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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 5, May 2026

May 1, 2026

RESULTS*

Tony Natale (King of Prussia) successfully obtained a full defense verdict in a workers’ compensation matter in Philadelphia. The claimant sustained a work-related abdominal hernia while working for the employer dismantling a stage. Five months later, while undergoing physical therapy, he alleged new injuries to his neck and back related to the PT. He filed a review/claim petition, where claimant testimony and orthopedic experts from both sides were presented. On cross-examination of the claimant, he admitted that no pain was felt during therapy to his neck or back, he did not remember injuring his neck or back during therapy, and did not experience any neck and back pain until later in the evening. The court ruled that there was no evidence of any neck or back injury, denying and dismissing the petition.

Tony Natale (King of Prussia) had a claim petition dismissed before the Venango County, PA Workers’ Compensation Bureau. The claimant alleged a stretching injury to his lower back while working on a circuit board for an electronics company, claiming he was debilitated to the point that he could not walk. During a crucial cross-examination, the claimant’s orthopedic surgeon admitted that he had the wrong date of injury, the wrong mechanism of injury, and the diagnostic MRI and EMG refuted every work-related diagnosis in his chart. The court returned a complete defense verdict, denying and dismissing the claim petition.

Tony Natale (King of Prussia) successfully had a workers’ compensation claim petition denied and dismissed. The claimant filed a claim petition alleging a foot injury with specific loss while working with a mushroom dispensary. The petition was filed within days of the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. The claimant failed to provide discovery, appear for an independent medical exam, or appear for a defense scheduled deposition. During the hearing, an explosive oral argument was made in support of a motion to dismiss the claim. The claimant’s attorney argued that the “humanitarian nature” of the Act allowed the case to move forward. A resounding rattling of Supreme Court case law put that argument to rest. The claim petition was dismissed and a full defense verdict was awarded, despite the humanitarian nature of the Act.

Andrew Maffett (Harrisburg) successfully had a claim petition dismissed in a workers’ compensation matter, awarding $0.00 in benefits to the claimant. The claimant filed a petition, alleging a work injury on April 15, 2025. We filed a motion to dismiss, which the judge granted, concluding that an employee/employer relationship was not established after February 20, 2025, because the claimant unilaterally misrepresented her identity to obtain continued employment.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia) and Alana Staniszewski (Pittsburgh) successfully had a termination petition granted in a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation case. The claimant suffered a minor head injury, with some features consistent with a minor concussion. The claimant was a Marine who served in the Iraq war from 2003 to 2005, during which he suffered a head injury. Additionally, the claimant had a history of headaches and psychogenic non-epileptic seizures dating back to his childhood. We secured the pre-existing medical records, which supported the significant pre-existing history leading up to the minor head injury. We presented a Board-certified neurologist who testified that there was no evidence of any ongoing neurological deficits based on a review of medical records and diagnostic film studies. Additionally, surveillance evidence covering multiple months demonstrated the claimant being active and unimpaired. The judge found that the claimant’s pre-existing conditions accounted for his ongoing complaints. This decision will result in a substantial recoupment of payments of indemnity benefits and medical paid throughout the course of the litigation via Supersedeas Fund recovery.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome


NEWS

A. Judd Woytek, Shareholder in the Workers’ Compensation Department in Marshall Dennehey’s King of Prussia office, has been named a Fellow of the College of Workers’ Compensation Lawyers. He was inducted into the College at a celebratory event held at the Loews Ventana Canyon Resort in Tucson, Arizona on April 18, 2026.

The College was established to honor attorneys who have distinguished themselves in the practice of workers' compensation law. Woytek is among a select group of attorneys in Pennsylvania, and across the country, who have earned this prestigious honor.

“Judd has long been a pillar of excellence in our department,” said Michele R. Punturi, Director of Marshall Dennehey’s Workers’ Compensation Department. “His induction into the College of Workers’ Compensation Lawyers is a well‑earned recognition of his integrity, skill, and commitment to our clients in the Lehigh Valley and beyond. We are proud of his efforts and celebrate this milestone with him.”

Woytek has dedicated his 30-year career to defending employers and litigating workers’ compensation cases across eastern Pennsylvania. He is named among the Best Lawyers in America® for Workers’ Compensation Law, and was recognized by The Morning Call in 2025 as one of the Top Lawyers of the Lehigh Valley for Workers' Compensation. He is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Committee of the Bar Association of Lehigh County, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and the Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM).

A graduate of Ursinus College, Woytek received his juris doctor from Widener University School of Law. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.