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Carol A. VanderWoude

Portrait of Carol A. VanderWoude

Carol is a member of the Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group in the Professional Liability Department.  She focuses her practice on drafting concise, forceful briefs and delivering persuasive oral arguments in state and federal trial and appellate courts. Carol handles appeals across a wide range of subject areas which include, among others, products liability, toxic torts, medical malpractice, insurance coverage, civil rights, professional liability and premises liability.  As part of her practice, Carol regularly handles emergency matters which arise throughout the course of litigation and assists trial counsel with development of legal strategies, preparation of pre-trial motions, trial briefs, and post-trial motions. She also performs appellate monitoring of high-exposure trials to assist trial counsel in preserving issues for appeal. This assistance includes handling and arguing legal issues before the trial court so trial counsel can focus on witnesses and the presentation of evidence. 

In addition to her practice, Carol is actively involved in Pennsylvania defense organizations and informing members of the defense bar about notable legal developments. Currently, Carol serves as co-editor of Counterpoint, the well-regarded magazine of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. She has also hosted statewide teleconferences of defense counsel regarding new legal developments.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 2005, Carol worked for five years as a staff attorney for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit where she drafted memoranda of law and opinions on a variety of subjects including civil rights, employment, bankruptcy, immigration, securities and tax law. 

Carol graduated from California State University, San Marcos, magna cum laude, with a Bachelor of Arts in political science. She subsequently attended American University, Washington College of Law, where she obtained her juris doctor, cum laude, in 2001. While attending law school, Carol taught legal research and writing and served as a member of the American University Law Review.

    • Washington College of Law American University (J.D., cum laude, 2001)
    • California State University, San Marcos (B.A., magna cum laude, 1997)
    • Pennsylvania, 2005
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2005
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Loyola University, Philadelphia Alumni Chapter, Board of Directors
    • "Statute of Limitations Stands: Pennsylvania Court Affirms Dismissal of Breach of Contract Claim Against Insurance Broker,"PLUS Blog, March 4, 2025
    • "Equipment Manufacturers Liable for Replacement Parts Under Maritime Law, SCOTUS Says," Legal Updates for Toxic Torts Litigation, March 19, 2019
    • “En Banc PA Superior Court Vacates $14.5 Million Asbestos Verdict and Remands for New Trial,” Legal Updates for Toxic Torts Litigation, January 2015
    • "Addressing Malfunction Theory for First Time in 20 Years: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Clarifies Burden of Proof in Product Liability Case Based Upon Malfunction Theory," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010
    • Obtained reversal of a trial court's order overruling preliminary objections as to venue. The plaintiff filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence for injuries sustained in a car accident. The accident occurred in Lebanon County between the plaintiff's vehicle and a school bus driven by an employee of defendant transportation company. The corporate defendant provided transportation services to school districts in Lebanon and Lancaster Counties, and had no clients in Philadelphia County. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to venue, reasoning the act of transporting students into Philadelphia for approximately two-dozen field trips during the pertinent school year satisfied the quality-quantity venue analysis. The Superior Court disagreed. It was persuaded by the arguments raised on appeal and reversed. The court held that the field trips simply aided in the corporate defendant's main purpose of providing transportation services as directed by its clients located outside Philadelphia County, and that those field trips were not conducted regularly enough to satisfy the quantity portion of the venue analysis. The venue ruling was interlocutory and not appealable, but the Superior Court granted permission to immediately appeal the ruling so the venue issue could be resolved at the outset of the case.

      • Obtained dismissal of clients by Summary Judgment in a Philadelphia premises liability case in which we represented both the landowner and tenant. The plaintiff originally demanded $2 million, later reduced to $800,000. Although our clients were responsible for sidewalk maintenance, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirmed she tripped on a smaller portion of an alleged defect which was larger in other areas of the sidewalk. We successfully argued that this portion was de minimis and not actionable under Pennsylvania law. Despite a comprehensive opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court agreed with our arguments, dismissing all claims against our clients with prejudice.

    Results

    Superior Court Reverses Trial Court Venue Objections

    Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia) obtained reversal of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary objections as to venue. The plaintiff filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence for injuries sustained in a car accident. The accident occurred in Lebanon County between the plaintiff’s vehicle and a school bus driven by an employee of defendant transportation company. The corporate defendant provided transportation services to school districts in Lebanon and Lancaster Counties, and had no clients in Philadelphia County. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to venue, reasoning the act of transporting students into Philadelphia for approximately two-dozen field trips during the pertinent school year satisfied the quality-quantity venue analysis. The Superior Court disagreed. It was persuaded by the arguments raised on appeal and reversed. The court held that the field trips simply aided in the corporate defendant’s main purpose of providing transportation services as directed by its clients located outside Philadelphia County, and that those field trips were not conducted regularly enough to satisfy the quantity portion of the venue analysis. The venue ruling was interlocutory and not appealable, but the Superior Court granted permission to immediately appeal the ruling so the venue issue could be resolved at the outset of the case.

    Summary Judgment Secured in a Case Involving a Trampoline Park Injury

    We obtained summary judgment in a lawsuit arising from an injury suffered at an indoor trampoline park. During the deposition, the plaintiff admitted that there are inherent risks of engaging in trampoline activities, including the risk of being injured. Under the no-duty rule, a defendant owes no duty of care to warn, protect, or insure against risks which are common, frequent, expected and inherent in an activity. In the motion for summary judgment, it was argued that a trampoline park has no duty to protect patrons from the inherent risks of injury when jumping from a trampoline. The court opined that the no-duty rule was implicated and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.

    Thought Leadership

    Firm Highlights

    Thought Leadership

    Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

    In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

    Thought Leadership

    Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

    In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

    Thought Leadership

    WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

    In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.