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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Superior Court affirms IAB decision enforcing workers’ compensation settlement agreement and rejected claimant’s attorney’s argument of entitlement to common law “attorney’s charging lien” that was not a term of the settlement.

Webb v. State of Delaware, 2024 WL 2077263 (Del. Super. May 9, 2024)

June 1, 2024

by Benjamin K. Durstein

Mr. Webb workers’ compensation claim was denied, and he filed a petition with the Industrial Accident Board that sought acknowledgment of the accident, medical expense benefits and temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Mr. Webb received short term disability (STD) benefits from his employer for the time he missed from work. The STD benefits were provided at no cost to the claimant and wholly funded by the employer through the Insurance Coverage Office (ICO). 

The employer eventually acknowledged the work accident as compensable and agreed to pay medical expenses and TTD of $15,556.00. The settlement offer from the employer specified that the TTD period overlapped with the STD period and that there was a likely offset as the claimant could not receive both. Accordingly, the TTD check was be held in an escrow account until the ICO calculated the recoupment amount owed for the STD benefits that were paid during the TTD period. Additionally, there was no separate attorney fee payable as part of the settlement. The claimant accepted the offer. The TTD check was issued and delivered to the claimant’s attorney, again with the explicit requirement that the funds were subject to offset by the STD benefits paid and should not be disbursed until the correct recoupment amount was determined.

The ICO determined that the STD recoupment owed was $15,486.00—almost equivalent to the TTD payment. Instead of reimbursing the ICO, per the settlement agreement, the claimant’s attorney sent the TTD check back and demanded an “attorney’s lien” on the TTD amount paid for one-third of the total recovery. That was the private contingent fee negotiated between the claimant and his attorney. The employer filed a motion with the IAB to enforce the settlement agreement. The IAB held that the settlement contract was clear. The claimant was to repay the STD recoupment amount once it was determined. No separate attorney fee was included as part of the agreement. The claimant was ordered to issue the check to the ICO. The claimant appealed.

On appeal, the claimant’s attorney contended that the Industrial Accident Board did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and that the workers’ compensation carrier did not have a right to negotiate the STD recoupment. The court held that the Board had authority to adjudicate the ICO’s right to set off its payments against payments awarded by the workers’ compensation carrier and the Board has statutory authority to give effect to agreements between the parties, including provisions not directly related to the compensation itself. Moreover, the court held that the Board’s authority to award attorney fees was limited by statute. The claimant’s attorney’s private contingent fee with Mr. Webb did not create a right to the fee from the ICO. The court would not void and rewrite the agreement. The claimant’s attorney was not entitled to the relief requested and the Industrial Accident Board decision was affirmed. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 6, June 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.