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With more than 25 years of legal experience, Judd has secured successful results for clients in Northampton, Lehigh, Berks, Schuylkill, Monroe and Carbon counties including school districts, intermediate units, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, large retailers, manufacturers, construction companies, and various other employers. He has also defended coal mine operations throughout the eastern part of Pennsylvania in Federal Black Lung claims. A native of Allentown, Judd has spent his legal career defending clients in the Lehigh Valley region against workers' compensation claims.

Judd has significant experience litigating cases before Workers’ Compensation Judges throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. He has successfully defeated numerous claim petitions by presenting medical and factual evidence showing that the claimants did not sustain work-related injuries and/or corresponding disabilities. Judd utilizes innovative legal strategies and develops unique solutions to help clients achieve their litigation goals. He places a high value on communication and works closely with each client from case inception to completion.

Judd is also skilled in counseling clients on effective management of workers' compensation plans and development and implementation of innovative return-to-work programs. He also provides risk management services, which can help reduce litigation costs.

In 2026, Judd was inducted into the College of Workers' Compensation Lawyers, joining a select group of attorneys from across the country who have distinguished themselves in the practice of workers' compensation law.

Judd is a graduate of Ursinus College in Collegeville, Pennsylvania. He received his juris doctor in from Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware, graduating cum laude. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 1995)
    • Ursinus College (B.A., 1992)
    • Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Workers’ Compensation Law - Employers (2025-2027)
    • Top Lawyers of the Lehigh Valley, Workers' Compensation (2025)
    • Bar Association of Lehigh County, Workers' Compensation Committee
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance
    • College of Workers' Compensation Lawyers
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Older, Wiser, But Costlier to Heal: What an Aging Workforce Means for Employers and for the Industry, National Comp, Las Vegas, NV, September 29, 2026
    • We See You: How Employee Engagement Enhances Work Comp Outcomes, CLM Work Comp Conference, Nashville, TN, May 20, 2026
    • A State-By-State Guide to Avoiding Attorneys' Fees and Sanctions, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2022
    • Civil Litigation Updates in COVID-19 Litigation – Where Do We Stand One Year Later?, Marshall Dennehey Webinar, May 2021
    • IREs and WC Case Law Update, client webinar, May 19, 2021
    • Are You Coming or Going – Do You Know Your Course and Scope?, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 26, 2020
    • Mitigating the Risk of Workplace Bullying, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 24, 2019
    • Return to Work: Perfecting Job Offers and the Revival of the Labor Market Survey, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 18 and 25, 2018
    • Ingredients for Successfully Defending Claims for Work Injuries at Home, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Course and Scope, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminars, October 19 and 27, 2016
    • Cover Your Bases: A WCAIS Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 22, 2015
    • The Basics of WCAIS, client seminar, Parsippany, New Jersey, November 21, 2014
    • Social Media Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, November 6, 2014
    • Workers' Compensation: What's the Best Case, The Seltzer Group Workers' Compensation Seminar, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 6, 2012
    • How To Control Your Claim, The Seltzer Group Workers' Compensation Seminar, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 7, 2011
    • Workers' Compensation Hearings: Techniques & Strategies for Success, National Business Institute, Allentown, Pennsylvania, October 22, 2008 
    • Advanced Workers' Compensation in Pennsylvania, National Business Institute, Allentown, Pennsylvania, 2003, 2004 (speaker and course planner) 
    • Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Law Seminar, Top 20 Cases of 2001 & 2002, Professional Education Systems Institute, Pittsburgh, 2002 
    • Workers' Compensation Update Lecture, Institute of Management Accountants, Lehigh Valley Chapter, Holiday Inn Bethlehem, 1998 
    • "Goodbye 'Yellow Freight' Road?," The Legal Intelligencer, November 15, 2024
    • “Protz – One Year Later,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • "It "Payes" to Be Abnormal - Is The Law Really Changing for Mental/Mental Claims in PA Workers’ Comp?," Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • "That 70's Show: Obamacare Takes Federal Black Lung Claims Back in Time," Carrier Management, December 2013 and Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Successfully defended against a Petition for Joinder of Additional Defendant that sought to place liability on our client as a statutory employer under the Act.  The judge found that the original defendants had failed to join the proper party, had failed to prove that our client was a statutory employer, and had failed to prove facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Our client was dismissed from the claim.
    • Defeated a claim where the claimant was alleging that his degenerative disc disease in his cervical and lumbar spine was caused by his years of employment as a lineman for a cable services company. 
    • Prevailed in several cases for a meat packing company by proving that the claimants' alleged repetitive stress injuries to the upper extremities (shoulder injuries, carpal tunnel, etc.) were not caused by their employment. 
    • Successfully defended numerous federal black lung claims filed by miners, even when the miner was able to prove an extensive coal mine employment history and significant exposure to coal dust, and widows' claims when the miners had been awarded lifetime benefits, but the widows were unable to prove that coal workers' pneumoconiosis caused or significantly contributed to the miners' death.
    • Successfully defended a claim in which claimant was seriously injured in an automobile accident on her way to work by convincing the judge and Appeal Board that the facts of the case did not meet the criteria for exclusion from the coming and going rule. 
    • Successfully defended multiple claims where claimant was working under restrictions but was fired by the employer. Successfully argued to several Workers' Compensation Judges that the claimant was fired for cause and for reasons unrelated to the work injury and that benefits should not be awarded or reinstated.

