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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Superior Court affirms decision denying claimant’s motion to strike medical expert testimony regarding medical records produced for the first time after claimant’s medical expert’s deposition.

Trincia v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, 2024 WL 1110401 (Del. Super. Mar. 14, 2024)

April 1, 2024

by Benjamin K. Durstein

Ms. Trincia filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due that alleged she injured her cervical spine and left shoulder in a work accident on September 23, 2020. The claimant’s primary care physician, Dr. Ivins, did not produce medical records in response to a subpoena request by the employer until four days before the hearing, which was after the claimant’s medical expert had testified by deposition. The employer immediately produced the records to the claimant. The next day, the employer’s medical expert testified, including about Dr. Ivins’ records. The claimant filed a motion to strike portions of the employer’s expert’s testimony that referenced these records or, alternatively, to continue the hearing and afford the claimant’s expert to the opportunity to review the records and offer additional testimony.

The Industrial Accident Board denied the claimant’s motion and held that the employer reasonably obtained and timely produced the records. It was not the employer’s fault that the claimant did not have the records. Moreover, the claimant could not be surprised by her own medical records. The IAB conducted the hearing on the claimant’s petition and concluded that she was not credible and failed to meet her evidentiary burden. The Board emphasized that the claimant continued to work her normal hours for two weeks after the accident, never reported the accident during that time, and requested to be placed off the work schedule because she did not feel well, not because of the work injury. Further, the claimant’s initial medical records after the accident did not document a work accident. They were subsequently changed by undated notes from the providers without explanation.

On appeal, the claimant contended that neither party was at fault for the delay in production of Dr. Ivins’ medical records and it was unfair and prejudicial to the claimant to allow the employer’s expert to review and testify regarding the records without affording the claimant’s expert the same opportunity. The claimant was not surprised that the records existed, but she was surprised by the contents of those records. For those reasons, the claimant argued that the Board’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.

The Delaware Superior Court confirmed that the production of the records was a violation of the rule that requires production of pertinent documents 30 days prior to a hearing and that the records were not obtained surreptitiously. The claimant should have been aware of her own medical records. It was up to the claimant, not the employer, to make sure she has the documents necessary for her expert and her case. Additionally, the Board explained its reasons why it did not find the claimant to be credible and denied the petition. The evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion and there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s conclusions. The Board’s decision was affirmed. 


What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 4, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.