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Christian D. Marquis

Portrait of Christian D. Marquis

Christian's practice includes the defense of professionals, public entities, police officers and public officials. He has handled numerous cases defending public entities and public officials in matters involving general negligence and intentional tort claims, land use and zoning issues including municipal statutory appeals, mandamus and inverse condemnation claims, and administrative regulatory issues. He also defends public entities, public officials and police officers in civil rights actions including land use and zoning denials, unlawful use of force, wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and also wrongful termination and discrimination claims.

Christian has significant experience representing architects and engineers, construction contractors, home and code inspectors, real estate agents and other professionals in the defense of professional and general negligence, construction injuries and accidents, construction defect and breach of contract claims. He also defends clients in personal injury, commercial, environmental and toxic tort litigation matters, more recently surrounding fracking related to natural gas drilling. Christian has tried and handled cases in state and federal courts.

In 1995, Christian graduated from St. Vincent College with a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics. In 1996, he graduated from the Pennsylvania State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in chemical engineering.  He then earned his juris doctor from the New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts, in 1999.

    • New England Law | Boston (J.D., 1999)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.S., 1996)
    • Saint Vincent College (B.A., 1995)
    • Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2007
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, "Lawyer of the Year," Pittsburgh, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendant (2019)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2014-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Municipal (2014-2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2005-2006)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • “Taking vs. Tort: Which Is It in Relation to Sanitary Sewer Overflows?,” Defense Digest, March 2021, Vol. 27, No. 2
    • "The First Amendment's Protection Applies To Certain Comments Directed Toward Police Officers," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 4, December, 2007
    • "Nanty-Glo Rule Applies to Preliminary Objections Raising Issues of Fact," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 1, March, 2004
    • After the completion of discovery, successfully obtained settlement of less than $42,000 on behalf of a police department and its officer arising out of a family dispute where seven family members filed Section 1983 civil rights claims alleging malicious and retaliatory prosecution where the initial demand was over $750,000.
    • In a case where a plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights claim based on alleged unlawful excessive use of force where a police canine, upon the command of its controlling officer, grabbed the plaintiff's abdomen, taking him to the ground and resulting in puncture wounds. Obtained a settlement of $20,000 where the plaintiff's demand was $250,000.
    • Currently handling a case on behalf of a roofing contractor where the plaintiff school district is alleging against multiple parties that the roof was improperly constructed, resulting in roof leakage associated damages in excess of $600,000.
    • Currently handling a case on behalf of a civil engineering and surveying firm resulting from an allegedly improperly designed storm water management system associated with a land development plan. Decedent's estate has raised claims against multiple parties that storm water drainage formed ice on a state road, causing decedent's accident.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a municipal authority wherein plaintiffs claimed damages in excess of $75,000 as a result of a landslide that impacted their property allegedly as a result of a defective sanitary sewer line and corresponding trenching.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a township wherein a plaintiff alleged that she sustained various personal injuries as a result of a motor vehicle versus tractor trailer accident that was allegedly caused by a defective traffic signal.
    • Successfully obtained a favorable decision on appeal before the Commonwealth Court in a reported decision on behalf of a borough and its council on the basis of high public official immunity wherein a plaintiff sought damages as a result of being debarred during a public meeting by the council from bidding on public works contracts.
    • Obtained a jury defense verdict on behalf of a township wherein a plaintiff alleged that he sustained a foot fracture after stepping into an uncovered utility trench.
    • Obtained a non-jury defense verdict on behalf of a city wherein a plaintiff alleged that his rental property sustained damages as a result of a sanitary sewer back-up.
    • Obtained a decision in favor of a home inspector after binding arbitration wherein a plaintiff alleged that the inspector was negligent for failing to discover the existence of mold during a home inspection.
    • Obtained a non-jury defense verdict on behalf of a police officer wherein a plaintiff alleged unlawful use of force during the course of an arrest.
    • Successfully negotiated a favorable settlement in the amount of $15,000 on behalf of a township wherein a police officer who demanded $75,000 alleged wrongful termination from the township police department in violation of his equal protection rights.
    • Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall, 877 A.2d 560 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)
    • Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall, 398 F. Supp. 2d 400 (W.D. Pa. 2005)

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained for School District in Slip-and-Fall Case

We secured summary judgment on behalf of a school district in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged he sustained a concussion as a result of a fall from a loading dock when making a delivery to a middle school in the school district. He argued that the loading dock was dangerous due to inappropriate depth, causing boxes on his hand truck to strike a wall, thus pushing him off of the loading dock. The court concluded that, because of the plaintiff’s prior uneventful encounters with the loading dock, the plaintiff was aware of the intricacies of the loading dock. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiff was an experienced delivery driver who, as indicated, was in the best position to perceive whether conditions were dangerous or not, and was, thus, in the best position to take appropriate precautions for his safety. Therefore, the court held that the defendants had no duty to warn or otherwise act to protect the plaintiff.

