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SIU Spotlight

Auto Glass Litigation in Florida: A Closer Look at Two Landmark Cases

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

By Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud & SIU Practice Group | Florida

Auto glass litigation in Florida has become a significant area of concern for both insurance companies and repair businesses. Disputes between insurers and auto glass repair shops often revolve around billing practices, consumer protection, and the legitimacy of claims. Two recent cases, Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc., No. SC2023-1540 (Fla. Sept. 25, 2024), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al., 8:21-cv-00239-TPB-AEP, have shaped the legal landscape for auto glass repair disputes in the state. 

An analysis of these cases offers insight into the complex relationship between insurance companies, repair shops, and the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (FMVRA) and Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). This article examines both cases and their implications for the auto glass industry in Florida.

Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc.

In Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc., the Florida Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in September 2024 which concluded that an insurance company does not have the right to sue an auto glass repair shop for violating the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (FMVRA). This has resulted in significant implications for the auto glass industry in Florida, particularly regarding the processing and payment of claims by insurance companies.

Background of the Case
The case arose after Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) sued Glassco Inc., a repair shop, alleging it had violated the FMVRA by failing to provide a written estimate for windshield repairs, as required by Florida law. GEICO argued this failure to provide the necessary written estimate made the repair invoice invalid, and the insurer refused to pay for the repairs.

Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling
After five years of litigation, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that GEICO could not sue Glassco under the FMVRA. The court clarified that the statute in question, Section 559.921(1), does not grant an insurance company a cause of action when a repair shop fails to provide a written estimate. Moreover, the court ruled, even if there was an alleged violation of the FMVRA, it did not invalidate a completed repair invoice, meaning the repair shop was still entitled to be paid for services rendered.

Key Takeaways
The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the FMVRA does not provide a private cause of action for insurers to sue repair shops. Insurance companies cannot withhold payment on the grounds that an auto glass repair shop violated the statute by not providing a written estimate or invoice. The decision clarified that insurance claims must be processed and paid according to the contractual terms, regardless of FMVRA violations, unless those violations directly harm the customer. The court’s ruling highlights that the statute’s protections are aimed at consumers, not insurance companies, and insurers do not have the right to enforce these protections in court.

This decision is a critical development for both auto glass repair businesses and insurers. It limits the ability of insurance companies to challenge invoices for minor procedural violations and reinforces the need for clear contractual terms when processing claims. However, the ruling can be altered only through legislative change, which would require action from Florida lawmakers.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al., a federal district court examined whether At Home Auto Glass violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) by unlawfully soliciting business and obtaining insurance payments through improper means. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had paid over $1 million to At Home Auto Glass for windshield repairs and replacements, but the insurer alleged At Home Auto Glass had engaged in unfair practices by obtaining customer assignments and insurance payments through deceptive means.

Background of the Case
State Farm’s lawsuit accused At Home Auto Glass of unlawfully contracting with its insured customers and soliciting business through practices that violated Florida’s consumer protection laws. State Farm argued the glass repair shop had engaged in deceptive actions by obtaining assignments of benefits (AOB) from customers, which allowed them to bill State Farm directly for the cost of windshield repairs. The insurer sought damages and declaratory relief, claiming that At Home Auto Glass’s actions were unfair and deceptive.

Court’s Ruling
The court ultimately ruled against State Farm, stating that At Home Auto Glass had not violated FDUTPA or engaged in unjust enrichment. The court found that there was no evidence to suggest that any customer had been harmed or financially impacted by At Home Auto Glass’s practices. In fact, customers received the services they had been promised, a windshield repair or replacement at no cost to them.

The court also noted there was no evidence showing that At Home Auto Glass had acted unjustly in obtaining payment from State Farm; the insurer had paid for services rendered according to the contracts with its insureds. Furthermore, the court declined to issue a declaratory judgment at the summary judgment stage, stating that such a decision was more appropriately handled by a state court as the case involved Florida state law.

Key Takeaways
This case is significant in that it clarifies how FDUTPA applies to auto glass repair practices in Florida. The court’s ruling underscores that, to prevail in a FDUTPA claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate there was actual harm to consumers. Since there was no evidence of consumer harm, the court dismissed the claims of unfair trade practices. 

The case also emphasizes that, while repair shops like At Home Auto Glass, may benefit from the assignment of benefits system, it does not automatically mean they have acted unlawfully or unfairly, as long as the consumer receives the service they contracted for.

The decision also highlights the importance of having clear evidence of customer harm in cases alleging deceptive trade practices. 

For insurers, this ruling demonstrates that the mere existence of AOB contracts or the use of third-party repair services does not automatically constitute a violation of consumer protection laws.

Conclusion

Both the Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al. cases have set important precedents for auto glass litigation in Florida. These decisions provide clarity on how insurers can challenge auto glass repair invoices and what constitutes unfair or deceptive business practices under Florida law. 

For repair shops, these rulings reinforce the importance of maintaining compliance with state regulations and being transparent with customers about the services provided. 

For insurance companies, the rulings highlight the need to process claims in accordance with contractual obligations and consumer protections, while understanding the limits of their legal standing in disputes with repair businesses.

As the landscape of auto glass litigation in Florida continues to evolve, these cases serve as essential guidelines for both insurers and repair shops, ensuring that the legal framework governing the industry remains clear and equitable. However, as these rulings indicate, any future changes to the laws or litigation practices may come from legislative reforms rather than judicial action. Therefore, stakeholders in Florida’s auto glass repair industry must stay informed about these developments to navigate the complexities of auto glass claims effectively. 



 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

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Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

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