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Defense Digest

Commonwealth Court Affirms Trial Court’s Decision to Determine Jerk and Jolt Burden as a Matter of Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

March 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • The “jerk and jolt doctrine” is a long-standing tenet of Pennsylvania law that protects common carriers from liability involving the normal “jerks” and “jolts” that are expected in the operation of a vehicle.
  • The doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish that the “jerk” or “jolt” or stop of a vehicle was so unusual and extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger’s reasonable anticipation.
  • A trial court may permissibly determine whether a vehicle’s movement satisfies the threshold requirements of the “jerk and jolt doctrine” as a matter of law.  

The “jerk and jolt doctrine” is a long-standing tenet of Pennsylvania law that protects common carriers from liability involving normal “jerks” and “jolts” that would be expected in the operation of a vehicle. The doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish that the jerk or stop of a vehicle was so unusual and extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger’s reasonable anticipation. The validity of the doctrine and, more importantly, the standard through which it is applied was discussed in a recent Commonwealth Court decision.

In Grant v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transport Authority, 2023 WL 352957 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 23, 2023), the Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a transit authority. The court effectively rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court had improperly substituted its judgment for that of the jury.

In Grant, video evidence demonstrated that shortly after the plaintiff had boarded a trolley, the trolley accelerated forward, causing the plaintiff to fall to the floor and allegedly suffer injury. No other passengers fell or claimed injuries as a result of the trolley’s movement. The plaintiff filed suit against the transit authority, SEPTA, claiming that the sudden movement of the trolley constituted negligence.

To succeed in her claim, the plaintiff needed to satisfy the threshold requirements of the jerk and jolt doctrine. That doctrine requires that a plaintiff establish that the movement (aka the jerk and/or jolt) of the vehicle was “so unusual and extraordinary” that it was beyond reasonable anticipation. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff could not meet these requirements and granted summary judgment in favor of SEPTA.

The plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred because the question of whether the trolley’s movement wasunusual and extraordinary” was a question of fact for the jury. The Commonwealth Court disagreed. It reasoned that, when a video recording demonstrates that neither the character nor the nature of a plaintiff’s fall could leave a factfinder with any basis to reasonably infer that the trolley’s movement was so “violent and extraordinary” as to meet the threshold to establish negligence under the jerk and jolt doctrine, a trial court may rightfully decide the issue as a matter of law.

While the court’s opinion is unpublished and non-precedential, Grant is significant in that it reaffirms the fact that trial courts may review video surveillance of an alleged jerk or jolt and decide the issue as a matter of law.  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.