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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

District Court Holds that Average Weekly Wage Should Be Calculated at Time of Last Injurious Exposure in Occupational Injury Cases

Guglielmo v. State of Florida, Fla. 1st DCA, No. 1D2022-3942, July 30, 2025

September 1, 2025

by Blake J. Hood

The First District Court of Appeal reversed a compensation judge’s denial of indemnity benefits to a former employee who developed atrial fibrillation months after resigning from his job. The appellate court emphasized that in occupational disease claims, “time of injury” and “disablement”—not the technical “date of accident”—control the calculation of average weekly wage (AWW). Because the claimant’s last injurious exposure occurred during his employment, the correct AWW was based on his final 13 weeks of wages.

For 23 years the claimant worked as a police officer. He retired and later returned to work with the Department of Corrections. Ultimately, he voluntarily resigned in March of 2021 because of health concerns; complaints of stress due to his job with the Department of Corrections and exhaustion due to the long working hours because of alleged understaffing. The parties agreed that when he resigned, he was making $673.20 per week. 

On July 16, 2021—after his March 2021 resignation—the claimant experienced heart palpitations. He sought medical treatment at the emergency room and was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation. He reported his heart condition to the employer/carrier and asserted an accident date July 16, 2021, the day he experienced cardiac issues. The employer/carrier accepted compensability of the atrial fibrillation and authorized medical care.

In April and June of 2022, the claimant filed petitions for benefits, requesting medical and indemnity benefits and medical care. Pay records revealed that the claimant did not work in the thirteen weeks leading up to July 16, 2021, the claimed date of accident. The employer/carrier argued that no indemnity benefits were due because the claimant’s AWW on the “date of accident” was $0.00, that the claimant “was not an employee” on that day because he was not working for the employer, and that he had no earnings in the thirteen weeks immediately preceding the accident date.

The claimant argued that, because the employer accepted the July 16, 2021, date of accident and atrial fibrillation as compensable, it conceded that he was an “employee” of the employer with an AWW corresponding to that employment.

The judge of compensation claims ultimately denied entitlement to indemnity benefits because he found that the claimant’s AWW was $0.00. The judge reasoned, because there was no “contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident,” there were no “wages.” The judge stated, “[a]s the claimant’s accident date occurred 119 days (17 weeks) after leaving his employment, he was not an employee in the 13 weeks preceding his accident.”

The First District Court of Appeal reversed. It highlighted one of the distinguishing factors of occupational disease claims—”disability.” It also explained the relationship of the terms “disability,” “disablement,” “date of accident” and “injury” for purposes of determining an AWW. 

Under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act, ”’disability’ means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added). The plain language of the definition unambiguously focuses on the wages the employee was receiving at the time of the injury. “Disablement” also determines the “date of accident.” See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident so long as the disease “resulted from the nature of the employment.” Id. (emphasis added). The time of injury means the period or periods of exposure. 

The definition of “disability” deliberately uses the term “injury” and “time of injury” as the critical time focus. It does not use the term “accident.” See § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2021). Furthermore, the definition of “wages” pinpoints those earnings at the “time of injury,” which in occupational disease cases relates to the period of exposure. See § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat. (2021).

The relevant “wages” for purposes of calculation are those paid to the claimant, in this case, for his services at the “time of injury.” And as the parties stipulated, there existed 13 weeks of wages preceding the last injurious exposure—the claimant’s last day of work—which provided an AWW of $673.20.

Thus, in an occupational disease context, the time of injury—when last injurious exposure occurred—is the period of relevant wages. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 9, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.