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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2024

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    Commonwealth Court holds that an employer’s failure to reimburse a claimant for out-of-pocket payments for CBD oil is in violation of the Act.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, Pa. C. (WCAB), 305 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The employer violated the Act for failing to reimburse the pro-se claimant for out-of-pocket expenses used to purchase CBD oil for treatment of his low back injury. The workers’ compensation judge properly found that CBD oil is a medical supply the employer was obligated to pay for under the Act, that the claimant properly submitted receipts to the employer for reimbursement and that the employer did not pay for medical treatment as obligated to under the Act. In April, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the employer’s appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision. The court will consider the issues of whether CBD oil and other products that may be purchased without a prescription from a health care provider are “medical services” and/or “medicines and supplies” under Section 306 (f.1) of the Act, whether the cost containment regulations of the Act apply to CBD oil, and whether Section 306(f.1) of the Act requires direct reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for “medical services” and “medicines and supplies.” If so, are claimants required to submit supporting documentation (medical records, prescriptions, HCFAs) for reimbursement?

2.    Commonwealth Court holds that the claimant, a truck driver, was not subjected to abnormal working conditions from a minor truck fire which was extinguished in two minutes and without physical injury occurring to anyone.
Premium Transportation Staffing, Inc. v. Welker (WCAB), 305 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The claimant was trained to anticipate and respond to fires, had a fire extinguisher on the truck, was not trapped in the cab during the fire, and was able to leave the cab and retreat safely. The fire also lasted two to three minutes and was put out with assistance from another driver.

3.    Although a claimant may not have been at work with a concurrent employer on the date of a work injury with another employer, her relationship with the concurrent employer was sufficiently intact; thus, concurrent wages must be included in calculating her average weekly wage.
Resources for Human Development, Inc. and Gallagher Bassett Services v. Sherry Dixon (WCAB), 306 A.3d 1019 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The claimant’s concurrent employment was sufficiently intact at the time of the work injury because she continued to work as a home health aide for the concurrent employer after her injury with the employer, as well as after her last day of employment with the employer. 

4.    Injuries sustained by a claimant while commuting are not compensable under the Act as the claimant was not a traveling employee with no fixed place of work.
Jorge Martinez v. Lewis Tree Service (WCAB), 310 A.3d 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

The claimant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while commuting home from his work as a tree trimmer, was not a traveling employee without a fixed place of employment for purposes of an exception to the “coming and going” rule. The claimant drove his personal vehicle to and from his home, his workday started at the employer’s yard where their trucks were parked, he drove the trucks to job sites and returned to the yard at the end of the workday. Additionally, the claimant was not reimbursed for travel expenses, did not store equipment at his home and was not furthering the employer’s business while commuting home in his personal vehicle. A change of work location during the day, or from day to day, does not make a claimant a traveling employee. 

5.    The Bureau is directed to identify and publish in the Pennsylvania Bulletin a different, nationally recognized schedule for valuing pharmaceuticals.
Federated Insurance Company v. Summit Pharmacy (Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office), 308 A.3d 329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

The use of a private publisher’s schedule of pharmaceutical prices in determining average wholesale prices (AWP) to resolve payment disputes for pharmaceuticals was found inconsistent with AWP as used in the Act governing prescription reimbursement in worker’s compensation cases. Furthermore, reliance on private schedule values of AWP to calculate the amount the insurer is to reimburse a pharmacy was inappropriate. 

6.    Exclusion of counsel fees from payment of future medical benefits on the basis that claimant’s future medical expenses are speculative was contrary to Section 306(f.1)(7) of the Act, which prohibits providers from billing a claimant for any costs relating to care under the Act.
Patrice Williams v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB), 312 A.3d 976 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Although the claimant’s future medical expenses were undetermined, such that the amount of counsel fees based on medical expenses could not yet be determined, there was no requirement that the fee agreement could only apply to past or fixed medical expenses. Moreover, the Act’s prohibition on a medical provider billing a claimant for any costs related to medical care for a compensable injury applies to amounts deducted from the medical provider’s bills for counsel fees. 

7.    Under Section 440 of the Act, an unreasonable contest will always result in an award of attorney’s fees and a reasonable contest may result in an attorney’s fee award.
Glenny Torres v. Amazon.com Services LLC (WCAB), 313 A.3d 486 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

An award of attorney’s fees is mandatory when a workers’ compensation judge resolves a contest in favor of the claimant and finds the basis of the employer’s contest was unreasonable. An employer is not automatically absolved from exposure to attorney’s fees whenever its contest is deemed reasonable in a workers’ compensation matter; instead, a workers’ compensation judge has discretion to either award or exclude attorney’s fees if the workers’ compensation judge determines the contest is reasonable.

8.    A pharmacy staffed by a pharmacist supplied by an employee leasing agency is a provider as defined by Section 109 of the Act. When a physician has ownership interest in said pharmacy, a referral to the pharmacy violates the Act’s self-referral prohibition.
700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office & SWIF, 315 A.3d 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Drugs and pharmaceutical services fall within “goods and services” as governed by the anti-referral provision of the Act. Thus, Fee Review applications associated with prescriptions filled for a claimant initiated by a pharmacist were properly denied for originating from a prohibited self-referral. The pharmacy did not dispute that the prescribing physician had a financial interest in the pharmacy.

9.    Commonwealth Court holds that a claimant who was the sole proprietor is required to provide notice of a work-related injury to the workers’ compensation insurance carrier within 120 days of occurrence of the injury. 
Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. David Heater (WCAB), 316 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Where a claimant is both the injured employee and the sole proprietor/employer, the “employer” to whom the claimant must notify of a work-related injury under the Act is the insurer that bears the ultimate liability for the claim. This allows the insurer to ensure that the prompt and complete investigation into the claimed injury, which would normally be performed by a disinterested employer, can be performed to protect against stale claims. Failure of the sole proprietor/claimant to give notice to his workers’ compensation insurer within 21 days of his injury, as required, precluded his Claim Petition. On December 17, 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the claimant’s appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision. They will consider the issue of whether the 21-day notice requirement of Section 311 of the Act is satisfied when the claimant gives notice solely to the employer.

10.    Acts 121 and Act 126 signed into law by Governor Shapiro.

On October 30, 2024, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro signed into law two significant workers’ compensation bills that were recently passed by the State Legislature. Act 126 establishes direct deposit for the payment of wage benefits to claimants. Act 121 relates to first responders and post-traumatic stress injuries (PTSI). First responder claimants will no longer have to prove that a psychiatric injury was caused by abnormal working conditions. The law applies to specified categories of public employees, stipulates that PTSI must result from an individual undergoing a qualifying traumatic event and limits benefits to 104 weeks. A diagnosis to be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist is required, and claims must be filed within three years of a diagnosis. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.