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Chair, Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group

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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Pennsylvania Federal Court Takes a Bite Out of Restaurant’s COVID/Business Interruption Coverage Claims Against Insurance Broker

Presented by the Insurance Agents & Brokers Liability Practice Group

A Pennsylvania federal court recently dismissed claims asserted against an insurance broker for breach of contract and declaratory judgment in connection with a COVID-related business interruption loss in State Street Restaurant Group, Inc. v. The Cincinnati Casualty Co., et al., (M.D. Pa., Civil No. 3:20-CV-816). Marshall Dennehey attorneys Timothy Ventura and Dana Gittleman represented defendants AssuredPartners of New Jersey, LLC d/b/a Kincel & Co. The court granted Kincel’s motion to dismiss, determining that State Street lacked a viable breach of contract claim against our client and that the derivative declaratory judgment claim also failed as a matter of law. 

In its complaint, State Street alleged bad faith against its insurer, Cincinnati Casualty Company, and declaratory judgment and breach of contract against Cincinnati and Kincel, based upon Cincinnati’s denial of State Street’s insurance claim for loss of business income arising from COVID-related shutdown and governmental orders mandating the closure of all non-essential businesses.

State Street alleged that Kincel breached the insurance policy/its coverage obligations under the policy. Yet, the policy itself unequivocally stated that the parties to the insurance policy contract were the plaintiff, as policyholder, and Cincinnati, the insurer—notably, not Kincel—and the plain language of the policy did not impose any duty or coverage obligations upon Kincel. 

In the Magistrate Judge’s opinion, adopted by Judge Mariani, the court concluded that Kincel was not a party to the contract and had not agreed to undertake any responsibilities or liabilities for Cincinnati’s coverage determinations. Kincel merely acted as an agent for a plainly disclosed principal (Cincinnati) and facilitated the contract between the parties thereto.

State Street’s declaratory judgment count sought a declaration that State Street’s COVID-related business losses were insured under the policy and that Kincel was obligated to pay for these losses. Given the inextricable entwinement of the breach of contract and declaratory judgment allegations at issue—and in the absence of a viable breach of contract claim against Kincel—the court dismissed State Street’s declaratory judgment claim against Kincel as well. 

Notably, the complaint contained fact averments regarding purported misrepresentations made by Kincel post-loss regarding claim submission, i.e, indicating to the plaintiff that the business interruption loss likely would not be covered by the insurer because there was no physical property damage, but that they would still submit the claim regardless. However, the plaintiff’s complaint did not assert any tort theories against Kincel for negligence—e.g, failure to procure adequate coverage that would have indemnified for the lost business income due to government-mandated closures due to COVID—or for negligent misrepresentation.

The scope of this decision exceeds pandemic-related litigation and, in fact, blunts plaintiffs’ potential arguments about an insurance broker’s purported breach of an insurance policy to which it is not a party, in concert with recent Pennsylvania federal court opinions. 

Fundamental contract law provides that a party cannot be liable for breach of a contract to which it was not a party. See Electron Energy Corp. v. Short, 597 A.2d 175, 177 (Pa. Super. 1991) (internal citations omitted). Pennsylvania courts have held that an insurance broker who is not a party to the insurance contract (policy) cannot be liable for a breach of that contract. See Kearns v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Conquest v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 247 F. Supp. 618, 640 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017); Wilson v. Hartford Cas. Co., 2020 WL 5820800 at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2020).

While it may seem intuitive to insurance brokers that they are not parties to the insurance policy, affirmative steps may be undertaken to mitigate the risk of a potential breach of contract claim, such as clearly communicating the insurance broker’s role in the insurance transaction; avoiding issuing coverage opinions or analyses, deferring such coverage and claim determinations to the insurer; and submitting their customer’s claims, regardless of the broker’s impression as to coverage.

 

The material in this law alert has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.