Successful Appeal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Taking vs. Tort: Which Is It in Relation to Sanitary Sewer Overflows?

March 1, 2021

Key Points: To constitute a taking, purposeful and deliberate action is required. A corrective action plan with the aim of reducing inflow and infiltration in a sanitary sewer system is evidence against the finding of a taking with respect to overflows. The failure to replace piping in an aging sanitary sewer system due to the lack of sufficient public funding does not constitute deliberate and purposeful action. In Matter of Franklin Township Sewage Authority, 233 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), the Commonwealth Court clarified the standard to distinguish whether a landowner damaged by repeated sanitary sewer overflows may claim that his property has been “taken” in the context of an inverse condemnation under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code or whether the landowner is limited to a common law tort claim. Often this issue presents a dilemma to attorneys on both sides of the “v” in determining the legal theory applicable to the prosecution or defense of a case. Given the aging sanitary sewer infrastructure in most urban and suburban areas of Pennsylvania, coupled with the lack of sufficient public funding, this problem frequently presents itself in civil actions when damages are alleged that, if proved, might amount to the full-value level of a “taking,” although a common law tort theory such as negligence has been pleaded. In Franklin Township, the landowner commenced an inverse condemnation action by filing a petition for the appointment of a board of viewers against the Franklin Township Municipal Sanitary Authority (Authority), contending that a de facto taking of his property had resulted from repeated sanitary sewer overflows that occurred in November 2003, August 2007, and October 2012. The Authority filed preliminary objections, asserting that the petition was barred because the landowner’s proper redress was by way of a tort action. After an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, the preliminary objections were sustained, and an appeal to the Commonwealth Court followed. It was agreed that the sanitary sewer overflows onto the landowner’s property were caused by significant rainfalls that resulted in inflow and infiltration into the aging sanitary sewer system, which primarily consisted of terra cotta piping. Because the Authority attempted to reduce inflow and infiltration through a corrective action plan that involved inspections and repairs that did not intend to allow inflow and infiltration into its system, it was determined that the Authority had made a good faith attempt to fix the problem. The evidence also demonstrated that the problem could not have been eliminated unless the Authority had spent approximately $245 million to replace over 245 miles of piping. However, as with most local agencies owning aging infrastructure, the Authority did not have sufficient funding to upgrade its system. The court noted the following standard to prove a de facto taking: (1) [the] condemnor has the power to condemn the land under eminent domain procedures; (2) exceptional circumstances have substantially deprived the [landowner] of the use and enjoyment of the property; and (3) the damages sustained were the immediate, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Franklin Township, 233 A.3d at 1021 (citation omitted). The court also stated that a “de facto taking must result from the governmental body’s actual exercise of the power of eminent domain.” Critical to whether a taking occurs, the court also stated, “[t]he injury complained of [must] [be] a direct result of intentional action by an entity incidental to its exercise of its eminent domain power.” In affirming the trial court, the court in Franklin Township indicated that the facts were more akin to those considered in the Commonwealth Court’s unreported opinion of In re Condemnation by the Youngwood Borough Authority, 2014 WL 10298904 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 5, 2014) rather than those found in the case of In re Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Authority, 166 A.3d 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). The latter case, cited by the landowner, was found to involve a taking, primarily because the authority chose to operate its system in a manner that would result in sanitary sewer overflows due to the design of its system. Therefore, the overflows resulted from a purposeful and deliberate drainage plan. However, the court in Franklin Township essentially adopted the holding in the unreported Youngwood Borough Authority opinion, in essence making it precedential based on similar facts. The original sewer system of the Authority operated as intended when it was first constructed in 1968-69, utilizing terra cotta pipes. Since 2003, the landowner’s property had flooded as a result of inflow from illegally connected downspouts and infiltration due to cracks, breaks and separations that are natural to aging terra cotta pipes. The Authority had not intended to have inflow and infiltration in its system and had a corrective action plan that included a lateral inspection program to identify and repair problems. Furthermore, the Authority had even installed a check valve on the landowner’s property that stopped basement flooding, although sewage still flowed into a retention pond on the property a few times a year. Therefore, the court held that a de facto taking had not occurred because the landowner’s injury had not resulted from a purposeful or deliberate action by the Authority with respect to the manner in which it chose to operate its system. Of particular significance with respect to Pennsylvania’s aging sanitary sewer infrastructure was the court’s consideration of the evidence related to the cost to remediate the Authority’s terra cotta pipe sewage system. The trial court addressed this issue through the landowner’s argument that the Authority’s failure to replace the terra cotta piping was a deliberate and purposeful action amounting to a de facto taking. The court disagreed with the landowner, holding that, because of the lack of adequate funding, the choice to replace the entire system was not even on the table to consider. The choice would only have been available if the funding existed, and, only then, could the court have potentially found that the failure to replace the system was deliberate and purposeful so as to constitute a de facto taking.  *Christian is a shareholder and works in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office. He can be reached at 412.803.1142 or cdmarquis@mdwcg.com. Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.