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Defense Digest

The Hills and Ridges Doctrine: A Property Owner’s Best Friend When Conditions Get Slippery

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021

June 1, 2021

by Christian A. Weimann

Key Points:

  • The “hills and ridges” doctrine imposes a heightened burden on a plaintiff who slips and falls on snow and ice, and it can insulate a property owner from liability altogether.
  • The “hills and ridges” doctrine protects a property owner from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from snow or ice where the property owner has not permitted the snow or ice to unreasonably accumulate in ridges and elevations.
  • Under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, property owners are not obligated to plow, salt or shovel their property until a reasonable time after a snowstorm has ended.

With the arrival of spring and winter in the history books, property owners will be braced for another round of lawsuits alleging slip and falls on snow and ice. In Pennsylvania, however, the “hills and ridges” doctrine imposes a heightened burden on a plaintiff who slips and falls on snow and ice, and it can even insulate a property owner from liability altogether. Biernacki v. Presque Isle Condominiums Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc., 828 A.2d 1114, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Generally, in order for a plaintiff to recover for a fall on a snow- or ice-covered surface, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians; (2) the landowner had either actual or constructive notice of the condition; and (3) it was the dangerous accumulation of snow or ice which caused the plaintiff to fall. Morin v. Traveler’s Rest Motel, Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Pa. Super. 1997).

The “hills and ridges” doctrine protects a property owner from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from snow or ice where the property owner has not permitted the snow or ice to unreasonably accumulate in ridges and elevations. Morin, 704 A.2d at 1087-1088. However, what if a winter storm passes through and drops a considerable amount of snow and ice on a landowner’s property? If a pedestrian slips and falls on that fresh snow and ice, will the property owner be held liable? Under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, a property owner will not be held liable for general slippery conditions when these conditions prevail in the community. Tonik v. Apex, 275 A.2d 296, 298 (Pa. 1971).

Further, under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, property owners are specifically not obligated to plow, salt or shovel their property until a reasonable time after the snowstorm has ended. Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 75 (Pa. Super. 2018). In other words, under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, there is no duty to remove the snow and ice while the snowstorm is still active. Rinaldi v. Levine, 176 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1962). Pennsylvania courts have made clear that there is no absolute duty on property owners to keep their properties completely free of snow and ice at all times. In one instance, the court found it was not reasonable to require a property owner to remove snow and ice from its parking lot by 7:45 a.m., when it had only begun to fall the night before. Biernacki, 828 A.2d at 1117.

What if the property owner, or a snowplow company on behalf of the property owner, plows, salts, shovels or otherwise intervenes to remove snow and ice while the snowstorm is still active? Will the property owner or snowplow company lose the protections afforded under the “hills and ridges” doctrine? No. When a property owner, or a snowplow company on behalf of the property owner, takes steps to remove snow and ice during the course of a snowstorm, the property owner or snowplow company does not lose those protections. Moreover, when there is snowfall immediately prior to a slip and fall on snow and ice, intervention through plowing, salting or shoveling does not bar the application of the “hills and ridges” doctrine. Beck v. Holly Tree Homeowners Ass’n, 689 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2010). Additionally, in the absence of a claim grounded in contract, a snowplow company is protected by the “hills and ridges” doctrine to the same degree as the property owner. Biernacki, 828 A.2d. at 1117.

Lastly, when there is evidence of rain on the date of a slip and fall and temperature change leads to an accumulation of ice, the “hills and ridges” doctrine is triggered even in the absence of snow. Beck v. Holly Tree Homeowners Ass’n, 689 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2010). In one such instance, the court held there would be no liability imposed on the owner of a parking lot which had icy patches in some areas of the lot where other areas of the lot were free of ice. Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 124-125 (Pa. 1983).

*Christian is an associate in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office. He can be reached at 215.575.2737 or caweimann@mdwcg.com

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.