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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Workers’ Compensation Decision Clarifies that Out‑of‑State Family Visits Don’t Meet Medical Necessity Standard

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 6, June 2026

June 8, 2026

by Blake J. Hood

Purple Pride, Inc. v. Burgess, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D479 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 18, 2026), reh'g denied (Mar. 31, 2026)

The claimant suffered a work-related motor vehicle accident in 2019 that caused him to become tetraplegic (or quadriplegic), requiring around-the-clock attendant care. In 2024, the claimant filed a petition for benefits, requesting certain attendant care benefits he felt were necessary to allow him to take a trip to visit family in New York. The benefits he sought included the extra cost of traveling attendants, including their overtime pay and accommodations, and the extra cost of renting a Hoyer lift, commode chair, and other durable medical equipment (DME) needed for the trip. The employer/carrier denied the request as not being medically necessary.

The claimant obtained an opinion from the treating psychotherapist that a visit to see family in New York would improve claimant's mental health. The psychotherapist opined that the trip was “medically necessary” in the sense that it could improve claimant's symptoms related to depression and anxiety.

The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejected the claimant’s position that the trip to New York itself was medically necessary under the definition of medical necessity in § 440.13(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2024). However, the JCC found that the employer/carrier should nonetheless be required to pay for the additional costs the claimant would incur to travel with the attendants and DMEs. In the JCC's view, the employer/carrier should cover those costs anywhere, pursuant to “the maxim that industry is responsible for what industry causes.”

The First District Court of Appeal set aside the JCC’s order and held that because the JCC concluded that the claimant's trip to New York was not medically necessary, it was error to require the employer/carrier to pay for the additional medical benefits he sought for the trip.  The court explained that “transportation other than to a doctor” reflects on quality of life rather than medical necessity and is “generally considered gratuitous and not compensable.” Therefore, the JCC’s order was set aside.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.