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SIU Spotlight

Auto Glass Litigation in Florida: A Closer Look at Two Landmark Cases

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

By Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud & SIU Practice Group | Florida

Auto glass litigation in Florida has become a significant area of concern for both insurance companies and repair businesses. Disputes between insurers and auto glass repair shops often revolve around billing practices, consumer protection, and the legitimacy of claims. Two recent cases, Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc., No. SC2023-1540 (Fla. Sept. 25, 2024), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al., 8:21-cv-00239-TPB-AEP, have shaped the legal landscape for auto glass repair disputes in the state. 

An analysis of these cases offers insight into the complex relationship between insurance companies, repair shops, and the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (FMVRA) and Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). This article examines both cases and their implications for the auto glass industry in Florida.

Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc.

In Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc., the Florida Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in September 2024 which concluded that an insurance company does not have the right to sue an auto glass repair shop for violating the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (FMVRA). This has resulted in significant implications for the auto glass industry in Florida, particularly regarding the processing and payment of claims by insurance companies.

Background of the Case
The case arose after Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) sued Glassco Inc., a repair shop, alleging it had violated the FMVRA by failing to provide a written estimate for windshield repairs, as required by Florida law. GEICO argued this failure to provide the necessary written estimate made the repair invoice invalid, and the insurer refused to pay for the repairs.

Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling
After five years of litigation, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that GEICO could not sue Glassco under the FMVRA. The court clarified that the statute in question, Section 559.921(1), does not grant an insurance company a cause of action when a repair shop fails to provide a written estimate. Moreover, the court ruled, even if there was an alleged violation of the FMVRA, it did not invalidate a completed repair invoice, meaning the repair shop was still entitled to be paid for services rendered.

Key Takeaways
The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the FMVRA does not provide a private cause of action for insurers to sue repair shops. Insurance companies cannot withhold payment on the grounds that an auto glass repair shop violated the statute by not providing a written estimate or invoice. The decision clarified that insurance claims must be processed and paid according to the contractual terms, regardless of FMVRA violations, unless those violations directly harm the customer. The court’s ruling highlights that the statute’s protections are aimed at consumers, not insurance companies, and insurers do not have the right to enforce these protections in court.

This decision is a critical development for both auto glass repair businesses and insurers. It limits the ability of insurance companies to challenge invoices for minor procedural violations and reinforces the need for clear contractual terms when processing claims. However, the ruling can be altered only through legislative change, which would require action from Florida lawmakers.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al., a federal district court examined whether At Home Auto Glass violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) by unlawfully soliciting business and obtaining insurance payments through improper means. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had paid over $1 million to At Home Auto Glass for windshield repairs and replacements, but the insurer alleged At Home Auto Glass had engaged in unfair practices by obtaining customer assignments and insurance payments through deceptive means.

Background of the Case
State Farm’s lawsuit accused At Home Auto Glass of unlawfully contracting with its insured customers and soliciting business through practices that violated Florida’s consumer protection laws. State Farm argued the glass repair shop had engaged in deceptive actions by obtaining assignments of benefits (AOB) from customers, which allowed them to bill State Farm directly for the cost of windshield repairs. The insurer sought damages and declaratory relief, claiming that At Home Auto Glass’s actions were unfair and deceptive.

Court’s Ruling
The court ultimately ruled against State Farm, stating that At Home Auto Glass had not violated FDUTPA or engaged in unjust enrichment. The court found that there was no evidence to suggest that any customer had been harmed or financially impacted by At Home Auto Glass’s practices. In fact, customers received the services they had been promised, a windshield repair or replacement at no cost to them.

The court also noted there was no evidence showing that At Home Auto Glass had acted unjustly in obtaining payment from State Farm; the insurer had paid for services rendered according to the contracts with its insureds. Furthermore, the court declined to issue a declaratory judgment at the summary judgment stage, stating that such a decision was more appropriately handled by a state court as the case involved Florida state law.

Key Takeaways
This case is significant in that it clarifies how FDUTPA applies to auto glass repair practices in Florida. The court’s ruling underscores that, to prevail in a FDUTPA claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate there was actual harm to consumers. Since there was no evidence of consumer harm, the court dismissed the claims of unfair trade practices. 

The case also emphasizes that, while repair shops like At Home Auto Glass, may benefit from the assignment of benefits system, it does not automatically mean they have acted unlawfully or unfairly, as long as the consumer receives the service they contracted for.

The decision also highlights the importance of having clear evidence of customer harm in cases alleging deceptive trade practices. 

For insurers, this ruling demonstrates that the mere existence of AOB contracts or the use of third-party repair services does not automatically constitute a violation of consumer protection laws.

Conclusion

Both the Gov’t Employees Insurance Co. v. Glassco Inc. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. v. At Home Auto Glass LLC et al. cases have set important precedents for auto glass litigation in Florida. These decisions provide clarity on how insurers can challenge auto glass repair invoices and what constitutes unfair or deceptive business practices under Florida law. 

For repair shops, these rulings reinforce the importance of maintaining compliance with state regulations and being transparent with customers about the services provided. 

For insurance companies, the rulings highlight the need to process claims in accordance with contractual obligations and consumer protections, while understanding the limits of their legal standing in disputes with repair businesses.

As the landscape of auto glass litigation in Florida continues to evolve, these cases serve as essential guidelines for both insurers and repair shops, ensuring that the legal framework governing the industry remains clear and equitable. However, as these rulings indicate, any future changes to the laws or litigation practices may come from legislative reforms rather than judicial action. Therefore, stakeholders in Florida’s auto glass repair industry must stay informed about these developments to navigate the complexities of auto glass claims effectively. 



 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.