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Defense Digest

Sometimes Discovery Disputes Can Be Interesting

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

March 1, 2023

by Laurianne Falcone

Key Points:

  • The distinction between security video and surveillance video is important.
  • Preservation of all possible video is critical to avoiding spoliation claims.

Discovery issues aren’t usually the most moving and compelling (see what I did there), but a court’s resolution of those issues can be informative. One such discovery issue that is in flux much of the time concerns production of video footage in premises liability cases. Two recent opinions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are worth examining.

In the case of Dietzel v. Costco, et al., 2022 WL 2703612 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2022), the plaintiff claimed that he tripped and fell on an uneven sidewalk as he attempted to enter the tire center at Costco. According to the defendants, the alleged incident was not captured on their video cameras because there were no cameras covering the area in question. However, the plaintiffs noted that the claim notes produced by the defendants in discovery instructed the defendants to save video footage from the closest camera from one hour prior to the alleged incident until one hour after. Thus, the plaintiffs moved to compel production of any and all video footage from the entire property on the day of the alleged incident, regardless of whether that footage depicted the incident.

In her opinion, Magistrate Judge Sitarski noted that the crux of the dispute was whether the footage in question was “security footage,” which was the plaintiffs’ position, or “surveillance footage,” as the defendants contended. Judge Sitarski noted that Pennsylvania courts have held that a defendant does not have to produce surveillance footage until after the plaintiff has been deposed because such footage is made for the purposes of impeachment.

In contrast, the footage in that case was not a surveillance tape, rather, it was a security tape made in the normal course of business operations. Thus, Judge Sitarski ordered the defendants to produce 30 minutes of video footage before the time of the alleged incident and 30 minutes of footage after the incident, for a total of 60 minutes. Alternatively, if the defendants had no such footage, they were required to certify that in writing to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not required to appear for their depositions until after either the footage or the certification was produced.

In the case of Defrehn v. TJX Companies, Inc., 2022 WL 2974717 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2022), the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after she slipped and fell on a clear, gel-like substance inside of a TJ Maxx store on December 16, 2018. On December 31, 2018, the defendants’ insurance carrier requested that the defendants’ loss prevention district manager preserve all video footage from 20 minutes before and after the fall. The manager stated that no video of the incident existed. However, the manager later testified at his deposition that he had “reviewed” the footage but chose not to preserve it because he “didn’t think it was relevant.” In his testimony, he also confirmed that cameras would have captured when an employee removed cleaning supplies from a janitor’s closet.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. The plaintiff argued that the motion should be denied because of the defendants’ failure to preserve the video. District Judge Robreno agreed, stating that the manager testified he reviewed the footage and chose not to preserve it, even though it was relevant in that it would have at least shown when employees removed cleaning supplies from the janitor’s closet. Thus, application of an adverse inference by the court precluded the defendants from prevailing on summary judgment.

What’s the practical application of these decisions?

First, it is critical to ensure that any video footage, even if it doesn’t show the alleged incident, is preserved from the entire location for the entire day of the incident, if possible. Many times we are forced to try to prove a negative, and being able to show that something didn’t happen, or couldn’t have happened, is key.

Second, there should be clear guidelines in place at the facility level as to what steps should be taken in the event of a customer incident in terms of incident reporting and preservation of video footage.

As your defense attorneys, we typically come in to these situations long after the fact. Having solid protocols in place for these events protects your business from spoliation claims and adverse inferences, or worse, and makes our job easier.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.