.

Defense Digest

A Warning on Wording: Appellate Court Reverses Summary Judgment Ruling for Insurer After Finding Condition Precedent Affirmative Defense Too Narrowly Pled

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Sean P. Greenwalt

Key Points:

  • Florida’s Sixth District Court of Appeal recently examined the pleading requirements for condition precedents as they relate to an examination under oath.
  • The court concluded that an affirmative defense that is narrowly worded may not be extended to a broader definition despite overall non-compliance with a condition precedent.
  • Pleading condition precedent failure requires specificity by a defendant, but, in certain situations, a broader description of condition precedent noncompliance may be warranted. 

In a cautionary tale, the Sixth District Court of Appeal, in Advanced Florida Medical Group, Corp. v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 364 So.3d 1131 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), after finding the underlying affirmative defense insufficient, reversed a final summary judgment in favor of an insurer where a claimant failed to complete an examination under oath. The examination was a mandatory condition precedent to receiving personal injury protection benefits under the insurer’s policy and per § 627.736(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2023).

In the lower court, the insurer obtained summary judgment by arguing the claimant failed to “submit” to a mandatory examination under oath. However, the insurer’s affirmative defense pled that the claimant “failed to appear for an examination under oath.” The trial court entered judgment for the insurer, finding no distinction. The plaintiff appealed. 

On appeal, the Sixth District analyzed the pleading standard for contractual condition precedents, noting that “the burden on the defendant [is] to identify the specific condition that the plaintiff failed to perform[.]” Colon v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 162 So. 3d 195, 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). The court then analyzed the dictionary definitions of the words “submit” (“to yield oneself to the authority or will of another: or permit oneself to be subjected to something”) and “appear” (“to come formally before an authoritative body[.]”)

The Sixth District went on to hold that the defendant’s choice of wording failed to plead its actual defense that the plaintiff failed to “submit” to an examination because a defendant:

[H]as the burden of pleading its affirmative defense with enough specificity and particularity to alert [the Plaintiff] of what condition was violated[.]” Therefore, the insurer “was bound by its pleadings in moving for summary judgment.”

Citing Inphynet Contracting Servs. v. Soria, 77 So. 3d 776, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

However, the irony of the situation is that given the District Court of Appeal’s dictionary references, a claimant who fails to “submit” or “yield oneself to the authority or will of another” would certainly also have failed to “appear” or “come formally before and authoritative body[.]” Had the insurer pled more broadly in this situation, they actually would have met the specificity requirement that the Sixth District had placed before them. 

This opinion is an important reminder that no defense should be left behind when drafting an answer and that all affirmative defenses should be artfully worded to encompass the specificity requirement of condition precedents. 

*Sean is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. He may be reached at 813.989.1814 or spgreenwalt@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.