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Defense Digest

To Proximately Cause or Not Proximately Cause?

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

Key Points: 

  • A negligent actor can be held responsible if the supposed intervening cause is “foreseeable.”
  • Foreseeability is generally within the province of the jury.
  • A chain-reaction accident may be a foreseeable result of a vehicle becoming disabled within a lane of a busy interstate highway.

A negligent act does not always automatically make a party liable in tort. For liability to exist, after the duty and breach are established, the prosecuting party must also always prove causation. And if the alleged breach of a duty did not proximately cause the alleged harm, liability will not attach. This idea is axiomatic in all aspects of tort law, including motor vehicle and transportation law. Defendants are often entitled to summary judgment where the evidence establishes that the proximate cause of an accident was something other than the defendant’s actions, or where there is a superseding and intervening cause that produced the harm. 

However, this idea was not followed in a recent Florida appellate decision. In Serrano v. Dickinson, 2023 WL 3985021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 14, 2023), the plaintiff alleged she was injured when a semi-truck operated by the co-defendant, Luis Serrano, rear-ended a semi-truck that was stopped in traffic, causing a load to fall off of Serrano’s flatbed and onto the plaintiff’s vehicle. The specific sequence of events is key to the analysis. Dickinson struck a median, causing her Jeep to become disabled. The plaintiff stopped her vehicle behind Dickinson. The first semi-truck, seeing this occur, slowed and engaged her hazard lights. Serrano then rear-ends the first semi-truck, causing the incident that allegedly injured the plaintiff.

The District Court justified the decision by finding that, under Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys, Inc., 386 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1980), this chain-reaction accident was a foreseeable result of Dickinson’s vehicle becoming disabled within a lane of a busy interstate highway. Gibson states that a negligent actor can be held responsible if the supposed intervening cause is “foreseeable.” Under this standard, foreseeability is generally within the province of the jury. Dickinson’s arguments—and the trial court’s decision—relied primarily on Department of Transportation v. Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987), because Serrano’s actions—failing to brake until the last second and rear-ending the stopped semi-truck at a speed in excess of 60 miles per hour—were not a reasonably foreseeable result of Dickinson’s vehicle becoming disabled on the turnpike.

In further underlining their rationale, the District Court cited Cooke v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 14 So. 3d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). In Cooke, it was concluded that when an accident had occurred an hour earlier and warning flares were set up, a driver’s failure to see stopped vehicles, warning flares, and avoid an accident did not qualify as an intervening cause. The Cooke court also found that a jury could conclude this was as a “foreseeable” “chain of events” stemming from the original accident. The court’s logic amounted to a finding that a jury is permitted to find that a “typical” traffic accident—however that determination is established—can be a foreseeable result of negligently causing or allowing your vehicle to be disabled on the road or otherwise obstructing traffic in a manner that contributes to a subsequent accident. These standards are ill-defined in the decision. However, the court focuses on “unusual” circumstances, such as in Anglin, where a car became disabled because it drove through a large pool of water and then the accident occurred when a vehicle that turned around to assist the disabled car did so in such a reckless manner as to crash into the disabled vehicle. The court also put great focus on the fact that this obstruction was also on a major interstate highway as opposed to a “rural” road. This leaves open the possibility that if you negligently disable your vehicle on a back road, where vehicles travel at slower speeds, and they should someone crash into your stopped vehicle, this could be a superseding and intervening cause as a matter of law.

The Serrano holding appears to establish that motorists who “see what there is to be seen” and avoid accidents will not be held to be the sole proximate cause in a chain-reaction accident, if the totality of events are considered foreseeable. This begs the question of what someone who is involved in an accident can do if their attempts to alert other motorists, such as by setting up road flares and otherwise making the lane obstruction inarguably conspicuous, do not serve as absolute defenses to the negligence of another party?

*Steven is a shareholder in our Westchester County, New York, office. He can be reached at 914.977.7330 or SBSaal@mdwcg.com.

 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.