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Case Law Alerts

No Error in Ordering Repayment for Services Where Reimbursement Was Initially Denied Because CPT Code Billed Was Not Recognized by Medicate Part B or Workers' Compensation Fee Schedules - The Nature of the Service Controls, Not the Billed CPT Code

United Automobile Insurance Company v. Chironex Enterprises, Inc., a/a/o Emily Echegaray, 4th District Case No. 4D21-2307, Nov. 30, 2022

January 1, 2023

The 4th District Court of Appeal affirmed that the trial court correctly ruled that, when determining whether a CPT code is reimbursable under the Florida PIP Statute Section 627.736(5)(a)[1](f), the insurance company must look to the nature of the service as opposed to the individual CPT code in order to determine whether said service is reimbursable. 

In the lower court, the defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the low-level laser therapy that was billed under CPT code S8948 was compensable under the CPT code 97039. The nature of the dispute was due to the fact that S8948 is not reimbursable under the Medicare Fee Schedule, nor is it reimbursable under the Worker’s Compensation Fee Schedule. However, low level therapy itself is reimbursable under the Medicare Fee Schedule. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to reimburse the service under CPT code 97039. 

The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, finding that pursuant to Section 627.736(5) and Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jeffrey Tedder, M.D., P.A., a/a/o Jorge Perez, 111 So. 3d 960, the focus is on whether the services are reimbursable under the Medicare Part B or workers’ compensation fee schedules, not on whether the particular code is reimbursable. 

In its appeal, the defendant argued that S8948 lower laser therapy is not reimbursable under the Medicare Part B or workers’ compensation fee schedules and, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to reimbursement under section 627.736(5)(a)(1)(f). The court analyzed both section 627.736(5)(a)(1)(f) as well as the holding in United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lauderhill Med. Ctr. LLC, No. 4D21-2308 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 9, 2022); United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lauderhill Med. Ctr. LLC, No. 4D21-3336 (Fa. 4th DCA Nov. 9, 2022) and Perez, 111 So. 3d 960. In Lauderhill Medical, No. 4D21-2308, the 4th DCA made the following finding: “The language of section 627.736(5)(a)(2)(f) [now 627.736(5)(a)(1)(f)] is clear that the statute focuses on whether services, supplies, or care is ‘reimbursable under Medicare Part B’ and does not require that CPT codes be recognized by Medicare for reimbursement purposes.” The court used this analysis to conclude that in the instant case, “Focusing solely on the CPT code would be contrary to the dictates of the statute, where the relevant subsection does not even reference CPT Codes” and that laser therapy would be an unlisted modality. The court also found that while S8948 is recognized only by commercial payors, 97039 is a more general CPT code that also encompasses the therapy provided in the instant case. The plaintiff argued that section 627.736 does not require it to convert a specific, non-billable CPT code to a general reimbursable CPT code, but Perez held that insurers “would have to look beyond the CPT code to determine whether the services represented in the code are reimbursable.” Perez, 111 So. 3d at 964. 
 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2032 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.