, upon receipt of Lee’s Café’s notice of claim on March 4, 2016, Erie issued a reservation of rights letter, outlining potential grounds for disclaiming coverage and stating that the injuries to employees were excluded under the policy; thus, decedent Nguyen’s injury would be precluded. Erie advised Lee’s Café that it “may want to notify [its] Workers’ Compensation insurance carrier of this loss.” On May 16, 2016, Erie reiterated its coverage position under the subject Erie policy. Thus, as of April 22, 2016, and May 16, 2016, Lee’s Café knew of a potential coverage issue regarding the Nguyen claim under the Erie policy and that it did not have workers’ compensation insurance under the Erie policy. Further, on November 1, 2016, Lee’s Café signed a State Workers’ Insurance Fund application, stating the business did not have previous workers’ compensation insurance coverage in Pennsylvania. On April 20, 2018, Erie issued a denial letter, disclaiming coverage for the wrongful death action, citing the employer’s liability exclusion.

The trial court held the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims arising out of the defendants’ alleged failure to obtain “all necessary coverages,” including liability coverage for the employees of Lee’s Café that would have covered the March 3, 2016, loss, were time-barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Defendants’ counsel raised several instances of notice of the alleged loss (no insurance coverage) including: December 2014 policy application and inception; December 2015 policy renewal; April 22, 2016, and May 16, 2016, coverage denial letters; April 20, 2018, Erie denial letter; and June 13, 2018, declaratory judgment action.

The trial court judge identified the dates plaintiff’s cause of action potentially accrued, all of which were more than four years prior to the inception of the instant lawsuit against Defendants on July 27, 2022. The court further rejected plaintiff’s argument that the claims did not accrue until after Erie won summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action (when Lee’s Café allegedly sustained an “actual injury”), despite the several times preceding that date when Lee’s Café was put on notice that employees were not covered under the Erie policy. The court further rejected plaintiff’s argument that Lee’s Café could not bring the suit against Defendants while Erie was providing a defense in the wrongful death action. 

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found no error by the trial court, reiterating that the loss for which coverage was sought was the March 3, 2016, murder. Moreover, as of June 14, 2018, when Erie denied coverage, all necessary elements were present to trigger a potential breach of contract claim against the defendants. The Superior Court found the breach occurred in December 2015, when the defendants allegedly failed to follow instructions and procured a policy other than that which they had been contracted to procure, and the loss occurred on March 3, 2016. At the time Erie denied coverage in June 2018, “Defendants became liable to [Lee’s Café] for breach of contract.” The court further commented that Lee’s Café failed to allege facts to show that it did not know of the alleged injury on June 14, 2018, when Erie filed the declaratory judgment action. This June 2018 filing date served as the latest discovery date of the plaintiff’s purported injury, and the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim against the defendants arising from the procurement of the Erie policy expired on or about June 14, 2022. 

The Superior Court’s ruling clarifies and expands the general dearth of case law regarding the commencement of the statute of limitations applicable to claims against insurance brokers. Indeed, where, as here, there are multiple potential dates of notice or “discovery” pursuant to the discovery rule, the commencement date is, at the latest, the date a declaratory judgment action or other definitive coverage denial notification is tendered to the plaintiff. 

This decision is meaningful for insurance brokers, and the attorneys who defend them, as it sets forth a bright line test for suit preclusion in a currently ambiguous legal landscape. Further, the decision outright rejects the plaintiff’s theory that the claim did not accrue until Erie prevailed in the declaratory judgment action, a formality given that Erie’s coverage position was staunchly established by its reservation of rights and denial letters which preceded the declaratory judgment action filing. 

Insurance brokers should remain vigilant when an insurance customer’s claim is denied by the carrier and monitor any related coverage litigation. Doing so can assist in developing procedural defenses to a subsequent professional negligence claim asserted against the insurance professional, as well as substantive grounds for potential causation defenses.  


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers - February 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.