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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Delaware Superior Court reverses and remands Industrial Accident Board’s decision involving a Utilization Review appeal because it was unclear whether the Board had correctly applied the relevant Delaware Healthcare Practice Guidelines.

Baxter v. Verizon Communications, C. A., No. N23A-11-001 PAW (Del. Super. July 30, 2024).

August 1, 2024

by Benjamin K. Durstein

Mr. Baxter was injured when he fell from a ladder on May 28, 2019, while working as a fiber optic cable installer. He had multiple injuries, one of which was to the left knee. He had an arthroscopic surgery a few months afterwards, but he continued to experience pain. The doctors believed the ongoing problem was now due to arthritis aggravated by the fall. The claimant tried both cortisone and viscosupplementation injections but was unable to progress beyond light duty. Verizon could not accommodate those restrictions. In 2020, it was recommended that Mr. Baxter have a total knee replacement to provide more lasting relief and, hopefully, return him to work. The claimant decided to move forward with surgery, and it was eventually performed on April 17, 2023. There was no causation defense, so the employer referred the surgery to Utilization Review (UR) where it was determined that it did not comply with the Guidelines. The claimant appealed that UR with a petition to the Industrial Accident Board.

An Industrial Accident Board hearing officer heard the case and denied the petition. The decision stated that the treating surgeon failed to pursue the cortisone injections or physical therapy specifically for osteoarthritis or to explain why those were not tried before resorting to surgery. The doctor did not exhaust conservative care and failed to explain why it was not exhausted. Therefore, the surgery was found not reasonable or necessary. The claimant appealed.

On appeal, the claimant argued that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law by requiring him to exhaust all conservative treatment before undergoing a knee replacement surgery rather than reasonable conservative treatment. The latter statement tracks the language in the Practice Guidelines exactly. The court agreed that the Industrial Accident Board’s decision was unclear as to whether the Guidelines were applied correctly. As part of the statement of the law, the judge added that, “In making its reasonable and necessary determination, the Board must consider whether all reasonable conservative measures have been exhausted as to the claimant's treatment specifically. This standard is undisputed.” 

Additionally, the court reasoned that the Board did not examine this individual claimant’s circumstances. In particular, the Board had failed to discuss whether the claimant’s inability to return to work impacted the reasonableness determination or to address how additional conservative treatments would have helped Mr. Baxter, specifically. The court advised that it was not confident that the hearing officer applied the correct standard of “whether Baxter exhausted all reasonable conservative treatment suitable for him.” Accordingly, the decision was reversed and remanded as the court was unable to conclude whether it was free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 8, August 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.