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Defense Digest

The “Innocent Plaintiff” Fair Share Argument Gains Momentum

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Edward J. Tuite

Key Points:

  • The federal court recently addressed the issue of the amount of credit due an underinsured motorist carrier. As part of its analysis, the court, in dicta, referenced a novel argument raised under the Fair Share Act.
  • The good news is that the UIM carrier was entitled to a full credit of all underlying liability coverage irrespective of the Fair Share Act.
  • The bad news is that the court predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will hold, especially in third-party liability cases, that the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act only applies where the plaintiffs’ negligence is in question.

In Anderson v. Motorist Mutual Insurance Company, 2022 WL 2238955 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2022), the plaintiffs sued third-party tortfeasors and settled all of their claims. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a claim for UIM benefits. That carrier denied the claim on the basis that the value of the claim did not exceed the combined $5.1 million liability limits of the various third-party tortfeasors.

In this claim, the plaintiffs’ decedent was an “innocent plaintiff”—a passenger in a motor vehicle accident. The vehicles involved had aggregate policy limits of $5.1 million.

The court noted that the carrier’s UIM endorsement stated that the carrier would only pay the UIM benefits if the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury or coverage policies had been exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements. The carrier contended that it should receive a credit of $5.1 million.

The plaintiffs’ theory in Anderson was a novel one. They attempted to argue that, unless the carrier could prove that one of the defendants’ percentage of fault equaled or exceeded 60%, the carrier should only be entitled to a credit equal to the amount that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to recover from the joint tortfeasors, or $650,000, which was the sum of the amounts actually paid in the settlement. The plaintiffs based their argument on the applicability of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act and its effect upon UIM coverage and joint and severability in Pennsylvania.

The Anderson court found that there is no controlling Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the issue of the enforcement of exhausting clauses related to UIM benefits. However, it did indicate that several Pennsylvania Superior Court cases have held that a UIM carrier was entitled to the full amount of any liability limits that were available from the third-party tortfeasor.

The plaintiffs in Anderson attempted to make the argument that those decisions were no longer applicable due to the passage of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act.

The court in its decision stated that, even if the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act altered the effect of these prior decisions, the plaintiffs’ argument still failed since the decedent’s negligence was not in question. Therefore, the applicability of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act would not apply. It cited other prior Pennsylvania cases which suggest that a plaintiff’s negligence must be at issue in a case for the Fair Share Act to apply.

As a result, this Western District of Pennsylvania Federal case predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases where a plaintiff’s negligence is not at issue and, as such, predicted that the Supreme Court would hold that traditional principles of joint and several liability, which existed before the Fair Share Act, would control .

That is the bad news for carriers. The good news is that the court held that the language of the policy’s exhaustion clause in this case mandated that the UIM carrier was entitled to a credit for the full amount of liability limits available in the underlying third-party case, totaling $5.1 million.

In conclusion, as per Anderson, any insurance carrier in Pennsylvania should evaluate whether or not there is any possible proof of negligence on the part of the plaintiff before it utilizes the Fair Share Act and its protections when evaluating such claims, in third-party liability cases and in UIM claims.

*Ed is a senior counsel in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 610.354.8483 or ejtuite@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.