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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Delaware Superior Court affirms a decision of the Industrial Accident Board that denied the employer’s motion to enforce a commutation.

Randstad Staffing v. Stansbury, 2023 WL 4553878 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 14, 2023)

July 1, 2023

by Benjamin K. Durstein

Ms. Stansbury was injured in a work accident on February 25, 2020. The employer acknowledged a left shoulder injury, but disputed injuries to the cervical and lumbar spines. The claimant retained an attorney and filed a petition for recognition of the alleged cervical spine injury and permanent impairment benefits. According to the claimant’s attorney at the time, Ms. Stansbury agreed to settle her case for $22,000 minus an expert witness reimbursement of $2,000. About a half hour before a deposition of the employer’s medical expert, the claimant told her attorney she did not want to proceed with the settlement. The attorney advised that he would withdraw as counsel if she did not proceed with the settlement. He testified that Ms. Stansbury agreed to settle the case. The claimant testified that she did not agree to move forward with the settlement.

The deposition did not proceed, and two days later, the claimant’s attorney accepted a commutation offer within authority. Ms. Stansbury subsequently saw Dr. Rastogi, who advised she needed surgery for her neck and that it was related to the work accident. When the claimant again raised concerns about the settlement, her attorney withdrew as counsel. 

The surgery was performed. Ms. Stansbury retained a new attorney and informed the employer that she did not want to proceed with the agreement. The employer filed a Motion to Enforce the Written Settlement Agreement. The Board denied the motion and concluded that the global settlement did not appear to be in the claimant’s best interest, as required by Section 2358(a).

The employer appealed the determination and attempted to argue that the “best interest” concept of Section 2358 was vague and that the Board’s authority to “veto” agreements violates freedom of contract. The Superior Court immediately dismissed the freedom of contract argument and advised that the Board’s statutory discretion under the Workers’ Compensation Act clearly permitted it to render decisions on settlements of the parties. The court did not believe there was a legitimate question of law raised by the appeal. The court opined that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that the global agreement was not in the best interest of Ms. Stansbury. Specifically, the court accepted Ms. Stansbury’s testimony about her own “best interest,” emphasized that the settlement did not contemplate compensation for the neck injury, and suggested that she may have been inadequately represented by counsel when the attorney threatened to withdraw representation if she did not proceed with the settlement. The Board’s decision was affirmed.
 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 7, July 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.