.

SIU Spotlight

The "Inherent Risk" of Staged Collisions and the Limits of Sentencing Stipulations

May 15, 2026

by Ariel C. Brownstein

In a significant win for law enforcement and the insurance industry, the Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a 48-month sentence for a defendant who orchestrated a sophisticated, multi-year insurance fraud scheme involving staged car wrecks. The court’s ruling in United States v. Brown, No. 25-7026 (Dec. 30, 2025) underscores a powerful legal precedent: the act of staging an automobile collision is inherently dangerous and justifies strong sentencing enhancements, regardless of whether a particular crash resulted in actual injury.

A. Background

Defendant Sebron Dejuan Brown operated a four-year conspiracy involving odometer tampering and staged accidents. The scheme was twofold:

  • Vehicle Value Inflation: Brown replaced or "rolled back" odometers in high-mileage vehicles to artificially inflate their market value.
  • Orchestrated Crashes: He and his co-conspirators then deliberately crashed these vehicles—sometimes involving unsuspecting third parties—to submit fraudulent insurance claims for vehicle repairs and bodily injuries.

While the parties initially stipulated to a lower loss amount and offense level, the district court rejected the stipulated guidelines. Instead, the court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for an offense involving the "conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury" and imposed an 11-month upward variance, resulting in a four-year prison term.

B. The Tenth Circuit’s "Inherent Risk" Ruling

On appeal, Brown argued that the "serious bodily injury" enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A)) was misapplied because there was no evidence that anyone was actually at risk of grave harm during his "controlled" low-speed collisions.

The Tenth Circuit rejected this "semantic and evidentiary over-demand.” The panel held that because cars are "big pieces of machinery traveling at speed," the risk of serious injury is intrinsic in any deliberately caused accident. The court clarified that sentencing judges do not need to quantify the specific degree of risk for each individual collision; the criminal method itself—staging wrecks—is enough to trigger the enhancement.

Takeaways

1. The Power of "Inherent Risk" in Litigation

The most important takeaway for carriers is the judicial recognition that staged accidents are inherently dangerous. Carriers can leverage this "inherent risk" logic in civil litigation—especially in RICO or fraud counterclaims—to emphasize the egregious nature of the claimant’s conduct. By framing staged accidents as acts of reckless endangerment rather than mere paperwork fraud, carriers can more effectively push for punitive measures and deter future schemes.

2. Beware of Sentencing Stipulations

Brown highlights that courts are not bound by the stipulations between prosecutors and defendants regarding loss amounts or offense levels. Carriers, often acting as victims in these cases, should ensure their "actual loss" statements are strongly documented. Even if the parties agree to a lower loss figure for a plea deal, the carrier’s impact statement can lead the court to apply enhancements or adjustments that better reflect the true scope of the harm.

3. Identifying the "Sophisticated Means" Red Flags

Although Brown’s scheme was simple in its execution (crashing cars), the court noted the "repetitive and consistent nature" of the fraud for over four years as a reason for the upward variance. Carriers should look for these patterns early in the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) process:

  • Commonalities in Vehicle Acquisition: Vehicles with high mileage that have recently "lost" significant mileage on their odometers.
  • Recruitment Patterns: Schemes involving five or more participants often share common medical providers or legal representatives.
  • Frequency Limits: Tracking how often the same individual appears as a passenger or "witness" across different claims.

4. Proactive Defense Strategies: Beyond Affirmative Defenses

Carriers should move beyond simple denials of claims. As seen in Brown, the criminal justice system is increasingly willing to treat these cases as serious threats to public safety. In civil court, carriers should consider:

  • Declaratory Judgment Actions: Seeking an early court ruling that no coverage exists due to the fraudulent nature of the incident.
  • Aggressive Counterclaims: Filing counterclaims for fraud or RICO violations rather than just asserting fraud as an affirmative defense. This shifts the burden and signals that the carrier will not settle "low-value" nuisance claims.

Accordingly, United States v. Brown serves as a solid reminder that the "staged accident" is not viewed by the courts as a victimless white-collar crime. By affirming that these schemes pose an inherent risk of death or serious injury, the Tenth Circuit has provided insurance carriers with a potent rhetorical and legal tool to use in the ongoing fight against organized fraud rings.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.