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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Delaware Supreme Court affirms IAB decision and rejects employer’s arguments that Superior Court Civil Rule 41(a)(1) and the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred claimant from filing a petition for a recurrence of total disability benefits.

United Parcel Service v. Hawkins, No. 233, 2023, 2024 WL 666726 (Del. Feb. 19, 2024)

March 1, 2024

by Benjamin K. Durstein

The claimant was injured in a work accident on October 28, 2018. On December 9, 2019, he filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due that sought total disability benefits (TTD) and two surgeries, including a spine surgery. The employer filed a petition for review to terminate TTD in response. The claimant withdrew the TTD petition without prejudice. The petition for review was resolved via a settlement of the parties. Per a stipulation of the parties approved by the Industrial Accident Board, the claimant’s TTD was terminated as of February 7, 2020, and he was placed on temporary partial disability benefits (TPD) as of October 17, 2020.

On April 20, 2021, the claimant filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due (DACD) that again sought acknowledgment of two spine surgeries, resulting in periods of total disability beginning on January 10, 2022, and extending beyond the TPD Agreement. Before the hearing, the claimant voluntarily withdrew the petition. The claimant re-filed an identical petition on December 10, 2021. The employer moved to dismiss the petition on multiple bases, including that it was barred by: (1) the doctrine of collateral estoppel, (2) the doctrine of res judicata and (3) Superior Court Civil Rule 41(a)(1)’s “Two Dismissal” rule. 

The Board rejected the employer’s arguments regarding collateral estoppel and res judicata because the issues and claims presented by the DACD were new and different from prior agreements between the parties. Additionally, the Board explained that it is not bound by the Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure. Its own rules and the rules of the Administrative Procedures Act do not include a similar provision; accordingly, it did not regard the petition as dismissed with prejudice. The employer’s motion was denied. The Superior Court agreed with the Board’s conclusions.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the Board is not required to follow the Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure in its proceedings. Whether to rely on or consider court rules is within the Board’s discretion. No provision of the Board’s Rules, the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Administrative Procedures Act indicates otherwise.

Additionally, the court agreed with and expanded on the collateral estoppel rulings below. The court explained that a consent judgment—such as the Board-approved Read-In Order terminating TTD as of February 7, 2020—generally cannot support claims of issue preclusion. Collateral estoppel only applies when the facts have been “actually litigated and determined” in the first case. The stipulation did not clearly manifest the parties’ intention to be bound by the employer’s allegation that the “claimant’s disability had terminated as of February 7, 2020.” Accordingly, collateral estoppel did not bar the claimant from bringing the claim for a recurrence of total disability. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 3, March 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.