Results

Successfully Represented an Insurance Company in a Workers’ Compensation Appellate Matter

We successfully represented an insurance company before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court agreed with our argument that the claimant needed to provide notice of his work-related injury to the defendant insurance company within 120 days of the occurrence of the injury due to his combined status as sole proprietor/owner and also the employee in this matter. The judges distinguished the facts of the case due to the fact that the claimant was a sole proprietor, owner and the only employee of his own business. The court agreed that allowing the claimant to pursue a claim, by claiming that he provided notice to himself immediately when the accident occurred, but did not bother to report the injury to the insurance company for over a year thereafter, would result in an absurdity and put the insurance company at a disadvantage in the investigation of the claim. The court also noted that the definition of “employer” in certain portions of the Act includes not only the actual employer as a business itself, but also the employer’s duly authorized agent or its insurer, if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability. Since the claimant failed to provide notice to the insurance company within 120 days of his injury, the court held that the Claim Petition was barred. The Claim Petition was dismissed, and the claimant was not entitled to any benefits at all.

Establishing Failure to Well-Plead Secures a Win for the Defense

In our successful appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the workers’ compensation judge had awarded a closed period of benefits and then terminated all benefits, despite the employer’s late answer. The judge found that the description of injury was not well-pled and, therefore, not deemed admitted. The Appeal Board reversed the judge on the full termination of benefits, saying that, since our IME physician did not acknowledge a work-related psychiatric injury, his testimony was in conflict with the admitted injury due to the late answer. They reversed the judge and ordered reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits. The Commonwealth Court found in our favor and reversed. The court held that the judge was correct that the injury was not well-pled and that we were not deemed to have admitted a psychiatric injury. Therefore, they reinstated the judge’s decision which terminated benefits.

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers' Compensation Payment Authorization Form

January 14, 2025

On October 29, 2024, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro signed into law Senate Bill 1232, which amended the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act to require that employers and insurers offer claimants the option to receive their workers’ compensation wage loss payments by direct deposit. The Direct Deposit law took effect December 28, 2024. Pursuant to the law, direct deposit must be offered to all claimants as an option for payment of indemnity benefits on or before December 28, 2025.  Employers and carriers can start offering direct deposit immediately. The Bureau recently issued a form (LIBC-215) that employers and carriers can send to claimants to authorize direct deposit. A copy of the form can be found at this link:  Payment Authorization Form LIBC-215  Please note that claimants are not required to use direct deposit, but the law requires that it be offered as an option. Please contact any of our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation attorneys if you have any questions regarding this new requirement.    What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp – Special PA Alert – January 14, 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Goodbye ‘Yellow Freight’ Road?

November 15, 2024

Pursuant to Yellow Freight System v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Madara), 423 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), an employer’s answer to a claim petition that is filed more than 20 days after the assignment of the claim petition to a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) is deemed to be a “late answer” and the employer is deemed to have admitted all well pleaded facts alleged in the claim petition. While not a complete default judgment, the granting of a Yellow Freight motion by a WCJ will often mean that a claim is found compensable and benefits are payable with the burden of proof shifting to the employer to prove that benefits should be modified, suspended or terminated.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.