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Benjamin K. Durstein

Portrait of Benjamin K. Durstein

As a member of the Workers' Compensation Department, Ben represents employers, insurance carriers and third-party administrators in defense of workers' compensation claims before the Industrial Accident Board and Delaware courts.

Ben earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Delaware in 2007, and went on to receive his juris doctor from Widener University School of Law in 2012.  After law school, he served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable James T. Vaughn, Jr., who was then President Judge of the Delaware Superior Court.

Ben is a member of Delaware Claims Association, Delaware State Bar Association Workers’ Compensation Section and the Randy J. Holland Delaware Workers’ Compensation American Inn of Court.  He is admitted to practice in the State of Delaware.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2012)
    • University of Delaware (B.A., 2007)
    • Delaware, 2013
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Workers’ Compensation Law – Employers (2024-2025)
    • Top Lawyer, Workers' Compensation Employer Defense, Delaware Today Magazine (November 2022)
    • Delaware Claims Association
    • Delaware State Bar Association; member, Workers' Compensation Section
    • Randy J. Holland Delaware Workers’ Compensation American Inn of Court
    • Ethics and the Duty to the Tribunal and Opposing Counsel, panelist, Delaware State Bar Association and the Industrial Accident Board Workers' Compensation Seminar 2023, Wilmington, Delaware, May 2, 2023
    • Strategies to Limit Exposure and Minimize Risk, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2022
    • Do’s and Don’ts in the Practice of Workers Compensation, Delaware State Bar Association William D. Rimmer Workers’ Compensation Seminar 2022, Wilmington, Delaware, May 3, 2022
    • Are You Coming or Going – Do You Know Your Course and Scope?, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 26, 2020

Results

Petition to Terminate Ongoing Receipt of TPD Benefits Granted on Basis that Claimant Voluntarily Removed Himself from the Workforce

The Industrial Accident Board (IAB) granted our petition to terminate the ongoing receipt of temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits on the basis that the claimant had voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The claimant was a correction officer who suffered head injuries in an altercation with an inmate. He was out of work for a time and eventually released to return to work on modified duty. His restrictions were permanent and, because they could not be accommodated by his employer, he was placed on TPD. After more than a year with no indication of an attempt to return to the workforce, we challenged his ongoing entitlement to receive TPD. We worked with the employer to obtain documentation regarding the claimant’s job search (or lack thereof), other sources of income (pension, Social Security) and recreational/social activities since he had been separated from employment. In addition, we put forward both medical and vocational expert testimony at the hearing. As a result, the IAB reasoned that the claimant was able to work in a medium-duty job, that jobs were available within his restrictions, the he had conducted a minimal job search since his work release more than a year and a half earlier, and that his description of his daily activities was consistent with a person content with a retirement lifestyle rather than someone who intended to continue to work. Accordingly, he was no longer entitled to wage replacement benefits.

Petition to Terminate Temporary Partial Disability Benefits Granted

We were successful in having our petition to terminate the ongoing receipt of temporary partial disability benefits granted on the basis that the claimant had voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The Industrial Accident Board reasoned that the claimant was able to work in a medium-duty job, that jobs were available within his restrictions, the he had conducted a minimal job search since his work release more than a year and a half earlier, and that his description of his daily activities was consistent with a person content with a retirement lifestyle rather than someone who intended to continue to work. Accordingly, he was no longer entitled to wage replacement benefits.

