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Defense Digest

Jane Doe: Navigating Gender Identity and Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Carly P. Edman

Key Points:

  • To proceed anonymously in a court proceeding, a plaintiff must show a reasonable fear of severe harm.
  • Under the principle that open and transparent proceedings are imperative to equitable outcomes, citizens have a right to know who is using their courts and defendants have a right to confront their accusers.
  • With regard to transgender people specifically, courts in the Third Circuit have allowed anonymity due to the private and intimate nature of being transgender as well as the widespread discrimination, harassment and violence faced by these individuals.

The legal profession has not been exempt from the increasingly debated topic of gender identity taking place in the United States. A recent 2021 case involving a transgender individual in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Doe v. Genesis HealthCare, 535 F. Supp. 3d 335, 337 (E.D. Pa. 2021), demonstrates that courts in the Third Circuit recognize the importance of preserving the anonymity of transgender people in order to protect them from scrutiny or threats.

The plaintiff in Doe, a transgender woman, brought discrimination claims on the basis of her sex/gender identity and disability—gender dysphoria—against her former employer. The plaintiff began working as a certified nursing assistant for the defendants in February of 2019. She alleged that during her employment she was repeatedly discriminated against, harassed, and ultimately terminated because of her gender identity. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged her supervisors would misgender her by referring to her with incorrect pronouns and telling patients to do so. The plaintiff sought to proceed in her employment discrimination lawsuit under the pseudonym “Jane Doe.”

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, every pleading must have a caption with the court’s name, a title, file number and Rule 7(a) designation. The names of all parties must be listed in the caption of the complaint. Courts have explained that this level of specificity is necessary because of the long-held principle that “open and transparent proceedings are imperative to equitable outcomes.” However, courts have long recognized that the circumstances of a case, particularly when litigants may suffer extreme distress or danger from their participation in the lawsuit, may justify allowing a party to proceed under a pseudonym.

To proceed anonymously, a plaintiff must show a reasonable fear of severe harm. The courts then apply a balancing test to determine if the plaintiff’s reasonable fear of severe harm outweighs the public’s interest in open litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider. The factors favoring anonymity include:

(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential;

(2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases;

(3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity;

(4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities;

(5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and

(6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.

By contrast, three factors disfavor anonymity:

(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants;

(2) whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigants’ identities, beyond the public’s interest which is normally obtained; and

(3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated.

With regard to transgender people specifically, courts in the Third Circuit have allowed anonymity due to the private and intimate nature of being transgender as well as the widespread discrimination, harassment and violence faced by these individuals. Courts have balanced the need for a public trial with the need for anonymity by requiring plaintiffs to disclose their legal names for the limited purposes of conducting discovery and depositions.

In Doe, the court determined that the plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable fear of severe harm through her allegations of discrimination and significant harassment in her workplace based, in part, on her gender identity. The court opined that by using a pseudonym, the plaintiff also avoided additional threats or future harmful interactions with co-workers based on her transgender status of a kind similar to those that allegedly marked her employment with the defendants. This factor weighed in favor of anonymity because the potential harm to the plaintiff in that situation was that to reveal her identity presented a reasonable and justifiable fear.

Regarding the public interest factor, the plaintiff was not a public figure, which decreased the public’s interest in knowing the plaintiff’s identity. Forcing the plaintiff to reveal her identity risked placing her in danger, and if her identity were to be revealed, the plaintiff stated she would instead choose not to continue pursuing her claim. Because of this, the court determined it was also likely that other similarly situated litigants would be deterred from litigating these types of claims for the same reasons. Ultimately, the court concluded that the threat of verbal and possible physical harm risked deterring a significant number of potential litigants, which would lead to claims being unresolved. The Doe court, therefore, allowed the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym, confirming the recognized importance of protecting transgender individuals from the threats of harmful scrutiny caused by public disclosure. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.