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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Superior Court affirms decision denying claimant’s petition for increased medical bill payments for ketamine infusions under the theory that the Delaware Fee Schedule does not apply and the Board should order payment of “reasonable cost” of treatment.

Taylor v. State of Delaware, N22A-09-007 CLS (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2023)

August 1, 2023

by Benjamin K. Durstein

Ms. Taylor was injured in a compensable work accident on September 16, 2016. The injury later developed into Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) involving her right arm and right leg. She received ketamine infusion treatments for the CRPS that were performed at a surgery center in Pennsylvania. The employer did not contest that the treatment was reasonable, necessary, and causally related and made payments to the surgery center. Ms. Taylor filed a petition in which she alleged that the payments were not sufficient to reimburse such a complicated procedure and not consistent with the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Industrial Accident Board determined that the employer correctly reimbursed the surgery center in accordance with the Delaware Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule (summarized in our October 2022 What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp).

On appeal, the claimant argued that the Board committed legal error when it failed to exercise its jurisdiction over the amount to be paid and determined that the “reasonable cost” provision of 19 Del. C. § 2322(b) did not apply and control reimbursement in this case. The Superior Court first concluded that the Board properly exercised its jurisdiction and correctly noted that a change to fee schedule reimbursement amounts could not be achieved by a Board decision. The court distinguished the Quaile v. National Tire and Battery opinion because, unlike in Quaile, there was no “refusal/denial” of treatment to trigger § 2322(b) in this case. Rather, the employer had accepted the treatment and paid for it correctly, as required by § 2322B(7)b’s provision directed towards reimbursement of out-of-state providers. Accordingly, Ms. Taylor was not forced to seek and pay for medical treatment herself. The Workers’ Compensation Act prohibited the surgery center from seeking payment from Ms. Taylor for charges above those authorized by the health care payment system.

The court held that the “reasonable cost” of the treatment did not apply and there was no legal error by the Board. The Board’s decision was affirmed. The Superior Court’s order is currently on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.
 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 8, August 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.