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Industrial Accident Board Denies EMT’s Motion to Amend Injury Date, Citing Statute of Limitations and Inexcusable Neglect

July 1, 2025

The Industrial Accident Board dismissed a workers’ compensation claim after determining that the claimant’s attempt to amend the alleged date of injury was both untimely and the result of inexcusable neglect. The claimant initially reported an injury occurring on May 26, 2023, but later acknowledged—well after the two-year statute of limitations had expired—that the incident had actually taken place in March 2023. Arguing that amendment should “relate back” to his original petition, the claimant sought to preserve the claim despite the revised date. However, the Board applied Superior Court Rule 15(c) and found that the amendment failed to arise from the same occurrence and that the delay in correcting the date was unjustifiable. As a result, the motion to amend was denied, and the petition was dismissed as time-barred. The claimant worked as an EMT for the employer. On August 21, 2023, he reported that a few months earlier, on May 26, 2023, he had injured his low back while moving a patient in a stretcher. The claim was denied by the employer due to the late reporting of the event and because there was no evidence to support that a work accident occurred on that day. On December 1, 2024, the claimant filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due that sought acknowledgment of injuries sustained at work on May 26, 2023. On February 23, 2025, the employer inquired as to whether the correct date of loss was asserted because medical records reflected a similar incident on March 20, 2023. On April 8, 2025, the claimant responded that, upon review of his text messages, the accident at work had actually occurred in March 2023, not May 26, 2023. Upon request, the claimant produced screenshots of the text messages and represented to the employer that the correct accident date was actually March 20, 2023, or March 21, 2023—the claimant worked a night shift from the 20th to the 21st. The employer objected to an amendment of the date of loss, now more than two years after the alleged accident. The claimant filed a motion to amend the petition and contended that the amendment should “relate back” to the original filing date of December 13, 2024, which was within the two-year statute of limitations.  The Board determined that the best way to analyze the issue of “relation back” was to apply Superior Court Rule 15(c) because the Workers’ Compensation Act, Administrative Procedure Act and the Board Rules do not contain such a provision. To relate back, Rule 15(c) requires that the amendment “arise out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading.” Additionally, Delaware courts will reject motions to amend when the moving party has shown inexcusable neglect. The Board concluded that the claimant’s proposed amendment failed on both fronts: (1) it did not arise out of the same occurrence as the original pleading and (2) his conduct constituted inexcusable neglect. The Board reasoned that the proposed change of the date of injury by more than two months was not a trivial amendment of a few days or a week. The revised claim occurred on a completely different day and time. Moreover, the Board emphasized that the claimant’s delay in reporting and subsequent failure to correct the date until after the statute of limitations had elapsed resulted in prejudice to the employer and constituted inexcusable neglect. Lastly, the Board held that no provision of the savings statute applied to grant the claimant an additional year to make a timely filing of the petition. The claimant’s motion to amend was denied, and the pending petition was dismissed.    What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Petition to terminate total disability benefits for claimant who had light-duty restrictions that could not be accommodated denied; claimant had reasonable expectation of returning to pre-injury job with same employer when his condition improved.

February 1, 2025

On November 4, 2023, the claimant injured his left knee in a compensable work accident that required surgery to his patella. He had to switch doctors after his first treating surgeon passed away. On March 26, 2024, the claimant was released to return to light-duty work, but with no use of the stairs. He briefly returned to work, but the employer was not able to accommodate those restrictions because his job required using steps connecting multiple levels of the plant.  The claimant was issued a note on June 17, 2024, that removed the stairs restriction. He briefly returned to a modified-duty position with those restrictions, but a few days later, he was taken back out of work with a more restrictive, light-duty note.  On August 5, 2024, the employer filed a petition to terminate total disability benefits on the basis that the claimant was capable of returning to work and there were jobs within his restrictions available.  The parties stipulated that the claimant continued with light-duty restrictions and that jobs identified within a labor market survey were available and within those restrictions. Therefore, the sole issue to determine entitlement to temporary total disability benefits was whether the claimant qualified as a “Hoey displaced worker.” The legal standard was whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of returning to work for the employer.  The Industrial Accident Board concluded he did and confirmed the claimant was informed he would not be able to return to work without a lifting of his restrictions. However, he was also told to keep the employer updated about his medical appointments and any changes in restrictions. He was never separated from employment or told to look for employment elsewhere.  The claimant’s testimony, that he expected to improve with physical therapy and return to his pre-injury job, was found to be credible by the Board. The termination petition was denied.    What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 2, February 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.