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Case Law Alerts

Marriage is not enough to establish privity related to collateral estoppel or res judicata.

Johnson v. Jester, No. K21C-03-025 NEP, 2022 WL 102097 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2022)

April 1, 2022

In 2019, a Justice of the Peace Court action was brought by Paulette Pace against Chelsea Jester for property damage to Paulette Pace’s recreational vehicle. The JP Court found there had been a rear-end collision between the vehicle driven by Pace’s husband, Clint Johnson, and the defendant, Chelsea Jester. In the JP action, Mr. Johnson testified he was driving the recreational vehicle titled in Pace’s name and towing a trailer, which was titled in Mr. Johnson’s name. Mr. Johnson testified he heard a noise, just before the accident, of a vehicle swerving immediately before that vehicle (driven by Jester) rear-ended his vehicle. Mr. Johnson testified that after the collision, he spoke with defendant Jester, who told him she lost control because a bag of kitty litter hit her windshield. According to JP Court’s findings, “He acknowledged seeing a bag of flour that had flown out of the window of his vehicle at some point resting on the rear of Defendant Chester’s vehicle.” The JP Court ultimately held that “[a]s Defendant Jester is not at fault for this accident, she cannot be held responsible for any consequent damages to [Pace’s] vehicle.” 

In a subsequent Superior Court action, filed in March 2021, Pace’s husband, Mr. Johnson, filed a personal injury suit against Ms. Jester arising from the same accident. Jester filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was converted to a summary judgment motion. In deciding the motion, the court considered whether the second Superior Court action was barred by res judiciata or collateral estoppel. Jester argued privity existed between Johnson and Paulette Pace in the JP Court action because: (1) they are married; and (2) they had “joint interests” in the property that was the subject of the JP Court trial and, thus, in the outcome of the trial. The Superior Court opinion explained: 

The question before this Court is whether the legal relationship between spouses, paired with one spouse’s testifying in court for the other, establishes privity. The Court recognized that in Delaware, the spousal relationship on its own does not establish privity. While some states have found that joint ownership paired with legal marital status does equate to privity with regard to actions relating to jointly owned real estate…The Delaware Supreme Court has not decided this matter, and more importantly, in this case the damaged recreational vehicle was not jointly owned. Moreover, the JP Court explicitly held that its ruling would only consider the property that was under Pace’s legal title, i.e., the recreational vehicle, and that Plaintiff’s property damage could not be compensable, no matter the ruling.” 

The court found no privity existed and, therefore, denied the defendant’s motion.
 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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